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Elixir or Opiate?
An Assessment of Minor Irrigation Policies in North Bengal
Executive Summary
Introduction
This study was commissioned by North Bengal Terai Development Project (NBTDP) and was
supported by the IDE-Ford Foundation-sponsored Irrigation against Rural Poverty Research
Program. Its aim is to analyze North Bengal’s minor irrigation (MI) policy. This report does this
using a broad social policy framework and participatory field research; however, besides doing
this, we also explore a range of politico-economic issues that have shaped the formulation and
implementation of MI policy in the North Bengal region. After 30 years of evidence showing how
infallibly the Green Revolution has chased tube well revolution West to East in the North Indian
plains, the coexistence of massive groundwater resources and dense rural poverty in North Bengal
remains something of an enigma. And that makes the NBTDP both interesting and significant as a
strategic intervention, since it has zeroed in on MI development as the centerpiece of its
agricultural development programing strategy.
Despite its underdevelopment, North Bengal brims with a variety of irrigation technologies,
traditional and modern, muscle-powered and machine-driven, small and large. There are
traditionally manually operated dhenkul and taar-balti systems; there are modern and manual—
hand pump tube wells (HTWs) and treadle pumps (TPs); diesel pumps are used by farmers to
pump water from ponds, bamboo tube wells, streams and rivers; and unlined field channels and
over-ground poly-pipes are used as water transmission systems. Over five decades, government
and donor agencies have created Deep Tube wells (DTWs), Medium Duty Tube Wells
(MDTWs), Shallow Tube Wells (STWs), and Pump Dug-Wells (PDWs)—and all these with or
without underground cement or PVC pipeline networks with spouts for water transmission; they
have also built major and mini River Lift Irrigation (RLIs) systems; and local agencies have
simplified some of these technologies further to cut costs and make their operation and
maintenance (O&M) easier. This variety of technologies has spawned a diversity of institutional
forms. Major RLIs and DTWs are controlled and managed by government agencies; smaller
systems are managed either by Panchayat Samities through committees or turned over to BCs.
Then, in many areas, there are booming pump irrigation markets. And most Gram Panchayats
stock diesel pumps for renting out to farmers.2
The NBTDP
The NBTDP-support has extended to several of these technologies. Until it discontinued its
support to them recently, the Project provided 100 percent subsidy on capital costs to major RLIs
and DTWs, which also get over 70 percent subsidy on O&M costs from state governments. In its
Phase III, the NBTDP offers 100 percent capital cost subsidy to mini RLIs (and MDTWs, but
none of these has been planned yet), 75 percent capital cost subsidy to STW and PDW clusters,
90 percent subsidy on HTWs (which are targeted to resource poor women as an irrigation-cum-
drinking water support system), and zero direct subsidy on treadle pumps.
We deal with three distinct sets of questions regarding the subsidy policy under the NBTDP:
first, about the rationale for MI subsidies in North Bengal; second, about whether the NBTDP’s
current subsidy policy achieves the Project’s MI objectives in an efficient, sustainable and
livelihood-intensive manner; and third, if there is scope for modifying the current policies for better
impact. Towards the end, we also explore what should ideally be the objective of MI policy in
North Bengal’s socioeconomic and aquatic conditions and how it might be achieved.
Are MI Subsidies Justified in North Bengal?
Given that subsidies will continue to be extensively used in North Bengal and elsewhere in the
country to spur development and promote smallholder livelihoods, the use of MI subsidies in North
Bengal is justified on several grounds: a) Environmental: stimulating groundwater withdrawal in a
judicious manner can create a positive externality in many parts of the region by reducing
waterlogging and flood-proneness in low-lying areas; b) Development: MI development can give
a kick-start to the region’s Green Revolution, which rural North Bengal needs badly; c) Rural
poverty and capital scarcity: left to itself, the region will take a long time before its Green
Revolution takes off because the primary constraint on expansion of groundwater irrigation is its
pump capital scarcity that, in turn, is caused by its rural poverty, low capital accumulation and lack
of enterprise; d) Productivity and livelihood impacts: there is vast evidence to suggest powerful
productivity and livelihood impacts of MI development far out of proportion to the investment
needed; e) Optimal use of subsidy: considering that a backward region like North Bengal will
anyway attract developmental funds, MI offers better uses of subsidies than many other activities
where their productivity and livelihood impacts may be inferior.
On analyzing the NBTDP subsidy policy, we kept several normative criteria in mind: Is the
existing design of the NBTDP subsidy policy appropriate, especially from the viewpoint of
resource poor farmers’ investment and repayment capacity? Does the current subsidy
arrangement influence the choice of farmers? Is the targeting of the subsidized schemes right?
Does the subsidy policy also affect the choice of irrigation technology by farmers and government
decision makers? Then, does the subsidy policy help in the efficient delivery of irrigation systems?
Finally, is the subsidy policy realistic in its assessment of the organizational preconditions
necessary for their efficient and viable operation?.
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Assessment of the MI Subsidy Policy
Our analysis fully validates the NBTDP’s decision to discontinue support to major RLIs and
DTWs. Our limited field research—and several other studies of these systems in North Bengal—
suggest that the region offers no exception to the general experience of many countries of South
Asia and most Indian States where public DTWs have been a uniform and resounding failure.
Our analysis also vindicates the decision to discontinue support to the ‘4-hectare’ scheme; besides
being financially and economically unattractive, one can also argue that the buried pipeline
transmission systems in general are far too costly, sophisticated, capital-intensive and
unsustainable compared to their usefulness, especially in a flat, water-abundant region like North
Bengal.
The NBTDP subsidy support to mini-RLIs and MDTWs is likely to produce somewhat better
outcomes in that: a) these systems are smaller and technologically simpler; b) the design of the
scheme provides for their turnover to a BC as soon as commissioned; c) with fewer farmers in
their command, it would be easier to build a user organization to operate the scheme on a
sustainable basis. The threats for the mini-RLI and MDTW program arise from: a) the ambiguity
about the government order stipulating the turn over of the schemes to BCs; b) the process-
intensive organization of users that a government department may neither have the will nor the
capacity to undertake; c) the high capital cost per family as well as per hectare covered by these
schemes; and d) the unfamiliarity of the small farmer and local technicians with some components
of the technology, especially, the buried pipeline distribution system, and the consequent difficulty
that they may encounter in its maintenance and repair.
From the techno-economic and organizational standpoint, the NBTDP subsidies are probably
put to best use in STW and PDW cluster schemes; these fit farmer needs and constraints quite
well; a group of four small farmers seems ideally suited to achieve viable level of utilization; and
having to contribute 25 percent of the capital cost helps build solidarity and oblige them to
transparently decide at the outset the `rules-of-the-game’ for O&M cost sharing; small farmer
beneficiaries are fully familiar with the technology involved, especially in diesel STWs; they are
comfortable about maintenance and repair using largely local resources and skills; all in all, then,
STW and PDW cluster schemes are financially viable and economically rewarding.  Some
worrisome aspects are: a) the allocation of budgets between PDWs and STWs, as well as
allocation of schemes to different areas, appears to be somewhat arbitrary; b) the cost of the
system tends to be significantly higher than what farmers themselves would incur; c) schemes
fitted with electric pumps run into a variety of problems due to unreliability of power supply and
flat electricity tariffs; d) the scheme may attract pressures from farmers who would normally be
ineligible to claim and get benefit out of the scheme; e) there is a propensity on the part of the
better-off to form `dummy groups’ and effectively privatize the scheme; f) however, the negative
equity impacts of  such oligarchic propensities are probably far less serious than one would think
and we suggest a broad, practical-political-economy approach towards these;  g) at times, the
partisan propensity of Panchayat  decision makers might probably be more serious in choice of
beneficiaries; many resource poor farmers we talked to lamented that subsidies are directed
towards the politically agile and verbose rather than to the politically passive and quiet.4
Hand Pump Tube Wells (HTWs) are a case apart; they are promoted as a multipurpose
device used for obtaining drinking water as well as for irrigating backyard vegetable gardens in
homesteads; their target is primarily resource poor women; as a result, a rather large subsidy on
HTWs (90 percent on a unit cost of Rs 3,500
1) is to be assessed not so much against their
productivity and income impacts but against their contribution to health and sanitation and to
gender equity. There are nevertheless cost-effectiveness issues here; in terms of water output,
HTWs’ performance is at best as good as of treadle pumps; however, they cost five times as
much. The high cost of HTWs is explained by the deeper bore (up to 45 feet) and the use of GI
pipes, cast iron head and metal strainer; it is justified on the grounds that HTWs, widely used for
fetching drinking water need to tap deeper aquifers. This assumption perhaps needs probing and
reconsideration.
Issues in Design and Administration of Subsidies
Important issues emerge from the NBTDP’s as well as West Bengal government’s experience
with the design MI subsidies. One might argue that subsidies differ in their `smartness;’ dumb
subsidies create dependency, induce `money illusion’ (that entices target groups to make choices
they would not make with their own resources), and create room for allocational arbitrariness in
the selection of beneficiaries. Smart subsidies minimize these, ceteris paribus; the best example
we found of smart subsidies was the STW cluster scheme. Another relevant second order
question is about designing a subsidy that gets `the best bang out of its buck.’ For this, in our
assessment, subsidies should: a) be `efficient’—in the sense that they should be designed to
minimize the cost of assisting a beneficiary in the manner defined; b) be designed to produce
sustainable change; that it should support techno-institutional interventions that beneficiaries can—
and will want to—sustain on their own; and c) aim to significantly address outstanding anomalies
and inequities of a society.
Without explicitly stating them, throughout this report, the analysis of the NBTDP MI policy
has used these normative criteria. And, we believe that the NBTDP itself has implicitly used
strikingly similar normative criteria to introduce the changes that it has made in recent years in its
MI subsidy policy. However, besides learning from its own experience, we believe the Project
also can—and needs to—constantly assess and learn from what farmers themselves do when
their own resources are at stake, and what other agencies making similar interventions do and
with what effect. We found it striking, for example, that Panchayat Samitis provide subsidy
support to smaller RLIs than the NBTDPs—the basic minis—which cost at best a quarter of the
NBTDP’s mini RLI. We also found it striking that when they use their own money, farmers build
even simpler RLIs—the super mini—that has just a pump on the river bank and a distribution
system made of shiftable, flexible poly-pipe. True, the basic and super mini RLIs are less fancy
and have a smaller design command, and the poly-pipes used by farmers for transmission last all
of 12 months; but, ceteris paribus, chances are that Rs 1 million spent on 2 mini RLIs of the
NBTDP will produce less actual area irrigated and reach fewer small farmers sustainably than if
                                                                
1US$1.00=Indian Rs 43.50..
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spent on 10 basic mini RLIs or to subsidize 75 percent of the capital cost of around 50 super-mini
RLIs of the type that small farmers built from their own resources.
Similarly, the Project needs to analyze the full potential offered by—and the limitations of—
the  pump-for-rental scheme adopted by almost all the Gram Panchayats of Jalpaiguri. That so
many Gram Panchayats have adopted it suggests their assessment to be that the critical
bottleneck on expanding MI is not shortage of boreholes and water sources but of pumps. If this
were true, there is need to assess the merit of 75 percent subsidy on the cost of Shallow Tube
Wells (STBs) and PDWs in the shallow cluster scheme. Moreover, even if the Project wants to
continue support for boreholes, it needs to assess, whether from the same budget head for
STW/PDW subsidy, it should not reach out to a larger number of farmers by encouraging
beneficiaries to build bamboo bores each at Rs 1,500 instead of GI pipe STWs each costing Rs
18,000.
There is also the question of overall strategy: if pump capital scarcity is the prime bottleneck in
MI expansion in North Bengal, would the project not produce greater strategic impact through a
pure pump-subsidy rather than through spending its limited budget on construction-intensive MI
schemes that devote the bulk of the subsidy funds on MI miscellanies (such as buried pipe
transmission systems, GI pipe STWs, etc.) that resource poor farmers seldom use to build, with
their own resources?   Imagine the STW/PDW scheme modified hypothetically as follows: any
group of four small and marginal farmers who deposit Rs 5,000 along with the required
documentation in their Panchayat Samiti are instantly issued a delivery order for a diesel pump set
of their choice, a fuel-saving contraption and 500 feet of poly-pipe; the procedure for approval can
be simple and completed at the level of the Panchayat Samiti itself; the farmers can produce the
Delivery Order before the dealer concerned, and procure their pump and poly-pipes. A program
such as this can, in our assessment, reach a larger number of small farmers and produce more
MI; it will also be more sustainable because, given a chance, farmers will choose the technology
they are most familiar and confident with.
The Case for Redesigning the MI Strategy for North Bengal
These suggestions are in the manner of incremental changes in existing strategy. But it is also
possible—and desirable, at some stage—to review the analytical framework underlying the
present strategy itself. We have repeatedly argued in the report that the critical challenge of MI
development—and, indeed, of overall agrarian growth—in North Bengal is of dealing with the
pump capital scarcity. North Bengal has a pump density of around 1–3 pumps/1,000 ha of net
sown area. Eastern UP and North Bihar—which are similarly flush with groundwater—had pump
densities in this range during the mid-1980s. Today, these latter regions have expanded their pump
capital to achieve pump densities of around 25–40/1,000 ha; and in an earlier study of these
regions, we have shown that this expansion in pump capital has been at the heart of the belated
onset of the Green Revolution in these regions; and that it has been achieved during the past 10
years through active government policy.
North Bengal, instead, has been busy building MI miscellanies that guzzle funds but make little
net addition to MI. Most of India—including states like Gujarat, Rajasthan and Maharashtra that
actually need them—gave up building new public DTWs 15 years ago; but North Bengal—which6
does not need DTWs in the first place—has continued building them until recently. One can also
find fault with the extensive use of buried pipeline technology in North Bengal; in Gujarat, the
savings in energy and water that these effect and their advantage in overcoming topographical
barriers in conveying water are so huge that even private farmers invest in buried pipeline systems
even though they are enormously costly to build and maintain. But the use of buried pipeline
distribution systems in North Bengal—a flat terrain with the marginal value of groundwater at sub-
zero levels—seems to be a doubtful strategy. In the course of our fieldwork, we found numerous
farmers who owned or leased flexible poly-pipes for conveying water but we met none who
invested in buried pipes. Overall, then the bulk of the public resources for MI development—in our
rough estimate, around 50–60 percent—continues to be devoted to MI miscellanies and very little
to putting pumps in the hands of the farmer even though it is common knowledge that any farmer
in the region can make a bore ever so much more easily than lay his hands on a pump. Finally,
through a series of design reversals, North Bengal’s pump-subsidy scheme has become all but
unworkable. Of the nearly 200 small farmers we met in the course of our fieldwork, not one had
benefited from North Bengal’s pump subsidy scheme, although most knew about it and many had
tried; now, the scheme has acquired such a bad reputation amongst the poor that they have
stopped trying. Banks have been dragging their feet in lending for pumps; subsidy resources
available to the scheme seem woefully limited; of this, the bulk got captured by the Gram
Panchayats (at least in the Jalpaiguri district) for their pump-rental programs; the process of
getting approval for subsidy-loan applications—which involves 8–10 independent decision
makers—is made so lengthy, laborious and full of hassle that the scared small farmer has all but
written off the scheme as out-of-bounds; and the pump dealer, who made the scheme a success in
Eastern UP and North Bihar, has remained completely marginalized in North Bengal. Result?
Pump density of 1–3/1,000 ha whereas it should—and can easily—be 25–40/1,000 ha by the turn
of the century.
All in all, then, one can argue that the present MI strategy of North Bengal is what might be
the MI strategy of a State like Gujarat or Maharashtra—regions that have scarcity of water and
abundance of capital, where governments as well as farmers have money and valid reasons to
sink deep tube wells and lay buried pipeline networks, and where the sheer economics of large
tube wells forces sustainable collective action amongst the farmers of the command area. North
Bengal has none of these conditions; its farmers have too much water but no pump capital;
collective management of large irrigation systems is neither necessary nor worthwhile for them
nor have they got the economic drive and maturity to make collective enterprises work. The
correct MI strategy for Gujarat is clearly a wrong MI strategy for North Bengal; the latter should
be the reverse of the former.
North Bengal’s conditions—socioeconomic as well as aquatic—are more akin to those of
Eastern UP and North Bihar and, therefore, one would have thought that its MI policy would be
similar to what these regions have. Strangely, however, this is not so; and one can argue that in
promoting MI, North Bengal can learn a lesson or two from Eastern UP and North Bihar because
our earlier studies showed that, over the past decade, these regions have been able to achieve
remarkable expansion in their pump capital, and the resultant intensification of MI has been at the
center of their belated onset of Green Revolution; our studies have also shown that this process
was by no means autonomous but was induced by an astute MI policy. MI policy makers of North.
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Bengal should be interested in figuring out how MI policies pursued in Eastern Uttar Pradesh and
North Bihar increased the pump capital in those regions and how it is at the center of their Green
Revolution that has eluded North Bengal.
Getting the Biggest Bang out of the Subsidy Buck: Learning from the Experience of
Eastern UP
Eastern UP and North Bihar have long since given up MI miscellanies such as DTWs and mega
RLIs, community management of large MI schemes and buried pipeline systems—all of which
use up a lot of resources but produce little MI; their MI policy now places a single-minded thrust
on overcoming pump capital scarcity through the Free Boring Scheme (FBS) whose sole objective
is to put a pump in the hands of the small farmer with the least hassle, delay or `transaction costs.’
To this end, the FBS design has been modified in stages to a level where it has become a precision
tool to achieve just this aim. All resources available have been pumped into the FBS to create a
sense of sufficiency and to avoid stringent rationing. The system for processing applications for
pump subsidy and the loan scheme has been enormously simplified and, in each tehsil town, an
intensely competitive group of diesel pump dealers has been pitchforked into the central
coordinating position in the implementation of the scheme. As a result, over the past decade or so,
the FBS has supported over 70–80 percent of the close to a million new bore-wells and pumps
installed in these regions.
The process that a small farmer goes through today in Gorakhpur mandal to acquire a pump-
subsidy loan is extremely simple and involves the following steps: a) equipped with his photograph,
land and caste documents, the farmer approaches one of the several dealers in diesel pump sets
depending upon his choice and presents the papers to him. From then on, the pump dealer takes
over. After examining the documentation, the dealer immediately delivers the engine and pump set
to him, takes the farmer to the MI office and gets  subsidized pipes issued to him on the same day;
b) the farmer returns to his village complete with pipes and the pump set the same day. He then
approaches any of the several rigging operators found in almost every fifth village and orders a
bore done. If he and his friends can share the labor, the cost of boring—depending upon the depth
of the water table—is just about Rs 200–250. If the rigging operator has to provide all the labor,
the cost may go up to Rs 350–400, cash down, which the farmer pays from his own resources; c)
in the next few days, the rig operators mount the boring operation and, once begun, they
commission the bore-well within 4–5 hours. The farmer’s bore-well is thus operational at a
personal cash outlay of less than Rs 500 inside of a week at the most; d) some days later, the
dealer comes to the village and takes the farmer on his motor cycle to the bank for completing the
loan formalities. All that the farmer has to do is sign on the form. The loan for the National Bank
for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD)-determined unit cost of Rs 12,500 gets
sanctioned and is directly received by the dealer towards the cost of the pump; e) some
days/weeks later, someone from the Block office visits the farmer to ascertain that the boring has
indeed been done; he also collects information on the depth of the bore, the nature of  the
geological formation, etc., to estimate the boring costs; f) after several months, the boring subsidy
comes in the form of an MI Department check. This often exceeds the actual cost of boring to the
farmer, to cover the unofficial payment he was required to make to the MI Inspector. Nearly 2008
beneficiary-farmers we interviewed in Maharajganj, Deoria and Gorakhpur districts of Eastern
UP during November and December 1996 considered the FBS scheme to be a great boon for
them and the diesel pump dealer to be their best friend, despite the fact that he charged a premium
of an average of Rs 1,000 on the subsidy-loan pump. Most farmers considered this to be a small
price to pay for accessing the FBS so smoothly; besides, they knew that the dealer had to keep
the `system’ well-oiled.
Compared to this, a small farmer in North Bengal has to go through an arduous process to get
the subsidy loan benefit on the diesel pump. According to a Jilla Prishad Krishi Karmadhyaksha
in North Bengal, the procedure of accessing the pump subsidy-loan scheme  involves the following
steps: a) the small farmer gets his name listed as an eligible aspirant with the Gram Panchayat
along with all documentation; at the first stage, the Gram Panchayat has to agree to forward his
application to the Block Development Officer (BDO); b) a Gram Panchayat member has to
personally recommend his application  to the BDO; c) The application is discussed in the
bimonthly meetings of the bank, Gram Panchayat Pradhan and Panchayat Samiti member
concerned to assess the creditworthiness and eligibility of the aspirant; d) if the aspirant clears this
stage, his application is completed and forwarded to the bank with the recommendation of the
Panchayat Samiti; e) after this, the bank claims the subsidy from the District Rural Development
Agency (DRDA); f) the bank releases the loan but only after the DRDA pays the subsidy; g) the
bank issues the Delivery Order to the beneficiary who can then claim his diesel  pump. The
procedure always takes one year or longer; in recent years, it seldom gets completed because
banks, facing massive nonperforming assets (NPAs) in government subsidy schemes, are
dragging their feet. The BDOs we met asserted that the delay was caused mainly by the banks;
and Central Bank (lead bank) officials we met passed the blame to the DRDA and Panchayat
authorities. These, in turn, argued that the banks do not proceed unless the Panchayat Samiti
forwards an application; and the Panchayat Samiti does not forward an application unless the
Gram Panchayat recommends it. None of the 200 small farmers we met in North Bengal had
anything but frustration to share about the pump subsidy scheme.
Even in Eastern UP, things were not always as good as they are now. For example, a study in
1984 showed that the process of approval of an application for subsidy and loan for a diesel pump
took over 11 months to complete. In the FBS of those days, the MI Department played a central
role in implementing the subsidy policy;  the  Department maintained a stock of diesel pumps of
one or two preferred brands. Similarly, the block office maintained an inventory of PVC and GI
pipes, rigs, foot valves and other material needed to make bore-wells and employed an army of
staff who would make the borings. When a small farmer applied for a shallow tube well (STW)
under the subsidy-loan scheme, he had to accept the diesel pump stocked by the MI Department
and wait for months until the government mistry (technician) came to make a boring. After all
these, the final cost of the STW to him often turned out to be higher under the subsidy-loan
scheme than if he had done it on his own. The diesel pumps stocked by the government sold in the
open market at a 20–30 percent discount compared to what the Department charged; similarly,
farmers who made borings on their own got them done for less than Rs 2,500; but under the
government scheme, the small farmer ended up by paying over Rs 10,000 for the boring. The bulk
of the actual subsidy was thus claimed by the `intermediaries’; as a result, farmers lost interest in
the scheme..
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Today, the scheme has a more farmer-friendly design because it has created a uniquely
beneficial `dealer dynamic’; a) the pump dealer (and not the MI Department) has emerged as the
point of access to the subsidy; as a result, over the years, all trading towns have grown a small
community of specialist pump dealers who deal solely or mostly in diesel engines; even small
district towns can have 15–20 such specialist dealers; b)  this pump-dealer community offers a
wide variety of brands to the farmers; c) All dealers would naturally look for the easiest way to
corner as much of the subsidy as possible; d) however, they would be constrained from overdoing
it because of the fierce competition amongst dealers to increase their share in a growing market;
e) competition amongst alternative brands and dealers prompts the latter to choose the hard way
and offer quality product and services to the farmers that go far beyond their ‘call of duty;’ f) and
in return, if they extracted an unofficial `service charge’ by jacking up pump set prices more than
they would have done in the absence of the subsidy, the farmers we met did not seem to mind it
very much; g) unlike earlier, in the present system, the farmers are spared the agony and hassle of
dealing with the various agencies involved in approving the subsidy-loan; their interface with them
is mediated by the dealer. The dealer who can offer a stable `business’ is able to strike a better
bargain with those in charge of processing subsidy-loan applications and change to the hafta
system rather than settling the `rate’ for each application; h) pump dealers with a larger turnover
have an obvious advantage in dealing with the administrative system; they can and do form long-
term contractual arrangements—informal, of course—with bank staff and MI staff to secure
speedy clearance of loan and subsidy applications, and they can afford to pay larger `hafta’ and
charge lower premiums the farmers on the subsidy pump—which is probably why the discount on
direct sales varies from Rs 700 to Rs 1,800; g) this dynamic propels the dealers to constantly try to
increase their market share by offering better and hassle-free services to farmers.
In the course of a 1996 study (Shah et al. 1996; Shah and Ballabh 1996), our overall
assessment of the FBS as it has operated in Eastern UP as well as in North Bihar was that: a) the
entire subsidy amount does not reach the farmer; this is evident in the difference of an average of
Rs 700–900/pump (6–8 percent) compared to the over-the-counter price; b) however, the small
farmer is extremely happy with this particular subsidy scheme—something that cannot be said
for most other subsidies; c) the services offered by the pump dealer in helping the farmer through
the entire bureaucratic process seem highly valued; d) if the ultimate purpose of the scheme is to
encourage small and marginal farmers to acquire and use bores and pump sets for irrigation, the
dealers’ drive to compete for a larger share of the subsidy-induced demand for pumps helps the
scheme along in achieving this purpose; e) the FBS has dramatically expanded the pump capital
stock available in these regions and has catalyzed their Green Revolution. In a subsequent study of
North Bihar, we found the `dealer dynamic’ so vibrant that they fiercely compete among
themselves in roaming from village to village looking for eligible applicants and sell the pump
subsidy-loan scheme to them at a margin as low as Rs 400–500! It is not that there is no `rent
seeking’ involved in the subsidy-loan approval process in Eastern UP; there certainly is; but for all
the rent extracted, the small farmers there do get the pumps and bores commissioned inside of a
week, with least hassle and delay, and at an 8–10 percent premium over the market price, which
they do not seem to mind paying as a `service charge.’ In North Bengal, too, the small farmers
have to be prepared to pay the `service charge;’ despite which, they can seldom lay their hands on
a pump and a bore under the subsidy-loan scheme. The long-term ideal would be, of course, a10
situation where there is no `rent seeking’ and the small farmer gets smooth and quick access to
the subsidy; but in the short run, a more practical approach is to accept the reality for what is it
and move from a greater to a lesser evil.
As a strategic alternative, thus, we believe that a pump-subsidy scheme of the type that
operates in Eastern UP can be a powerful addition to North Bengal’s present armory of
programs; to reproduce the same results, it should have the following features: a) sufficient
resources for the subsidy as well as for the loan should be earmarked so that there is no need for
stringent rationing; b) the scheme should give complete freedom to the farmers to choose any
make of engine and pump, and to get bores made by themselves rather than insisting that the
government-appointed contractor would do it; c) the application for the subsidy-loan should be
submitted at the Panchayat Samiti and processed there itself; d) every branch of the public sector
and cooperative banks should be encouraged to advance loans for diesel pumps and bores; e)
there should be a separate but similar scheme under which Gram Panchayats can acquire pumps
for renting out so that they do not preempt subsidy-loan resources meant for small farmers.
Introducing these features would, in our assessment, reproduce the dealer dynamic that has helped




An Assessment of MI Policies in North Bengal
I.  Techno-Institutional Compact of MI in North Bengal
North Bengal is amongst the aquatically best-endowed regions of India. The region has huge
ground water and surface water potential and is drained by numerous large and small rivers,
including Teesta, Torsa, Jaldhaka and others that flow through North Bengal into Bangladesh.
Groundwater tables in most areas are less than 5 m in the pre-monsoonal period and less than
2.5–4 m in the post-monsoon period. Despite irrigation development, groundwater monitoring data
show no significant secular decline in depth to the water tables indicating that increased water
draft during post-monsoon months is amply replenished through recharge from rainfall, rivers, and
irrigation return flows. The aquifers in the entire region are unconfined up to over 100 feet,
implying that water flows horizontally to lower grounds, often causing perennial flooding and
waterlogging problems in low-lying areas. According to the Central Groundwater Board estimates,
Coochbehar has 2,067 million m
3 and Jalpaiguri has 4,838 million m
3 of replenishable recharge; and
the present level of use is barely 217 million m
3 (15%) and 106 million m
3 (3%), respectively. The
two districts thus have 0.36 million m
3 and 0.56 million m
3, respectively, of groundwater available
for future development per every km
2.
2 In fact, the two districts alone have more than half of all
of Bangladesh’s groundwater resources;
3 and as in Bangladesh, most of it is located within 7 m
from the ground even during the dry seasons. Predictably, then, all the 11 blocks of Coochbehar
and the 13 blocks of Jalpaiguri have been declared ‘white’ by NABARD.
4 The danger of
overdevelopment of groundwater resources in the region is remote except in very small pockets
where groundwater withdrawals will need some monitoring fairly soon (Shah and Ballabh 1996).
5
                                                                
2Assuming that 60 percent of the geographical area is agricultural land, this implies enough groundwater to submerge all
agricultural lands of Coochbehar and Jalpaiguri under 3.6 m and 5.6 m of water every year, without crossing the limit
imposed by long-term recharge.
3Bangladesh’s unutilized groundwater resource was estimated to be 11,600 million m
3 during the mid-1980s  .see, Orr,
Islam and Barnes 1991:29).
4Areas with less than 65 percent development of groundwater potential are categorized as ‘white’; those with 65–85
percent development are ‘grey’; and those with more than 85 percent are called ‘dark.’ Areas classified `dark’ are
overexploiting their groundwater resources.
5This is because already the cropping pattern of a sizeable chunk of the farmers is as highly water-intensive as it can get
and has little scope to get more water-intensive. There already are large areas in which 2 crops of boro rice are taken;
and according to the farmers we met, two crops of  boro rice and one of aman rice is the most water-intensive crop
cycle they can follow in the foreseeable future. The most that the less well-endowed farmers of the region dream of is
two crops of improved  variety rice crops, typically grown during the boro season of a year. Thus even if two `boro
rice crops’ a year expand to the entire region, it is unlikely that groundwater use would exceed 25 percent of the
replenishable recharge in North Bengal for a long time to come.12
If anything, there is a strong case for pulling down post-monsoonal water levels in many low-lying
areas of the Coochbehar and Jalpaiguri districts.
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It is not surprising therefore that with its central focus on agricultural development, the
NBTDP implemented by the Government of West Bengal with the support of the Royal
Netherlands Government has included MI development as the centerpiece of its programing
strategy. Besides the NBTDP, numerous other State and local government agencies are engaged
in MI intervention. These include Gram Panchayats at the village level, Panchayat Samitis at the
Block level, Zilla Parishads, Agriculture Department, MI Corporation, State Water Investigation
and Development (SWID) Department and its agri-irrigation and agri-mechanical Departments,
Scheduled Tribe and Schedule Caste Corporation, and the District Rural Development Agency.
The NBTDP itself is implemented by the Joint Director of Agriculture although it is monitored by
Euro-Consult through a Project Support Unit based at Jalpaiguri. With support from the Dutch
government under the NBTDP, the International Development Enterprise (IDE) has launched its
program of marketing treadle pumps in the Coochbehar and Jalpaiguri districts and in the Siliguri
subdivision.
Since time immemorial, farmers have laboriously irrigated small plots of land using traditional
water-lifting devices such as chuha, dhenki and taar-balti.
7 Even now they continue this
practice. Now, all manner of water-lifting technologies—traditional and modern, manual and
powered—can be seen in operation in the region simultaneously. The NBTDP has promoted
investments in a variety of MI technologies essentially through a subsidy program. Amongst these,
Hand Tube Wells (HTWs) or, Maya-6 hands pumps. known in Bangladesh as MOSTI) affixed to
a 100–120 feet deep tube well are the most numerous and are installed by the Agriculture
Department under 90 percent subsidy. Although treadle pumps (TPs) became known only after
IDE’s program began and are popular only in some pockets bordering Bangladesh, TPs smuggled
from across the Bangladesh border have been widely used for several years. In the treadle pump
program, the direct subsidy element is absent, except that the NBTDP supports the IDE
operations in the region.  Besides these, the NBTDP subsidizes a spectrum of MI technologies: at
the lower end, there are ‘STWs’, 100–120 feet deep tube wells (DTWs) with a diesel pump
(STWs) or, pump dug-wells (PDWs), which are shallow open wells with a diesel pump. At the
upper end, we find 300 feet or deeper DTWs with 20-hp electric pumps, and major River Lift
Irrigation Systems (RLIs). Early RLIs were big with an 81 ha (200 acre) design command using
two 24-hp diesel pumps; the NBTDP has recently discontinued support for these and is now
promoting mini-RLIs, using two 5-hp diesel pumps (with a third one as a standby) with a design
                                                                
6In fact, in most villages of the region, one finds up-lying areas and low-lying areas; farmers with lands in up-lying areas
tend to be better off compared to those with  fields in low lying areas although the latter find  groundwater pumping
easier and cheaper. For, low lying areas remained flooded for 2-3 post-monsoon months when nothing could be grown
on them. Farmers owning low-lying lands were thus condemned to one aman rice and one boro rice at the best; whereas
those in up-lying areas, as a rule, took three crops annually.
7Chuha is a shallow ditch dug up to tap shallow groundwater; dhenkuli is a manual water-lifting device, which  has a
bucket tied to a bamboo with a counterweight at its other end, and which is popular throughout North and Eastern
India; Taar-Balti is used by two persons to lift water from a surface or shallow water body in buckets, and to empty it
into a watercourse at considerable speed..
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command of 20.24 ha (50 acres). These pump water into a distribution chamber from where it is
conveyed to fields through an underground PVC pipeline network with PVC spouts. Then, there
are, what is called, basic RLIs, which typically have a lone diesel pump mounted on a river bank
or on a stationary boat, often fitted with a thatched hut as the pump house and a buried PVC pipe
distribution system. There are marked similarities between schemes subsidized by government
agencies and those built and run by farmers using their own resources. Thus, we can find in many
areas farmer-built and -managed super-mini RLIs, which are similar to basic RLIs except that
super-mini RLIs use an over-ground, shiftable poly-pipe water transmission system for conveying
water. Then, subsidy-supported STWs differ from farmer-built bamboo bores in that they use
GI—or, more recently, PVC—pipes for suction whereas bamboo tube wells, as their name
suggests, use cheaper bamboo for suction pipes, often with a strainer made out of bamboo chips
or netted fabric. Also, compared to `STWs,’ bamboo tube wells are also shallower, seldom
exceeding 45–60 feet in depth. In short, the whole range of water-lifting and -transport
technologies, which became popular in Bangladesh in the late 1980s has now come to North
Bengal.
And with this wide range of technologies have come a variety of irrigation institutions. Several
institutional models are witnessed: public ownership and management by government
bureaucracies, by Panchayati Raj institutions, by BCs of various hues and by individual owner-
managers. Big RLIs and DTWs—with a design command often exceeding 81 ha (200 acres) and
covering some 80–100 small farmers, are established by the government agencies under various
MI programs including those supported by the World Bank, NABARD and the NBTDP. Although
in recent years, BCs have been organized to take over their O&M, the larger schemes are still
controlled and run as public utilities by the Agri-Irrigation and Agri-Irrigation Departments of
SWID. The BCs are formed in these schemes but these are powerless and have only a marginal
role; and as we explore later, building robust user organizations may hold the key to efficient
management of these highly capital-intensive irrigation assets. The BCs are more active in mini
RLIs; however, the turnover program is still young; and it is rarely that we find mini RLIs under
complete control of well-functioning BCs. In contrast, BCs have a much larger role in smaller
group schemes; for instance, basic RLIs sponsored by block-level Panchayat Samitis—which
serve 8–20 members in their command—are constructed by Panchayat Samiti’s contractors and
handed over completely to BCs as soon as they are commissioned; BCs decide the water pricing
policies, take the responsibility for O&M and manage the water distribution. This is pretty much
the case with STWs and pump dug-well schemes as well. Gram Panchayats and Panchayat
Samitis have a powerful say in all these, essentially through the power to constitute BCs. Then,
most Panchayats stock diesel pumps and rent them out to needy farmers.
In contrast to all these—which involve some form of public or collective management of a
shared irrigation asset—we also find a large and growing `private’ sector, complete with vibrant
and functioning pump irrigation service markets. Hand pumps and traditional water- lifting devices
are typically owned and used individually; and there are no rental markets in these. In contrast, in
agriculturally dynamic areas, especially of Coochbehar, there is a large and growing population of
privately owned diesel pumps (mostly of 5 hp) with an extensive and booming market for pump
irrigation service (Shah 1997). Unlike elsewhere in India, bamboo tube wells are so cheap to make
in North Bengal that pump irrigation markets basically involve the diesel pump circulating around14
the village. In that sense, purchased pump irrigation is quite efficient; since water is pumped from
the field being irrigated, the distance over which it has to be conveyed is small; as a result,
conveyance losses (of water as well as energy) are negligible even though water is commonly
conveyed in unlined field channels. Where the density of bamboo tube wells is low because the
water table is relatively low, diesel pump owners often rent the pump along with 200–300 feet of
rubber pipes but charge a premium for it.
Table 1. Institution-technology mix in North Bengal irrigation.
















1. Hand Tube Wells* ?
2. Treadle Pumps* ?
3. Diesel Pumps for own
use and renting
?  (only large
farmers)
? ?
4. STW/PDW clusters :
diesel pump and well for a
group of 4 farmers*
?
5. STW/PDW clusters: 6
STWs +2 pumps
?
6. Basic RLI: 1 pump and
distributary system.
?





8. Deep tube wells* ?
9. River Lift Schemes* ?
II.Research and Policy Questions
Overall, then, nowhere in India does one find, in a single region, such a resplendently complex web
of MI technologies and institutions as in North Bengal. And the nature of the technology seems to
drive the institutional choice, as outlined in table 1. Treadle pump and hand tube wells neither need
an exchange institution nor are easily amenable to it; besides, their low capital and operating costs
bring them well within the reach of marginal farmers. Above all, these technologies are ‘self-
selecting’ in the sense that their natural appeal is to those who have small lands and plentiful
family labor with low opportunity cost. As a result, individual ownership with no rental markets is
the inevitable institutional format for these manual technologies. In diesel pumps, we find all three.
15
types of institutional arrangements; however, the most widespread is individual ownership with
pump irrigation markets. Large farmers—typically those with more than 4.05 ha (10 acres) —
seem neither interested nor able to spare their pumps for renting to others. Similarly, cooperatively
owned or Panchayat-owned and -managed pumps are rare to find outside government- or donor-
sponsored programs. The diesel pump technology does not seem to pose any intrinsic compulsions
for collective action, especially since bamboo tube wells are common, and there are numerous
sources of surface water. However, as elsewhere in eastern India, here too, many more farmers
irrigate with rented pumps than with their own or through government-aided irrigation assets.
Table 2. Institution-technology compact in the NBTDP.



























100 100 100 100 100 20 20
3.Water output Liters/second 0.3 0.9–1.1 6.1 8.3 28 56 111
4. Potential
command
ha 0.14 0.19 3 4 20 40 80
5.Beneficiaries/
unit
Households 1 1 5 5 37 50 100
6.   Depth  m 15 3–7 12 40 River 150 River
7. Capital
cost/unit
Rs 2,000 600 9,000 12,000 450,000 530,000 725,000
8. Cost/ha Rs/ha 11,764 750–1,200 3,000 3,000 22,500 13,250 9,062.5
Source:  The NBTDP Monitoring Reports.
It is the State government policy to promote RLIs as a method of augmenting groundwater
recharge (Sen 1997). Lifting river water for irrigation by private farmers is common in most of
North Bengal; however, the technology they use typically includes a diesel pump and often some
over-ground polyethylene-pipe for water conveyance. Big RLIs and DTWs are naturally suited
for collective ownership and management. However, such techno-institutional arrangements
would come up and sustain on their own only if they have significant techno-economic superiority
over STWs, or where there is no alternative to them as, for instance, in North Gujarat.
8 After all,
                                                                
8In many part of North Gujarat, especially in Mehsana and Banaskantha districts, groundwater tables have fallen to
800–1,200 feet over the past four decades. In the absence of surface water resources, the survival of agriculture has16
which private irrigator would want to bore to a depth of 350 feet if he can get as much water as
he needs at 20 feet? Not surprisingly, then, most of the DTWs and big RLIs we find in the region
are those built by the government or Panchayat Samitis or Zilla Parishads under the World Bank
or the NBTDP support.
Table 3. The NBTDP: Phase III targets.
Irrigation Units
Cost/Unit






HTWs 15,000 652.5 4,347 4,830
STWs 400 78.0 19,500 26,000
PDW 290 52.4 18,068 24,092
RLI 22 369.6 1,680,000 1,680,000
DTW 9 72.0 800,000 800,000
4-ha units 500 147.5 29,500 59,000
Source: NBTDP: PCR 27 1996.
The NBTDP works on a substantial portion of the entire matrix of this institution-technology
compact, essentially through funding government programs to construct MI schemes; the targets
for support under phase III are set out in table 3. The program of support has evolved historically
through a process of discussion and negotiation between the governments of the two countries;
however, the monitoring mechanisms deployed for the program produce feedback and analysis
that form the basis for periodic changes in the funding structure and pattern. For example, the
NBTDP-supported investments in DTWs and RLIs for several years during phases I and II;
however, based on the results of monitoring data and studies, the Project has now decided to
support clusters of mini RLIs and Medium Duty Deep Tube wells (MDTWs).
9 Similarly, Phase III
                                                                                                                                                                                                
depended upon farmers chasing these falling groundwater tables. Doing this has required progressively deeper tube
wells, larger pumps, and costlier irrigation. The capital costs and the risks of well failure are so high that even large and
affluent farmers cannot afford individually owned tube wells.  In this region, we find tube wells owned and managed
collectively by farmers’ tube well companies. In the Mehsana district alone, over 3,000 such tube well companies exist.
9In big RLIs of phases I and II, the actual command area—area served even once during the past 3 years—-was found to
be 37 ha instead of the designed net command area of 80 ha in a sample of 4 RLIs (Internal Monitoring Reports)
.Therefore, instead of old 80-ha big RLIs, in the third phase, it was decided to build clusters of four 20-hp mini RLIs
each at a cost of  Rs 4.5 lakhs. Each will have three 5-hp diesel pumps and a subsurface distribution system based on
PVC pipes instead of reinforced concrete pipes used earlier. It was also decided that Mini RLIs will also be farmer-
managed rather than government-managed. The MDTWs too have a design command of 20 ha but are run by electric
pumps. But no drilling companies are willing to come to drill the small number sanctioned so far; so the MDTWs have
not taken off as yet..
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project proposal provided support to `4-ha schemes,’
10 which have subsequently proved to be not
viable. In contrast, after a series of laboratory and field trials, the Project Support Unit (PSU) of
the NBTDP has established fuel-saving methodology for diesel pumps that can cut diesel
consumption to half;
11 phase III has now taken up this methodology for propagation.
A number of issues arise: Given the small and marginal farmers’ investment capacity, are
current levels and mechanisms of subsidy appropriate? Would reducing subsidy levels result in the
exclusion of the most vulnerable and needy sections of the farmers? Are existing mechanisms
evolved under the NBTDP for subsidy provision for MI schemes, for site selection, and for O&M
appropriate? Or, is it realistic and practical, given the circumstances, to choose greater beneficiary
participation at all stages, from conception and site selection to O&M? Might the level and
structure of MI subsidies distort the choice of technologies and institutions, which are not
sustainable in the absence of subsidies? Are the costs of MI assets created under the NBTDP
likely to be above market rates, and significantly higher than what farmers themselves might incur
in the absence of subsidies?
Successive reviews of the NBTDP have commented upon the techno-economic basis
underlying the schemes of subsidizing different technologies at different rates using different
subsidy mechanisms from time to time. The most recent Mid-Term Review of the Project (MTR
1997), for instance, noted, `…All MI devices presently installed and promoted are all (except one:
pump dug-well is suitable only in areas with subsurface rocks) based on suction pumps or suction
principles (including hand tube well and treadle pump). This is significant because it actually
means that none of the present systems can pump water from more than about 7 meters.
Consequently, most systems are inter-changeable. To draw the conclusion that all but one (deep
tube well with an economic rate of return of 11 percent, i.e., 1% below the opportunity cost of
capital) MI lifting facilities are economically viable is incorrect because the systems are not
mutually exclusive. This is a serious mistake and has led to the constant avoiding of answering the
question which MI schemes are where and when the best value for money, considering also other
socioeconomic and target group criteria.’ (P: 44). Other issues needing close scrutiny are the
sensitivity of the economics to the utilization rates of the MI assets, and the very indicators used to
assess these rates (design and actual command area) in North Bengal’s unique context. Past
studies have also explored the sensitivity of the economics of RLIs and DTWs to organizational
problems of collective or bureaucratic management.
                                                                
10These are masonry extensions of the subsurface transmission system. Not cost-effective. Pumping hours on RLIs and
DTWs were less than 1,000 hours; and usage rates of channels is a fraction of the pumping hours. Soil cement channels,
though cheaper, would be cost-ineffective too for the same reasons, especially when compared to poly-pipes.
11Modifications recommended under the fuel-saving methodology are:
removal of the foot valve and the use of wire net at the lower end of the suction pipe (in the case of PDWs) or removal
of the check valve (in STWs)
?  fitting of a hand pump on the delivery pipe for  priming
?  use of closed cooling system by fitting a water drum
?  reduction of engine speed from 1,470 to 1,100 rpm
?  cooling the gland packing with a small plastic tube18
In broad terms, then, central policy issues facing the NBTDP as well as North Bengal’s MI
policy makers are many, but at their root are some simple conceptual questions that need to be
raised as often as necessary: Why provide MI subsidies at all? Whose and what purpose do these
subsidies serve at present? If they need to be provided under the NBTDP, what is the unifying
logic underlying the scheme that provides 90 percent capital cost subsidies on HTWs, 0 percent
subsidy on treadle pumps, 75 percent on STWs and PDWs and 100 percent on mini-RLIs and
MDTWs? Should beneficiary contribution in HTWs be reviewed?
12 What impacts do MI subsidies
create? Do these result in distortions in technology and institution choices? Are the technologies
and institutional structures promoted with the NBTDP subsidy support sustainable? Are they
replicable?
This study is an attempt to respond to some—though not all—of these questions. In doing so,
we have concentrated our effort on evolving a well-rounded understanding of the political
economy of MI policy in North Bengal, often straying from the main course but at the end pulling
the threads together to create a coherent picture. This is also the format in which we present our
learning. In part III, we discuss what we learnt about deep tube wells and large RLIs in Jalpaiguri
district, essentially to explore if the experience with these `mega’ schemes here has been as
disappointing as it has been throughout South Asia (for a review of the South Asian experience
with DTWs, see Palmer-Jones 1995). In part IV, we examine the evidence we found on the
performance and political economy of smaller MI technologies promoted not only by the NBTDP
but also by other agencies. In part V, we report on the `private’ MI economy based on a series of
participatory and unstructured interactions with groups of small farmers, local leaders, pump
dealers and sundry others to explore the `non-official’ thinking and viewpoint about MI
technologies and how the official policy works the way it does and why. In part VI, we explore
the interactions between North Bengal’s dynamic Panchayat-system and the MI political
economy. Based on all these, in part VII, we attempt to answer, as best as is possible given our
understanding, some of the questions that the study began with.
III. Performance and Political Economy of Large DTWs and RLIs
                                                                
12There are pros and cons. Experience with HTWs has been by and large positive. The design command of an HTW is
0.14 ha; however, surveys indicate that an HTW irrigates 0.11 ha each in rabi and pre-kharif; and in kharif, it provides
supplemental irrigation to 0.02 ha; this suggests the validity of central techno-economic assumptions. On 10 percent
compulsory contribution by beneficiaries, informal surveys indicate that the farmer response was largely positive; some
could not deposit the money due to insufficient time allowed; only 1 out of 25 surveyed could not self-finance the
investment (Internal Monitoring Reports). All these suggest that higher beneficiary contribution can be justified. On the
other hand, HTWs seem to make a significant contribution to drinking water requirements (although water quality
issues are important in HTWs close to the field and not maintained in sanitary conditions; bacteriological contamination
is possible, especially in the post-monsoonal period, the water table rises); thus, primary users of HTWs for irrigation
too are poor women who irrigate homestead plots of vegetable crops; 21 percent of the HTWs supplied so far are
owned by females; many more are not officially owned by women but are primarily used by them; and it is an open
question whether poor women would be able—even if they are willing—to make higher contribution to capital costs..
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Introduction
West Bengal still has a sizeable program of large DTWs and RLIs even today. While many other
States have not only discontinued construction of new DTWs under their public tube well
programs but have been trying to either turnover existing irrigation assets to farmer groups or sell
them outright to whoever would buy them, DTWs and RLIs schemes in North Bengal are still
under government control; and under both the World Bank program and the NBTDP, new DTWs
and RLIs have been constructed until very recently.
13 The program has come under repeated
scrutiny. A 1995 study identified low water tax recovery (at around 80%), the so-called `operator
hazard,’ theft and damages to the systems, overirrigation by farmers as a response to the
uncertainty and undependability of water supply, and long shut-down periods as the key problems
of these government-managed irrigation schemes (Rao 1995a, 1995b; CDS 1995). The financial
viability of these systems has also been undermined by the huge subsidies—open and hidden. The
rate for irrigation from government-operated MI schemes was a low Rs 160/ha m for a long time;
in 1983, it was revised to Rs 500/ha m (or Rs 5/acre inch), which continues to be in force today.
14
A noted observer of the MI scene in North Bengal wrote, `..economic water rate of State-
managed tube wells (is) around Rs 3,000/ha m if depreciation on capital is included and Rs
1,800/ha m if depreciation charges are excluded. Water rate realized from the farmers being Rs
500/ha m, the subsidy would amount to 72 percent in the latter case and as much as 83 percent in
the former case. (Then,) the economic rate is calculated on the basis of design command area
which is invariably more than the actual command area’ (Kanwar and Bandyopayaya n.d.).
Purvo Harmothy River Lift Irrigation System
We take the analysis of DTWs and RLIs in the same stride because they have the same features
and problems: they are the largest amongst lift-based MI schemes; they have similar command
areas and involve user organizations of comparable sizes; moreover, their economics are similarly
dominated by their high capital costs and are therefore critically dependent upon their capacity
utilization; however, in North Bengal conditions, achieving the level of utilization necessary to
make these systems viable requires extremely tight and skilfull management of the agricultural
economy of the command area. These large schemes were not under the purview of our study
since the NBTDP has already decided to discontinue support to these. However, these are still an
                                                                
13True, West Bengal was amongst the first to start talking about turnover; and in some other districts, the turnover
program of the World Bank supported tube wells has achieved promising results (see, e.g. Rao 1995a, 1995b); however,
in North Bengal, the turnover has been only cosmetic; moreover, even in Hoogly and Nadia, where Rao found the
turnover to be successful, the annual running hours of turned-over tube wells ranged from 289 to 1,098 hours compared
to 3,500–4,000 hours/year needed for a deep tube well to achieve its techno-economic design potential and justify its
high capital intensity.
14Even successfully turned-over tube wells studied by Rao .1995b) in Nadia and Hoogly charged all of Rs 5/hour when
private diesel pump owners charge Rs35–40/hour and found plenty of  takers. The highest rate of Rs 2,000/ha charged
by Baksa and Babur beri clusters could cover direct operating costs but were still far lower than private economic costs
of groundwater irrigation.20
important part of North Bengal’s MI environment; moreover, DTWs and RLIs offer good study in
the dynamics of irrigation organizations; so we report on our visits to a few of these in the hope
that the report would contribute to a richer and more complete analysis.
DTWs and RLIs are entirely government-managed; and as elsewhere in India, the same
problems—of operator absenteeism, fuel shortages, inordinately long shut-down periods,
undependable irrigation supply, and all of these resulting in low utilization rates that have turned
public tube well programs into resounding failures in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat and
Rajasthan—seemed to bewitch DTWS and RLIs of North Bengal.
15 DTWs are constructed and
managed by the Agri-Irrigation Department whereas RLIs are in charge of the Agri-Mechanical
Department. These agencies manage these schemes through a complex maze of procedures.
Maintenance and repair, diesel procurement and supply and collection of water tax are all handled
by the Agri-Mech. and Agri-Irrigation Divisions.
Box 1
Purvo Harmoti RLI
In Purvo Harmoty village, we visited a large RLI with a design command of 80 ha serving
some 60–65 farmers; the scheme set up in 1980 had a large pump house with two diesel
engines each of 24.5 hp; the piped distribution system had 32 spouts. Typical of all DTWs
and RLIs, the scheme was owned, controlled and managed by the government. The RLI was
operated by a staff of three: an Operator, an Assistant Operator and a Watchman, all
employees of the Agri-Mechanical Department but under the operational control of the BDO.
Their salary was paid from the funds of the Agri-Mech Department but was released through
the BDO’s office; their casual leave was approved by the BDO; but earned leave, by the Agri-
Mech division. Although rated as amongst the better-run RLIs of Jalpaiguri, Purvo Harmoty
was neither financially viable nor did it generate in its command the agrarian dynamism that a
well-managed irrigation system invariably unleashes.
A major management challenge is to deal with the pronounced seasonality in demand for
irrigation. Rabi is the peak irrigation season when every farmer in the command wants to raise
vegetable crops; in summer, the demand drops drastically. In kharif, the system virtually remains
inoperative. Then, one of the powerful constraints on full utilization of the systems is the power
                                                                
15It was common to see here DTWs and RLIs, which had never begun to function after they were installed. On the first
day of our fieldwork, on the way to Dhupguri, we stopped at Magurmari to take a look at a big World Bank and
NABARD-supported DTW. Expectedly, it turned out to be out of commission. Soon after installation, apparently, the
distribution system began to leak at two or three places; as a result, it has never been operated. The Panchayat Samiti
member on whose land the DTW is located has drawn a domestic power line from the electricity pole; that has been the
sole beneficial impact of the DTW. In fact, he could do one better: he could install an electric pump and run it without
cost since he will  not get an electricity bill for a public tube well. Later, we were told that there was no BC on this
DTW;  and if there was one, farmers did not know about it..
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supply uncertainties and the complex logistics of securing diesel supply.
16 The binding constraint
on their financial and economic viability is created by unjustifiably low water charges and the
procedural complexity encountered in the system of water tax collection. To irrigate a crop, the
farmer has to pay the water tax in advance at the office of the BDO which issues him a challan
to be turned in to the RLI operator before irrigation starts. The purpose presumably is to ensure
that water is supplied only to those who have paid the fees. However, it is not easy for the
operator to restrict irrigation supply only to those who can produce the challan. Farmers near the
head can always irrigate when the system is on. Then, these worries arise only when the operator
displays a high level of sincerity and diligence or the Department operates a finely tuned control
system; neither is however the case.
Box 2
History of Farmer Managed Irrigation in North Bengal
West Bengal began to act on farmer participation in irrigation management way back in early
1970’s when most other states had not even begun talking about it. During the 1970’s some
200 DTWs were built for user groups organized as registered farmer cooperatives; for a
variety of reasons, this program failed miserably. This was followed by a movement to create
BCs which were to own and actively manage DTWs and RLIs; these failed too because the
BCs were designed to be wholly powerless and ineffectual; as a result, most of them became
defunct even as they were created. With the DTWs and RLIs, these powerless and defunct
BCs continue to remain marginalized even today; however, World Bank’s MI Scheme in 1985
struck a major departure in the management turn over of irrigation systems to user groups.
This took the shape of STW clusters under Panchayat Samitis in 1991. Each cluster has a BC
with one Panchayat Samiti member, one Gram Panchayat member and one member each from
the beneficiaries of each of the 6 STWs. These as well as the hon. secretary are appointed by
the Sabhapati of the Panchayat Samiti. Till May 1995, 2500 such STWs were transferred to
Panchayat Samitis. By a 1993 GO, the same rules were applied to  MDTWs and HDTWs.
However, only 12 such MDTWs and HDTWs were handed over by 1995.
                                                                
16During rabi, when average daily operation varies from 8 to 12 hours, these systems use a substantial quantity of diesel
at 4 liters of diesel per hour. However, diesel is centrally procured for all the 40 odd RLIs and an equal number of
DTWs in each of the North Bengal districts by the government agency based on indents placed by the operator of each
system. The operating rule is that each RLI/DTW places an indent for diesel when it has 1 drum (of 200 l) left in stock.
The Agency however cannot execute each RLI’s or DTW’s indent separately; so it waits for a sizeable demand to build
up before contacting the Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) to procure diesel. The IOC insists on advance payment; and the
Agency is always short of cash; when it is not short of cash, it is short of barrels to store diesel.  Altogether, then,
centralized procurement and distribution of diesel to the district’s RLIs is a complex logistical operation in itself;
naturally, diesel shortage, especially during the peak periods of irrigation demand is one of the central operating
problems of these agency-managed systems.22
Irrigation rates, last revised two decades ago, are levied on a per acre basis for different
crops. Once the water tax is paid, there is no officially fixed limit on the amount of water or the
number of waterings the farmer can take; the operator asserted that 4–5 irrigation turns were
commonly supplied for wheat and more for vegetable crops (box 3); however, the farmers we
interviewed did not agree with the figures given by the operator about the number of waterings
offered; they were far less happy about the reliability and timeliness of water supply, which had to
be supplemented with water purchased from owners of private wells. Thus, the actual cost of RLI
irrigation is quite high. Even so, the RLI irrigation rates are low by any standards one can judge;
and these have not been revised for over a decade.
17 Even the rates for canal irrigation—which
uses no energy—are higher in many States than the RLI rates in West Bengal. When compared
to the private costs of providing river-lift irrigation, the prevailing RLI rates are of course
`enormously low’ and inadequate to cover either fuel or staff or even repair and maintenance
costs.
Box 3
Water Tax Levied by River Lift Irrigation Systems









*As reported by the Operator of Purvo Harmoty RLI.
Until 3 years ago, the RLIs were completely managed by the Agri-Mech staff and BDO.
Since then, a six-member BC has been superimposed on this structure. In many CPM-dominated
areas, the BC is constituted by the Gram Panchayat Pradhan; the BC chairman and secretary
too are nominated by the Panchayat. The Purvo Harmoty RLI however had a BC selected by
people with the endorsement of the Agri-Mech staff; the BC here had no member from the
Panchayat but it does invite some members for some meetings when Panchayat’s cooperation is
needed. The BC’s primary responsibility is in water distribution. It meets around once a month;
but formal systems of governance by the BC are absent; in Purvo Harmoty, for example, there
were neither records of minutes nor resolutions of BC meetings; and we were told this was the
case in all RLIs and DTWs. Thus the main benefit of the BC as of now is in streamlining the
distribution. The operating staff ignored distribution problems earlier or muddled through them but
                                                                
17Mr. Majumdar, Jalpaiguri’s Executive Engineer in charge of the Agri Mechanical Division was of the view that these
have not changed for 20 years or more. The last time any thought was ever given to do a review was when Mr.
Siddhartha Shankar Ray was the CM in the early 1970s; but the proposal was soon dropped; and the matter has never
been raised again..
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now leave them to the BC who has to struggle with them. And the BCs seem to take this
seriously; however, BCs are unable to enlarge their role since they have little control on key
operating parameters. Dormant in normal times, then, the BC comes to life only in times of crises.
They run around to the Agri-Mech and BDO offices when the system is down due either to diesel
shortage or to repair problems.
Our impression in Purvo Harmoty RLI was that the BC was powerless, ineffectual and
unimportant; it has no role, no power, no responsibility except for settling minor issues in
distribution; this is a messy and burdensome task for the BCs that otherwise have no role in
decision making. Little or no process or organization development work has gone into their
formation; as a result, it had not acquired the maturity and awareness needed for effective
governance; the Secretary, for instance, did not know how many farmers there were in the
command or who they were. Is there willingness amongst farmers to take greater responsibility
and assume greater authority? The response seemed to be a conditional `yes.’ The Purvo
Harmoty Secretary told us that the BC would be willing for complete turnover of the RLI but only
if it is fitted with electric pumps, which have much lower energy cost. Insightfully, he patiently
explained to us the Williamsonasque transaction cost logic that private operators can make a diesel
pump profitable but `in group affairs, you see, you have to make allowances; you cannot ensure
tight management and therefore some slack has to be built in to cover the inefficiency and
friction!’ or, put simply, higher transaction costs.
An important lesson offered by Purvo Harmoty is about the motivations that drive
cooperation. Would these farmers ever forge collective action to take over and manage the RLI to
usher in a new era of agricultural prosperity in its command? It seemed highly unlikely. The
present arrangement has virtually subsidized them out of collective action of any form. The RLI
has stabilized at a low level of operation; and the economy of the command too has stabilized at a
low level of equilibrium (box 4). Unless the farmers begin to face the real costs and benefits of an
efficiently run irrigation system, there seems nothing to shake them out of the current low level of
equilibrium. And this sense was echoed by the Council for Development Studies in their case
studies of RLIs in Nutan Basti, Petvata and Barakmata villages in the NBTDP (CDS 1995: 41–
45). All the three were big systems of the type we saw in Purvo Harmoty; all had BCs, which
were largely irrelevant and quite uninterested and uninvolved; and equally importantly, the average
member neither knew nor cared about what the BCs ought to be doing.
18 The central malaise, it
seemed, was the absence of an `irrigation demand pull;’ that this absence persisted even under
subsidized irrigation pricing was indicative of either or both of the following: first, that many
factors other than irrigation—such as the absence of output marketing institutions and
infrastructure, lack of technical knowledge with the farmers and poor extension services, farmers’
risk preferences, etc.—restrict adoption by small farmers of rabi and pre-kharif cultivation;
second, that the transaction costs associated with obtaining subsidized irrigation from these RLIs
                                                                
18There are many reasons why BCs  in big RLIs do not function well; one of them is the way they are brought into
existence. A case study of Petvata RLI in South Berubari GP, Jalpaiguri notes: `There is a 10 member BC for this RLI.
Each member has 2-3 spouts under his operational command. Selection of members was done by a member of the
Panchayat Samiti who took a meeting of farmers in one afternoon, in which he proposed names of 10 members.. He
invited objections if there were any. For obvious reasons,.. the  members were unanimously elected..’ .CDS 1995: 44).24
was very high and tended to keep the farmers in the command area from getting the best
advantage out of it.
Box 4
Socieconomic Impact of Purvo Harmoty RLI
At such low water rates, one would expect irrigation demand to be sustained at high levels,
farmers to switch to water-intensive  cropping regimes, fertilizer use to be high; and in general,
to find the RLI command to experience an irrigation-induced economic upsurge. However, we
noticed no such upsurge in Purvo Harmoty. At the onset of the rabi season, farmers should be
falling over one another to get irrigation; but the bunch of water indents the Assistant
Operator showed us was quite thin and it looked as though payment chalans were presented
for no more than 5–8 ha of land, less than a 10
th of the system’s design command. The
operator’s assertion—that he had to operate the system every day for 6–12 hours—seemed an
exaggeration. Later, Gobind Bishwas, one of the farmers in the command, confided that the
staff followed the 10.00 a.m. to 5.00 p.m. routine strictly; more, on a given day, only one or at
best two of the three would show up since none lived in the village itself. Rarely would the
operator condescend to hand over the key to a ‘responsible’ farmer and allow him to operate
the system after 5 p.m.
Elsewhere in the country, private water sellers would have come up to feed the unsatisfied
irrigation demand in the command of a poorly managed public system. However, here, the RLI
command had no privately owned STWs—which probably meant that the command area’s
agriculture left enormous undeveloped economic potential. The present cropping intensity is
probably no more than 150–160 percent and can easily go up to 250 percent. One possibility is
that the irrigation demand pull has yet not become strong enough to stimulate private
investment in irrigation as in agriculturally dynamic pockets in Coochbehar and Siliguri next
door; a more likely explanation is that the poor quality of irrigation service offered by the RLI
has impeded the transformation of agriculture in the command.
Else, how can one explain that in Petvata, RLI started in 1989, irrigated 14.17 ha .35 acres) in
rabi and pre- kharif and provided a supplementary irrigation or two to around 52.54 .130 acres)
during aman and kharif seasons. In the Barakamat RLI of the same configuration, the demand
situation was the same; some 40.47 ha (100 acres) were under aman paddy; and about 32.38 ha
(80 acres) under rabi and pre-kharif, a lot of it getting only supplementary irrigation. Chances are
that these systems operate for just 700–800 hours in the whole year. Nutan Basti RLI’s command
was dominated by Rajbangshis most of whom were first- generation commercial farmers; they
were blissfully unaware of the economic possibilities offered by pre-kharif or rabi cultivation.
However, with the development of the Haldibari market nearby, things have suddenly begun to
look up for the Rajbangshis of Nutan Basti; and against the light of this emerging `irrigation
demand pull,’ the problems of RLI management are coming into bold relief; they have been
figuring out that long shut-down periods—that have been common so far because of lackadaisical
repair and maintenance—can cost them heavily in terms of burnt crops; that a good deal of the.
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RLI’s usefulness to them is lost because of the 10 a.m.–5.00 p.m. work schedule of the operator;
that much more can be got out of the RLI through better matching of the capacity of the pumping
plant, water demand parameters and the size of the distribution system.
Sarkar-Mai-Baap Syndrome: Badogadi DTW
DTWs, similar to RLIs in their scale, technology, organizational dynamic, were no different from
RLIs in their problems and prospects. Dependency on subsidies—and the sarkar mai-baap
syndrome—were the visible outcomes of current MI policy. This was evident in the course of our
visit to Madhya Badagadi DTW, Badogharia Gram Panchayat, Dhupguri. Here we carried out an
impromptu PRA with a small group of farmers in the command of this large deep tube well, which
has been nonfunctional for the past 2 months because a lightening hit the transformer and burnt it.
The 7-year old DTW was 375 feet deep and had a command area of 300 bigha served by an
underground piped distribution system. However, despite 7 years of DTW irrigation, we saw a
good deal of local aman paddy standing all around us, which would be harvested only in December
by which time it will probably be too late for potato. The DTW was in charge of an operator who
lived across the village in a DTW operator’s quarter in the neighboring village. The operator and
the assistant operator of that DTW commuted every day from Moynaguri, 35 km away.
Our discussion was led by Mohammad Hamiruddin, the BC President who represented the
irrigation interests of some 60–70 farmers (he was not sure how many) in the DTW command.
Hamiruddin was a typically opportunistic ‘communist party member’: ‘Sa’ab, poor people have no
political sympathies no interests. We join whichever party can get us benefits.’
The BC was constituted by owners of land where the 12 spouts were located. Hamiruddin was
conveniently appointed the President because the DTW was located besides his house. His
younger brother was similarly appointed the Secretary. As elsewhere, here too, the BC had no
well-defined function—except that the operator could conveniently off-load all non-technical
problems on to the BC, which had so far dealt with them with a fair degree of success. But the
BC had now met its Waterloo in the burnt transformer; the Assistant Engineer of the WBEB did
not pay much heed to their repeated representations; and if he insisted on paying only lip service
rather than doing something about the transformer, Hamiruddin and Co. will be in deep trouble in
December and thenceforth. Farmers here had no doubt thought they could, through alternative
courses of action in case the system does not get repaired purchase pump irrigation from private
well owners which would be many times more expensive; however, their preferred option would,
naturally, be for the Department to get the system back into operation; and to this end, Hamiruddin
and his co-members on the BC would keep doing rounds of the government offices in Dhupguri.
Box 526
PRA at Madhya Badagadi DTW, Dhupguri
We explored alternative courses of action in such an eventuality. The Panchayat has several
diesel pumps that they rent out at Rs 15–18/hour (excluding diesel and Mobil); besides, they
have to pay Rs 3/hour to the operator. Private STW owners here operate as discriminating
monopolists par excellence and charge Rs 40,50 or even 60/hour depending upon the market
position.  However, used to subsidized—why, nearly free—irrigation service for 7 years, the
group would not accept any solution other than complete and immediate resumption of DTW
irrigation in a mock brainstorming exercise we did with them. `If a businessman offered to run
the DTW with a 25-hp diesel pump and supply water at Rs 50/hour, would you be willing to
buy it?’, we explored cautiously. `No way.’ was the curt reply. `Would you like to rent private
pumps from neighboring farmers at Rs 35/hour?’, we probed further.
‘Why should we? What was the point of setting up this DTW? Besides, how can we poor
small farmers afford so expensive irrigation?’
‘Why, if you can afford to pay Rs 100/bigha to private power tiller operators—and Rs
50/bigha to a bullock pair with a driver—per chaas, why can’t you pay Rs 35/hour of pump
irrigation?’
`No, all we want is our DTW to restart. Else, we will all get ruined.’ We thought that here at
least was a DTW, which had brought about powerful socioeconomic change through
agricultural modernization. But this was not to be.
Before leaving the village, we met Nipendra Nath Das, the DTW operator and from his
records, we computed that during January and December 1996, the DTW operated for all of 357
hours; that the gross area irrigated by the DTW during 1996–97 was 29.75 ha (73.5 acres), and
that the total water tax paid by the farmers was Rs 8,254, over 90 percent of it in rabi. This again
suggested that 7 years of irrigation experience had still not changed cropping patterns
significantly; and the demand for irrigation outside the rabi season was negligible.
Dependency Syndrome: Paschim Magurmari
Back to RLIs. Our visit to Paschim Magurmari RLI produced lessons on the problems of the
buried pipe distribution system and on the dependency of farmers on the administration to solve all
their problems. Originally designed for a command of 40.47 ha (100 acres), the design command
was reworked first to 24.28 ha (60 acres) and then to 16.19 ha (40 acres) after the pump house
was found to be wrongly located. Two years later, the transmission system began to leak
profusely. The combined outcome of leaking spouts and the vanishing operator was that it could
barely irrigate 8.09 ha (20 acres) in rabi. Moreover, many closed spouts kept releasing water as
soon as the system got switched on and nearly half of the rest refused to let water down even
when opened. As a result, some fields received unstoppable supplies of water causing acute
flooding; and elsewhere, all that the 18-hp system could irrigate after all day of pumping was 3–4
bighas. Another problem was that the operator worked on his 10 a.m.–5 p.m. schedule and
refused to leave the keys behind; moreover, some engineer in the Department had convinced him
that it is good for the health of the system to give it a 2-hour break after every 2 hours of.
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operation; this effectively reduced the utilization rate of the RLI to 4 hours/day for 100 days of the
rabi season!
Despite all these problems, we found the farmers of Magurmari were deeply fond of and
possessive about the RLI. This was not easy to explicate because all them were used to diesel
pump irrigation service, which was several times more expensive compared to the RLI’s
subsidized water tax. Most RLI members rented diesel pumps when in dire need of irrigation.
During the rabi season, 8–10 diesel pumps were always on the riverside, pumping water for
irrigating potato or other rabi crops. Rental rates were Rs 40/hour without delivery pipe. For poly-
pipe, the extra rent was Rs 0.50/ foot/day—which was quite steep, indeed. Operating on the
private pump irrigation market, they could not have escaped the value of dependable, timely
irrigation supply.
Box 6
Focus Group Discussion: Paschim Magurmari RLI
‘Since you already have a BC, why don’t you take over the management of this RLI, pool
some funds, bring it in pin-up condition and then run it yourself?’, we explored. ‘No way,
Saar. What we have at present is the best arrangement.’
We probed: ‘Assume that the government is prepared to write off this system and give,
instead 50 diesel pumps to individual farmers in the RLI command, would you not be happier?
Would not more of the present RLI command be irrigated?’  We had expected that farmers
would gleefully accept this alternative. But this was not to be. Instead, one old man asked:
`why should the government want to do that?’. We explained:` ..because this RLI’s cost must
be well over Rs 5 lakhs, which can be used to acquire 35 diesel pumps of 5-hp at around Rs
13,000 and given away to individual farmers for free..’  The old one persisted: ‘Will the
government also pay for the diesel? You see, in the present system, we do not have to pay
the electricity bill. But with diesel pumps, we will have to spend from our own pocket on
diesel every time we irrigate. Also, we will have to make our own STWs at a cost of Rs 2,000
or even more. So how do you expect us to accept 50 pumps in place of our RLI?’
‘But you also have so many advantages. Each one of you can irrigate when you want and
as much as you want… you can also rent out your pump when it is free.. you can grow boro
rice on all your field.. and there is no hassle.. you don’t have to worry when the operator
comes or goes...you don’t have to wait for someone to come and fix your system when it
conks out.. with your own pump, you are on your own.. just buy your diesel and get on with
the job..’
After a long and inspiring lecture on advantages of standing on one’s own feet, they
reluctantly agreed to consider the hypothetical proposal. But once they did that, other
options came to the fore too. It was finally settled by consensus that if the government had
Rs 5 lakhs to blow up for the good of the small farmers, the best option: give away a diesel
pump to any group of 4–5 small farmers who would fork out cash to make their own bore-well.28
Perhaps we met only the small group consisting of fortunate owners of land actually served in
its command. Be that as it may, but there was this great fascination about the fact that someone
else had paid the electricity bill; and someone else had paid the operator’s wages; and someone
else had the responsibility of fixing the system when it conked out. This was the subsidy-created
money illusion at its full play; no matter the quality of service and what it does to their farming, as
long as the Department ran the RLI for them, nothing could be better.
Box 7





(a) Design command 60 ha 80 ha
Actual design command obtained by adding up
the design (a) command of each spout
49.3 ha 41.78 ha
(b) Actual cultivated area in rabi 12.8 ha 21.7 ha
(c) Area for which irrigation  was paid for 6.764 ha 17.6 ha
Problems of Water Tax Estimation and Collection
The economic viability of DTWs and RLIs—in terms of the scale of the increase in agricultural
value-added caused by them relative to the resource cost of establishing and operating them—is
deeply affected by their low utilization rates; however, their financial viability already impaired by
unduly low water tax is further hit by the low water charge collection rate. A study of two such
systems by van Keulen, Alice and Robert Dekker (1992) explored both low utilization and low
recovery.
Reasons given by farmers for the low percent of cultivated to design command included: a)
lack of money to buy seed and fertilizer; b) lack of money to hire—or nonviability of hiring—a
plough; c) lack of time and of money to hire labor; d) unreliable water supply; e) resting the land!
f) rabi crops cost too much to raise; g) no familiarity with rabi farming.
However, the two researchers also found that the beneficiaries irrigated more land than was
recorded and paid for. For the Dakshin Mathabdanga DTW, they found the area paid for in rabi
1990–91 to be 6.5 ha and in rabi 1991–92 to be 6.8 ha; but when they actually measured the area
irrigated in rabi 1991–92, it turned out to be 12.8 ha (box 7).  ‘The main reason for the big
difference in total cultivated area is the frequent operator’s absence...he (operator) does not
check whether the area on the requisition slip corresponds with the actual plot size. We found
many requisition slips from which the data was not written down in the book… it is easy for the
beneficiaries to take water without paying because they are all allowed to open the spouts... it
does not seem that the logbooks are checked, resulting in unreliable data which do not correspond
with actual situation….’
19
                                                                
19Things were actually worse than the recorded information showed. If only the recorded data and command area
according to original design criteria were used, a land utilization degree of 11 percent would be the result; fortunately,.
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Some Conclusions
The conclusions that follow from our field visits could suffer from small sample bias; however,
many trends we found derived indicative support from district-level aggregated data. For instance,
that the RLIs were not intensively utilized despite heavily subsidized irrigation rate is clear from
the block-wise picture provided by the office of the Executive Engineer (Agri Mech) and
summarized in tables 6 and 7. According to these figures, during 1996–97, RLIs in Jalpaiguri
district irrigated an average of 33 ha gross, some 60 percent of it during the rabi season; in net
terms, thus at peak irrigation load, the systems irrigated a net area of around 18–20 ha with
massive variations across blocks. Low utilization rates combined with low irrigation charges to
produce worrisome economics of RLIs: the gross income per RLI averaged less than Rs 2,000
per year, 1 percent or less of their capital cost of construction, and hardly enough to pay for the
chawkidar’s salary for one month!
Box 8
Area Irrigated, hours of operation and diesel















(diesel/ha of  gross area
irrigated)
Jalpaiguri 12 478.41 39.87 2,925 (6.1) 11,700 (24.5)
Rajganj 7 189.84 27.12 1,330(7.00) 5,320 (28.0)
Moynaguri 16 641.68 40.10 4,080 (6.35) 16,556 (25.8)
Dhupguri 9 635.21 70.58 6,702(10.55) 26,890 (42.3)
Mal 5 64.84 12.97 520 (8.01) 2,080 (32.0)
Alipurduar I 8 194.57 24.32 1,575 (8.08) 6,300 (32.3)
Alipurduar II 12 291.13 24.26 2,750 (9.45) 11,000 (37.8)
Falakata 6 70.53 11.76 490(6.95) 1,907 (27.0)
Madarihat 3 56.14 18.71 450(8.04) 1,800 (32.1)
Kalchini 1 27.77 27.77 240(8.57) 960 (34.3)
Kumargram 3 67.42 22.47 600 (8.8) 2,400 (35.8)
All 82 2,717.54 33.14 21,662(7.9) 86,913 (32.0)
                                                                                                                                                                                                
because of smaller actual design command and unpaid irrigation, the utilization ratio is 12.8 percent! No matter how
viable an irrigation scheme may appear at the planning stage, no amount of cushioning can make it viable at such
abominably low utilization rates.30
If we assume the current replacement cost of a DTW at a conservative Rs 5 lakhs, the
capital investment per ha of gross area irrigated amounts to over Rs 15,000, enough to give a
diesel pump and a bamboo bore to each farmer in the command, assuming that the average
landholding is 1.5 ha. The gross area irrigated per RLI varies from a high of 70.5 ha in Dhupguri
to a low of 12 ha in Falakata and averages 33 for the district as a whole. If we take the cropping
intensity to be 180 percent, then the net cropped area served by an average DTW is around 18 ha,
less than one-fifth of the design command. The data also provide a good insight into the adequacy
of irrigation provided by DTWs; the DTWs provide, on average, 8 hours of irrigation/ha or just 1
hour per bigha which is probably less than sufficient for rabi crops even in a region like North
Bengal where farmers commonly grow rabi crops, largely with moisture retained in soil
supplemented by light irrigation.
Another way of verifying this is diesel consumption/ha, which averages 32 l/ha or around 4.5
liters/bigha. In the course of our PRAs with farmers using small private diesel pumps, we figured
that a bigha of wheat or potato is given some 12–18 hours of irrigation using 12–18 liters of diesel.
Then, large systems probably use fuel more efficiently; yet, it is very unlikely that a 25-hp RLI can
provide in 4.5 liters of diesel (or 1.2 hours) the same amount of irrigation that a 5-hp pump would
provide in 15 liters (or 15 hours). Moreover, the timing of irrigation supply, its scheduling and
distribution, conveyance losses from spouts to the field, and the difficulty of handling large flow
might be the factors that can contribute to inefficient water use from such large systems
compared to small private diesel pump sets. This implies that command areas of government-
managed DTWs and RLIs are under-irrigated compared to privately irrigated areas.
Box 9
Area Irrigated and Water Tax Collected by RLIs:


















Jalpaiguri 12 478.41 29,244.6 39.87 61.13 2,437
Rajganj 7 189.84 11,390.4 27.12 60.00 1,627
Moynaguri 16 641.68 38,861.3 40.10 60.56 2,429
Dhupguri 9 635.21 31,623.2 70.58 49.78 3,514
Mal 5 64.84 3,890.4 12.97 60.00 778
Aliprduar I 8 194.57 17,179.5 24.32 88.29 2,147
Alipurduar II 12 291.13 27,408.1 24.26 94.14 2,284
Falakata 6 70.53 4,096.55 11.76 58.08 683
Madarihat 3 56.14 4,155.4 18.71 74.06 1,385
Kalchini 1 27.77 2,374.15 27.77 85.49 2,374
Kumargram 3 67.42 3,942.7 22.47 58.48 1,314
All 82 2,717.54 158,704.7 33.14 58.40 1,935.
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If farmers are not bitter about such poor offering by government-managed RLIs, the reasons
are obvious in table 7; all they have been paying as water tax per ha is Rs 60. If they purchased
the same amount of irrigation from private pump irrigation markets, they would have to pay in the
neighborhood of Rs 1,500.
20 Another implication is also that, when viewed in light of the actual
quantum of irrigation provided, and its timeliness and dependability, the subsidy provided on
government-managed MI systems may not be as large as one would imagine. True, farmers pay a
fraction of what they would pay in private pump irrigation markets; but then, they also get only a
fraction in terms of the quantity and quality of irrigation service that private pump irrigation
markets place on offer.
Overall, then, the conclusion drawn by Palmer-Jones (1995) based on an Asian study of deep
tube wells is apt here as well:
`DTW projects never achieved the productivity targets expected of them, and at best, barely
achieved accepted economic rates of return, at least as calculated in official evaluations… Many
DTWs had much shortened life than planned, and few were able to cover their operating costs,
leave alone amortisation charges…Some DTW projects managed in the public sector were by-
words in inefficiency and corruption; those managed by farmer groups or cooperatives were little
better, and the state sponsored cooperatives were often co-opted by the rural elite with inefficient
and inegalitarian outcomes. One response to the poor performance of DTW has been to initiate a
number of aid-supported attempts to improve the management of DTWs, but none has achieved
financial sustainability, let alone full economic viability…’
IV. Small and Medium Mechanical Systems
Introduction
Technology-institutional choice in the field of MI in West Bengal gets exercised at four levels: a)
state and district level government and administration (including irrigation and agriculture
Department at state and district levels and Zilla Parishads); b) Panchayat Samitis at the block
level; c) Gram Panchayats at the village level; and d) individual farmers. North Bengal’s MI scene
offers a good study because of the sharp differences in the way the choice is exercised at
different levels. The State and district administration stand on one extreme; have revealed a
preference for DTWs and RLIs under their own management; these are capital-intensive,
complex systems with large pumping plants and advanced piped water distribution systems that
can become viable only with large commands and necessitate an intricately designed and managed
economic organization. On the other extreme, individual farmers choose the simplest, the smallest
and the least capital-intensive irrigation technology that requires no group organization and uses
simple market processes to enhance pump utilization; farmers use 50–60’ deep bamboo bores
costing Rs 1,500–2,000 apiece instead of 350 feet deep tubes of GI pipes costing over Rs 100,000
                                                                
20The average RLI uses 32 liters of diesel/ha which is equivalent to 32 hours of pumping from a 5-hp diesel pump.
Assuming that the RLI is 20 percent more fuel-efficient compared to the smaller pump, the small pump would need to
work for 38 hours to irrigate 1 ha as well as the RLI does. At Rs 40/hour, which is the going price of pump irrigation in
the private market, the cost of equivalent private irrigation would be over Rs 1,500/ha.32
in DTWs; to cut conveyance losses, farmers use over-land poly-pipes costing Rs 3/foot compared
to the complex underground pipeline networks with spouts costing well over Rs 60/meter; farmers
use 5 or at best 7.5-hp diesel pumps with discharge of 8–10,000 liters/hour whereas DTWs/RLIs
use two 25-hp diesel pumps with a discharge of 35–40,000 liters/hour. DTWs/RLIs cost Rs 12–
15,000/ha of gross irrigated area; farmers’ irrigation systems cost Rs 3,000–3,500/ha of gross
irrigated area. Between these two extremes lies a range of small and medium techno-institutional
alternatives; and it is interesting that Panchayat Samitis tend to choose smaller, less capital-
intensive and organizationally simpler alternatives compared to those chosen by the State
administration; and Gram Panchayats—which are closest to the people and, therefore, most
realistic in their need-assessment—end up choosing even simpler and cheaper alternatives that are
less capital-intensive and construction-oriented.
Box 10





STWl MDTW Mini RLI
Capital cost (Rs/Unit) 3,550 500 27,700 29,200 12,600,000 450,000
Net Design Command (ha) 0.14 0.19 3 4 20 20
Gross area irrigated (ha) 0.25 0.46 2.18 5.70 23
b 27.5
b
Cropping Intensity (percent) 179 242 73.9 143 115
b 138 
b
Capital cost (Rs/ha of DC
a) 25,357 2,635 9,233 7,233 63,000 22,500
Capital cost/ha of GIA 
c 14,200 1,087 13,850 5,125 54,748 16,364
Capital cost /beneficiary 3,500 500 6,925 5,840 21,748 12,162
Farmer contribution (%) 10 100 25 25 0 0
Incre, net benefit (Rs/year) 4,140 6,483 4,324 71,482 206,254 275,373
IRR  percent 29.54 95.78 30.32 83.91 11 63
Source. Das 1997.
a. DC = Design command.
b. Assumed by the author.
c. Gross irrigated area by the scheme.
In Moynaguri BDO’s office, for example, the whole range of MI works undertaken by the
Panchayat Samitis from funds devolved to them was explained to us; these included surface
water-based schemes such as Surface Drainage Scheme, Drainage Canal Scheme, Lock-gate
Schemes
21 and Irrigation Tanks with diesel pumps. Groundwater-based schemes promoted by
                                                                
21Surface Drainage Schemes are designed to drain low-lying areas remaining waterlogged for several months after the end
of the monsoon; Drainage Canal Schemes involve transporting drained water and using it for irrigation elsewhere. Lock-
gate Schemes are styled after the traditional  Jamboi system of irrigation in which a stream is dammed to create a.
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Panchayat Samitis include, besides the regulation DTWs and RLIs controlled and managed by the
Agri-Mechanical and Agri-Irrigation Departments,  STW Clusters and Pump Dug-well Clusters,
22
which provide just a well and a shared pump but without buried distribution systems that cost a
fortune. Then, Panchayat Samitis also support Basic-or Ultra-Mini RLI schemes
23 costing just
around Rs 1 lakh; these are no-nonsense RLIs with each having just one 5-hp diesel pump
mounted on the river bank with the inlet pipe in the river; it has no pump house, nor a standby
pump, but a low-cost distribution system. Last but not least, the Panchayat Samiti MI Menu
includes Hand tube wells (HTWs) for which there is a strong demand.
Recently, Das (1997) carried out an economic analysis of six irrigation technologies supported
by the NBTDP (see box 10). He found Medium Duty DTWs and Mini RLIs with design
commands of 20 ha to be most capital-intensive; and these are substantially scaled-down versions
of the original `mega’ DTWs and RLIs with design commands of 80 ha plus. The only other
technology that beat it in capital intensity was HTWs;
24 but HTWs are supported as multipurpose
structures; most of them are used by small farmer households not only for irrigating small plots but
also for securing drinking water supplies. In this sense, they are not strictly comparable with other
pure irrigation technologies.
25 Treadle pumps, of course, are the least capital-intensive since they
are used on shallow bamboo-bores or PVC bores that cost a fraction of what GI-pipe bores
cost.
26 Smaller mechanized systems—pump dug-wells and STWs—fall in the middle in capital
intensity; but they have larger command areas than HTWs and TPWs. Since there is a heavy
element of capital subsidy in all these schemes except the treadle pump, there are major issues of
distributional equity. The farmers in the command of an MDTW get nearly Rs 20,000/family as
                                                                                                                                                                                                
diversion flow for gravity-based irrigation; a gated dam is now provided to regulate the size of the diversion flow
produced.
22Jalpaiguri Panchayat Samitis have done some 220 of these; these include a cluster of 6 STWs accompanied by two
diesel pumps between the six. A common BC is supposed to manage the machines. There is an identical Pump Dug-
well cluster scheme in which STWs are replaced by dug-wells. Both STW and pump dug-well cluster schemes are on
100 percent subsidy and are financed from the Government of India’s  Million Well Scheme. Each scheme (STWs or
dug-wells) costs 1.32 to 1.6 lakhs/cluster.
23This was a relatively new scheme and there is one such basic RLI in each Gram Panchayat. The scheme is turned over
to BCs straightaway without much ado; once commissioned, the Panchayat Samiti then takes no responsibility for
these whatever.
24The bulk of the capital cost in HTWs is of the bore and the GI pipe used in it. We could not figure out if the cheaper
materials used by farmers in  Rs 1,500-STWs—such as bamboo or PVC suction pipes—are unsuitable for HTWs,
which are used for drinking water supplies by most beneficiary households. If they are not, then, clearly, the current
programs support overinvestment in HTWs.
25For instance, HTWs are set on a concrete platform which costs a packet. But the concrete platform was introduced
because of the repeated finding that unhygienic conditions around HTWs cause contamination of drinking water.
26The choice between HYW and treadle pump however is puzzling. The treadle pump cost is one-seventh of the cost of
an HTW; its discharge is nearly twice that of the HTW; I have seen many women peddling comfortably on treadle
pumps in Coochbehar as well as in Jalpaiguri. Apparently, thus, it makes a lot more sense to promote treadle pump in
place of the HTW, unless the latter tapping deeper aquifers pump cleaner, better-quality water for drinking.34
subsidy; whereas those buying TPWs get no subsidy and those getting PDW and STW clusters
get between Rs 4,000 to 5,000/family. The financial and economic returns on the schemes vary
inversely with their capital intensity; TPW, the least-cost technology has the highest economic
IRR; MDTW has the lowest.
In the course of our fieldwork, we got a glimpse of many of these schemes. In Saptivadi
village of Moynaguri, we saw a basic RLI and talked to a section of its beneficiaries; in Dakshin
Saptiwadi, we interviewed a young local political leader who had got himself one of a cluster of
pump dug-wells; both he and a local leader we met soon thereafter suggested that the normal
pump subsidy available to small and marginal farmers in other States is very difficult to access in
North Bengal. We also explored diesel pump renting by Gram Panchayats. We visited the
NBTDP mini RLI in Jungli Pada village in Dhupguri, another one in Coverbail village in Dinhatta,
Coochbehar, and yet one more in Uttar Khagrabari in Moynaguri. In the remainder of this section,
we present a running account of what we saw before developing an overview and conclusions on
smaller MI initiatives supported by North Bengal’s MI policy.
The NBTDP’s Mini RLIs
Jungali Pada, Dhupguri
After supporting big DTWs and RLIs during its first two phases, the NBTDP reviewed their
performance and decided to support scaled-down versions of these schemes during phase III.
Large DTWs and RLIs typically have two 25-hp engines/motors and a design command area of
60 ha. The scaled-down versions—Medium Duty Tube Wells and Mini RLIs—that are now being
supported have a command area of just around 20 ha. Because of technical problems, no
MDTWs have been constructed as yet; however, a number of mini RLIs have been constructed.
We visited some of these at different stages of operation and interviewed their beneficiaries. The
first of these was in the village Jungali Pada in the Dhupguri block.
In this small village where a mini RLI (a member of a 4 RLI cluster) under the NBTDP was
due for commissioning, we met a group of farmers and, Gobinda Rai, the Secretary of the BC. All
the civil work was long since over; and after a frustratingly long wait, three brand new diesel
engines had arrived just the day before spreading all-round joy and excitement. The mini RLI had
the standard NBTDP design with three 5-hp engines and 8 spouts on a buried pipeline system.
The RLI had 32 farmers owning some 128 bighas (approximately 18 ha) in the command; 11 of
these beneficiaries had formed a BC and elected Rai to be the secretary. The BCs of the cluster
of 4 mini RLIs had fixed Rs 26/ hour as the water tax (Rs 9/hour and Rs 2/hour to cover fuel and
Mobil cost respectively; Rs 5/hour towards maintenance, Rs 5/hour as operator’s wage, and Rs
5/hour as depreciation cost). An indenting system for water has been designed under which the
farmer has to pay the water tax in advance for each irrigation. This poses problems; most
members are too poor to fork out ready cash at such times. It is not clear how they propose to
address this problem. Then, they will buy 50 liters of diesel at a time; and need working capital to
the tune of Rs 1,000–1,500 in the pipeline at any point of time. To meet this, they have raised
contributions from members according to ability; they have raised Rs 1,400; the secretary himself
has contributed Rs 200; and this sum is used as the working capital..
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There was already a tradition of irrigated rabi farming, especially of potato; but farmers rented
pumps at Rs 30/hour without a delivery pipe and Rs 40–45/hour with 800–1,000 feet of poly-pipe
for water distribution. The water source was not a problem; the farmer could lift water either
from the river or from any of the several STWs in the village. There were four such private
pumps in Janglipara; the neighboring Kothapara had many more; and all these have been doing
roaring business; and their pumps have been extensively used for potato cultivation, not by the
local farmers but by outside professional potato growers on leased farms.
Potato-lease—small farmers leasing their lands to merchant-farmers coming from outside—is
an extensive system in North Bengal; and its institutional foundation has not been adequately
explored. Apparently, a large number of outsiders—mostly merchants—lease farmlands for just
the rabi season to grow potato at a rental of Rs 800–1,000 per bigha. Their farming is truly
intensive; according to local farmers, over two-thirds of Janglipada’s land gets leased out in rabi
for such commercial potato farming; and in the neighboring village of Beltulivam, all the land is
leased out to merchant-farmers for potato cultivation; they use local as well as outside labor,
irrigate using rented pumps, apply high levels of chemical fertilizers and harvest 50–70 mt of
potato per ha. The landowner is given preference for giving work on the land. Land lease is
almost always on a fixed rent; sharecropping contracts are nonexistent in the potato economy.
With the coming of the RLI, a new dynamic has been unleashed. The merchants who have been
traditionally leasing land in the village have argued for access to irrigation through the RLI; and the
RLI managements have agreed, suggesting that the RLI membership is attached to land and not to
persons; so if the land in the command is leased by someone for a season, the leaseholder
automatically becomes the member of the RLI for the period of his lease.
Tentative lessons that Jungali Pada Mini RLI offers are: a) turnover of a new scheme to BCs
seems to attract better participation than of an existing scheme; b) mini-RLI probably presents a
more `manageable’ technology for small farmer groups than the big RLIs; c) the smaller number
of farmers (25–35) form a cohesive group with lower transaction costs far more easily than larger
groups that big RLIs and DTWs (80–125) require; d) in min-RLIs, there is a sense of finality
about the BC taking over O&M wholesale, which is absent in big RLIs and DTWs; this sense of
finality is highly functional in catalyzing the process of  group formation and preparing to take
over.
Coverbail Mini RLI, Dinhatta
Our experience at Jungli Pada was insightful but limited because it had yet not become
operational; so we could not get to witness the dynamic of a functioning mini-RLI. This
opportunity was provided by the Coverbail mini RLI that was commissioned in 1996. The
Panchayat Samiti had the scheme established and handed over to the members to manage. The
Sabhapati of the Panchayat Samiti had constituted a management committee of 11 members
selected by him; these included a President—who was the Pradhan of the Gram Panchayat, a
Vice President, a General Secretary, a Treasurer/Cashier and a paid Operator at a monthly pay of
Rs 300. The scheme is basically a set of two 10-hp diesel pumps installed on a stationary boat
with a boat-house to keep the pumps safe; it has 25 feet of delivery pipe after which, unlike in
piped transmission system of the NBTDP mini RLIs, water gets transported in open channels. We36
could not get firm figures but the system must have cost less than Rs 1 lakh. The scheme
commands around 40.47 ha (100 acres) and has 70–80 members. The members had fixed Rs
26/hour as the water charge (pre-diesel price hike), which is supposed to cover the full cost of
operation. The Committee, that is supposed to meet monthly since it was formed 6 months ago,
was actually meeting on the day of our visit for the first time to discuss the economics of the RLI.
Experience so far was that one hour of operation consumed 1.5 liters of diesel and around 40 ml
of Mobil together costing Rs 15 (pre-diesel price hike). The RLI commonly operated for 10
hours/day but on many days it operated for as many as 15 hours including at night. Taking 10
hours as average, the monthly operation of 300 hours generates a surplus of Rs 2,400 after paying
off the operator, which seemed enough to cover the repair, maintenance and depreciation cost.
The NBTDP fuel-saving contraption, which reduces diesel consumption to half, could make the
scheme even more viable; and the farmers we talked to were enthusiastic about trying it out.
Box 11
Jangali Para: Potato-lease and pump irrigation markets
According to the people we met, the most important reason why local farmers leased their land to
outsiders was their poverty. Most owned small parcels of land; they did not have the working
capital needed to grow a cash-intensive crop like potato; and Rs 800–1,000/bigha seemed an
attractive rent for a season, especially since it is paid in advance. Moreover, if you also get labor
opportunities at Rs 30/day, that is an additional advantage. For the leaseholder, it does not make
sense to grow any crop other than potato. Compared to vegetables, potato needs limited labor
and is comparatively easier to manage; it is also easy on irrigation; it is meant for the market, and
the merchant-leaseholder can combine production margins with marketing margins to make
potato cultivation on leased land a profitable enterprise.
  However, if the RLI does provide Junglipada’s small farmers a reliable irrigation source, then, in
theory, leasing land out to merchant farmers would become progressively less attractive. In my
surmise, an important reason why this institution has become popular is the absence of
irrigation, which is critical for rabi cultivation. With an assured irrigation source, self-cultivation
of vegetable crops like tomato, brinjal and even potato would emerge as a far more attractive
option for landowners than leasing it to merchant-farmers.
Did the members see great benefits from the scheme? Yes. Although the area has a high
density of private diesel pumps, the buyers find the rental costs at Rs 30–35/hour (pre-diesel price
hike) to be exorbitant. The RLI supplied water at 15–20 percent lower price/hour. Moreover, the
RLI’s discharge was nearly twice that of a 5-hp pump installed on an STW; in terms of actual
irrigation, the RLI could do in 3 hours what the 5-hp diesel pump did in 5. This made the RLI even
more attractive; in overall terms, for a watering, which earlier cost them Rs 150 through hired
diesel pump now cost them Rs 78. There was thus no doubt a strong ‘organizing logic’ for the
RLI..
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Coverbail mini RLI seemed to be the exception that proves the thesis that under well-designed
farmer management, a large MI system can not only operate viably but produce large
socioeconomic impacts provided farmers in the command have learnt to maximize gains from
irrigated farming. This cannot be said about most schemes we saw in Jalpaiguri, where sluggish
demand and primitive irrigated farming impeded the build-up of collective motivation to manage
the system for maximal benefit for the command area farmers. This meant that skilfull process
and organizational development work with the beneficiary group and the BC might help establish
the right group dynamic. This also meant that some key `design’ decisions taken at the start of the
scheme might play a crucial role in launching the farmer-managed irrigation system in a high
performance trajectory. The Uttar Khagrabari mini RLI we visited next illustrated both these.
Uttar Khagrabari Mini RLI, Bankandi, Moynaguri Panchayat
Uttar Khagrabari RLI, created under the NBTDP offered a counterpoise to the Coverbail mini
RLI. The scheme included one 8-hp diesel engine and a very elaborate distribution network of
underground pipes and 22 spouts, each with a threaded lid. All the spouts would be closed at any
point in time except the one where a farmer is irrigating. The RLI cost Rs 1.27 lakhs; with a
distribution chamber, the cost would rise to Rs 1.9 lakhs. The scheme was commissioned in 1995.
The RLI was constructed by the Moynaguri Panchayat Samiti and was given away free to
the BC to manage, use and maintain. The General Body of user-members of the scheme had 32
members; there was no management committee; however, the Sabhapati of the Panchayat
Samiti, Hillal Kumar Chakrabarti had appointed Siddha Mohan Rai, an elderly member of the
community as the President and Dinesh Rai as the General Secretary. There was no Vice
President or a Cashier/Treasurer. All their functions were performed by Paritosa Lashkar, the
paid operator whose wage was fixed at a rather generous rate of Rs 8/hour.
We had an informal group discussion with the President, the operator and four other members
of the group. Our discussion soon veered to the central problem facing the group: although the
scheme was designed to command 100 bigha, it was actually irrigating much less, in fact, no more
than 20 bigha. At a rate of a conservative 10 hours/bigha per rabi crop, the engine should operate
for 1,000 hours; but it did less than 100 in the 1995–96 and the 1996–97 rabi seasons. The key
problem apparently was the price of Rs 30/hour, which members found rather high. Many of them
were earlier hiring 5-hp private diesel pumps with 2–300 feet of rubber pipe at Rs 40/hour; but
they had to use such purchased pump irrigation very sparingly. They find the RLI’s price equally
prohibitive. For some reason, the water output of the scheme was not higher than that of 5-hp
diesel pumps. Before the RLI was commissioned, members grew aus paddy followed by aman
paddy, both of which got no irrigation and very little of other inputs. In rabi, they grew vegetables
like potato, tomato, cauliflower, cabbage and others with the help of rented diesel pumps.  They
got three crops all right; but even now, with the RLI, they grow exactly the same crops in the
same way as before. It was their dream to grow high-yielding rice at least once a year; but a
bigha of boro rice would need 50–60 hours of irrigation, which they found prohibitively expensive.
The ordinary members present in our discussion also appeared agitated because they felt
water rates were unnecessarily high. The engine used on an average 1.2–1.25 l/hour of diesel
and around 0.3 l/hour of Mobil. The fuel cost was no more than Rs 12/hour. The scheme was38
given free to them so there was no need to make provision for interest cost although depreciation
needed to be provided for. But this did not justify a price of Rs 30/hour. What made Rs 30/hour
necessary was the operator’s wage fixed at Rs 8/hour. At this wage rate, the variable cost itself
became Rs 20/hour. On the other hand, while others were not happy about the operator’s high
wage, the operator himself was dissatisfied too because, for all the responsibility of keeping the
engine in safe custody, of stocking diesel and oil, all that he earned was Rs 800/year.
Box 12
Uttar Kagrabari mini RLI:
Exploring  Alternative Pricing and Management Options
We found that the President and the Operator of Uttar Kagrabari mini RLI seemed to be simplistic in
fixing the price at Rs 30/hour; they clearly did not intuitively grasp the logic of break-even analysis.
So, in the course of our focus group discussion, we placed the following hypothetical proposition to
the President and the Operator: “The committee hands over the RLI to me on a management contract;
we promise to sell irrigation to all members at Rs 25/hour and pay to the Committee a fee of Rs
1,000/year. Would you be agreeable to this arrangement?”  We thought this was an irresistible offer;
but the President declined; “it would cause the loss of employment to one young man as the
operator,” he spilled the beans. When we said we would employ Paritosh as the Operator, he agreed
but was quite suspicious. Then, we explained that members of the BC could themselves achieve the
same result by slashing the water price and encouraging at least some members to switch to boro rice
to start with. Every one present agreed that at Rs 25/hour, the demand for pump irrigation would rise
at least to 200 hours from the present 100. We thought that at Rs 22/hour, many farmers would switch
to boro rice and the RLI operation in boro season might easily increase to 600 hours. The cost-plus
water pricing followed by the NBTDP RLIs ensured against hidden subsidies but could easily err on
the other side, too.
Before leaving the group, we asked the President and the Operator whether they would agree to
give such a management contract to their own member if one were ready. Paritosh was not ready; but
one of the other members present readily agreed to be the scheme manager for an annual fee of Rs 500
to be paid to the Committee, a commitment to sell water at Rs 25/hour and taking over the entire
responsibility for fuel, oil, maintenance, and repair.
There was little or no beneficiary participation in the management of the RLI. The general
body meeting was supposed to be held once every season; but the attendance of members was
poor. So meetings stopped being held altogether. President Siddha Mohan Rai seemed unable as
well as uninterested in taking a decisive stance. All in all, Uttar Khagrabari RLI looked like the
classic example of a group embroiled in degenerate collective action.
In the absence of effective group management, from the economic point of view, a superior
arrangement compared to the present low-level equilibrium might be to auction annual
management contract amongst members. The management committee should fix a reasonable
water tax and ask interested members to bid for the management contract. Under such an
arrangement, the highest bidder would have a strong interest in maximizing the RLI’s capacity.
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utilization by encouraging members to switch to profitable, irrigation-responsive crops such as
china boro or boro-9.’
`Basic’ and `Super’ Mini RLIs
At the start of this chapter, we suggested that the choice of technology as well as institution
becomes smaller, simpler, earthier and less capital-intensive as the agency exercising the choice
gets closer to the ground. In North Bengal, we saw a variety of river-lift technologies starting with
monster RLIs built on the one extreme to a simple diesel pump on a river bank pumping water that
gets conveyed to the fields by a shiftable, over-land poly-pipe distribution network (which someone
called `super’ mini RLI). The mini-RLIs supported by the NBTDP, which we reviewed in this
section, fall on this continuum; these are scaled- down versions of the big RLIs; they are more
manageabl and are to be turned over to BCs as soon as they are ready. The progress of the
turnover program of mini-RLIs has been variable and slower than originally envisaged. The
original government order of 1993 stipulated that the management of these schemes through BCs
would be the responsibility of the Panchayat Samitis. A modification in this order that allowed for
the BC to take greater responsibility and assume greater control over the O&M of mini-RLIs took
a long time in coming; and even after it finally came, it left a good deal to be desired. As a result,
the process of turnover made rapid progress where Panchayat Samiti leadership was enlightened;
elsewhere, the organizational arrangement for RLI operation remained weak and ambiguous.
Under the Million Well Scheme of the Government of India, however, the Panchayat Samitis
themselves have operated another scheme to construct small basic RLIs that are even simpler,
smaller and less capital-intensive compared to the NBTDP’s mini RLI. These probably cost
around Rs 100,000 a piece (compared to Rs 4–5 lakhs for the NBTDP- supported mini RLI); they
provide a single diesel pump of 5- or 8-hp capacity, a small distribution chamber to which is
hooked a buried pipeline distribution system made of PVC pipes and spouts. The system has been
designed to cut cost and to facilitate self-management by farmers. The system is handed over free
of cost to the BC as soon as it is commissioned; beneficiaries contribute nothing in the capital cost;
but once it is completed, the Panchayat Samiti withdraws completely from it leaving it entirely to
the BC to deal with it, the way it thinks fit. We report on one such basic mini RLI that we saw in
the course of our fieldwork.  In Saptivadi village, we saw a Panchayat Samiti-supported basic-mini
RLI, which had already done four seasons of irrigation. The system was far simpler and cheaper
than mini RLIs of the NBTDP. It had a 5-hp diesel pump on the riverbank out in the open with the
intake pipe in the river.
Box 13
Saptivadi, Moynaguri. Basic Mini RLI
This was a simple River Lift System with just a 5-hp diesel pump on the bank of a river
pumping water into a distribution chamber linked to a PVC buried pipe distribution system. The
capital cost of the system was around Rs 1 lakh. It was handed over to a BC as soon as it was40
commissioned; the capital cost was fully subsidized; but all operating costs and the scheme’s
O & M were the look out of the beneficiaries.
   A group of beneficiaries we talked to recounted the benefits of the RLI in terms of: a) cost
savings in comparison to getting hired pump from private owners at Rs 40–45/hour; b)
avoidance of output losses caused by over-economising on pump irrigation due to the hassle-
factor; c) reliable, adequate, timely irrigation; d) increased cultivation of potato, brinjal, tomato,
chilli and other vegetable crops in rabi. However, even at the start of the rabi season, it did not
look as if the RLI was going to irrigate the entire command of 80 bigha. The operator thought
that the total rabi irrigation would reach 50–60 bigha; in summer, another 15–20 bigha will
demand irrigation; and in aman, 60–70 bigha of aman rice might demand one watering. Overall, I
surmised, when fully operational, the RLI might have little difficulty in running for 800–1000
hours; and at that level, the entire command as well as the RLI will operate at high-level
equilibrium.
The distribution system consisted of buried PVC pipes with a total of 15 spouts. Designed to
serve some 80 bigha
27  (about 11 ha) owned by 14 families, it was managed by a BC that included
all 14 members. The village had for long been pressurizing the Panchayat Samiti for an irrigation
facility; and this was the Panchayat Samitis response; but the rest of the families felt left out and
sore. There are no private pumps in the area; so farmers economized excessively in irrigation but,
when absolutely necessary, rented a pump from a neighboring village, lifted river water, stored it in
a temporary storage chamber and used it for irrigation through open channels. Compared to this,
the new RLI was a luxury. However, the overall agricultural regime in the command was yet to
adapt itself to take the full advantage of the new irrigation opportunity. The operator complained
that there was something wrong with the pump; and the farmers had waited for nearly a year for
the Panchayat Samiti to get the engine fixed. But the Panchayat Samiti seems to have told them:`..
nothing doing! You better fix it yourselves.’
Despite its simplicity and lack of frill, this basic mini RLI was much better-managed—and
probably created more value and benefits—than the Purvo Harmoty’s mega RLI under Agri-
Mech management. The Panchayat Samiti had just handed over the system; it was now the
group’s responsibility to manage it on a sustainable basis through their BC. The members had just
elected Nagendra Nath Rai as the Adhyakha without any interference from the Panchayat
Samiti. The BC had decided the basic economic norms: water would be charged on an hourly rate
of Rs 25 (Rs 20 before the diesel price hike); of this, the operator would get Rs 5/hour as wage;
of the balance, Rs 11–11.50/hour would pay for diesel and Mobil; and the remaining Rs 8.50–
9.00/hour will cover repair and maintenance costs and contribute to a fund that would eventually
be used to replace parts of the system.
                                                                
27The number of spouts provided in this basic mini was larger compared to the NBTDP’s mini RLI, which has 8 spouts
for a design command of 20 ha @ 1 spout for 2.5 ha or over 17 bighas. In the Saptiwadi basic RLI, there was one spout
for every 5 bighas, which meant lower conveyance losses, better water distribution but probably also higher future
maintenance cost in the distribution system..
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The demand for irrigation had not yet risen to a level where water distribution issues became
important. As a result, the BC had left the RLI operation pretty much to the operator. The BC
met once a month or two; but probably did not have much business to transact. The operator saw
no need for a separate working capital. Whoever wants irrigation, intimates so to the operator,
gives him a fuel advance of Rs 35–40; the operator goes to Moynaguri, fetches fuel, and starts the
pump. Crude and laborious; but it probably works better than government RLIs and DTWs; and it
does reflect the high opportunity cost of working capital, besides giving the operator the chance to
show that he is earning his Rs 5/hour!  He collects the balance of the irrigation fee after the
irrigation is completed and from time to time, the BC deposits the moneys so accumulated, after
paying off the operator, in a special bank account, which now has a balance of around Rs 1,500.
The operator was able to offer no information on the capital cost. However, in my
assessment, it would not be more than Rs 100,000. The distribution system, the main component,
itself might amount to 70–80 percent of the capital cost because it used PVC pipes and simple
spouts. Perhaps, what the operator thought was an engine problem was, in fact, one of matching
the pump capacity with the huge design command. Later in the day, a senior engineer from the
Agri-Mech Department confirmed this; he told us that in the NBTDP mini RLI with three 5-hp
machines has just 8 spouts; and many basic mini RLIs sponsored by the Panchayat Samities such
as the  basic-mini system we saw have just one 5- hp machine had 15, each serving just about 4–6
bigha (less than a ha). The problem probably was not in the engine but in the overdesigned
command.
Pump Dug-Well and Shallow Clusters
Policy Goals and Farmer Preferences
Like all other MI programs in North Bengal, the choice of beneficiary groups and allocation of
different schemes to selected groups occurs through a politico-administrative process that is
largely a `black box’ to outsiders who are not privy to the internal discussions. The NBTDP
program, implemented by the office of the Joint Director of Agriculture gets subjected to pretty
much the same beneficiary selection and scheme allocation norms. Most likely, what happens is
that the total number of schemes approved under all the projects funded from different sources
gets allocated amongst districts according to some predetermined norms; and the quota for each
district gets further distributed amongst blocks. At the block level, there is an intense process of
negotiation and bargaining, which is very crucial for Gram Panchayat-level leaders; our sense is
that a typical Gram Panchayat leader has a dual objective function: he first tries to get as large a
share of the total pie as possible; and then, he tries to get more of those schemes, which he thinks
his people want most. But given the size of the pie, he cannot get as much of the preferred
scheme as he would want because the Panchayat Samiti is given quotas of each scheme
separately. And neither the Gram Panchayat nor the Panchayat Samiti seems to have the power
to convert DTW budgets into mini RLIs or HTW clusters. So the Gram Panchayat has to accept
a DTW even if its leaders as well as prospective beneficiaries would want six clusters of STWs
instead of a big RLI although both would cost about the same. If such convertibility were
available, it seems that a strong preference of the beneficiaries would be revealed for basic mini42
RLIs or STW-clusters over big or even mini-RLIs, DTWs and MDTWs. This was evident in a
PRA we did with a group of around 20 farmers in Zarmangurmari where we went to see one
more defunct RLI, which had been all but washed out by a flood 2 years ago. Three 25-hp diesel
engines were removed to a safe place but were now out of use. However, the distribution system
was intact; and an investment of around Rs 50–70,000 on a new pump house can probably
recommission the system. We suggested that if the government was not interested, the farmers
could have contributed and recommissioned the system. However, the group of 8–10 farmers
from the command we met subsequently were not enthusiastic about recommissioning it even with
government funds. Instead, the informal leader and spokesman of the group—and the secretary of
the 16 member BC—wanted a cluster of 4 STWs.
We explored to some depth the reasoning underlying their preference for an STW cluster over
recommissioned RLI. And the reasons that came up were pretty much what we had expected: the
RLI, after all is said and done, is just no good, even if given free on a platter because: a) irrigation
quality, reliability, dependability and adequacy are poor, to say the least; b) the operator, always
unavailable when needed most, as a rule, is the biggest part of the problem; he is irregular to the
extreme; his presence is scarce and unpredictable; above all, he does not care about farmer
needs; and the 16 member BC has no power over the operator; c) breakdowns are frequent, and
each breakdown takes 10 days to 1 month to fix after all the BC members take to pairavi-kari
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with the Agri-Mech local officials in Dhupguri on a full-time basis; d) diesel shortage at critical
periods is another problem. What they did not articulate but nodded vigorously when we expressed
was that access to control irrigation—the capacity to irrigate when the crops need it and in the
quantity they need—is valuable to them and the RLI offered them no control over their irrigation
regime. Subsequent discussions with other farmer groups also suggested that the groups of four
partners to whom STWs and pump dug-wells were given were organizationally far simpler and
easier to manage than even Mini and basic mini RLIs that needed the cooperation of 12–40
irrigators to operate the scheme through a BC and a specialist operator.
In the course of the PRA, it was also evident that what was critical, for the farmers in the
area, was not the lack of water sources but the shortage of pump capital. The diesel pump was
the most sought after irrigation product; most villages had a river or multiple open access surface
water bodies from which they could lift water for irrigating their crops; bamboo bores could be
made in two days at a cost of Rs 1,500–2,000 using wholly local resources and know-how; if a
farmer could not do even this, he could just dig for 4–5 hours to make a chuha from which he can
pump for 2–3 hours at a go, after leaving it to recharge overnight. In Zarmangurmari PRA, this
dissonance between farmer need for a pump and the official enthusiasm for creating costly water
sources was strikingly clear. Recently, an STW cluster was given to Zarmangurmari; although it
was too early to gauge its impact; what was curious was that the scheme included 6 STWs and
two shared diesel pumps although the farmers needed 8 pumps and no STWs or 6 pumps and 2
STWs. Other than the diesel pumps provided under this cluster, there were few private pumps in
the village; the Gram Panchayat had two of which one was broken down and the other rented at
                                                                
28Hindi for getting things done by influence-peddling or by wheeling and dealing (see, Arvind Das 1991). Pairvi-kari is
the full-time occupation of politicians’ underlings; and the whole tribe survives on the subsidy regime of the welfare
state..
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Rs 25–30/day while diesel is bought by the renter. The rent is collected by the Panchayat member
on behalf of the BC; the BC also takes responsibility for their upkeep. The conked-out machine is
shortly being sent for repair. Some time ago, one of the machines—the one now under repair—
was fitted to an ultra-mini RLI using village technology; but that meant that its use was restricted
to a small group of farmers with land near the river; there was some resistance; so the BC
disengaged the machine from the RLI and decided to keep it free-wheeling and mobile for renting
out to farmers.
Preference for STWs
This preference for STWs and pump dug-well clusters got readily translated in demand for them
by local politicians seeking popular allegiance and mass base. In Dakshin Saptiwadi, we
interviewed Karuna Gobinda Ray, a young Communist party member who had made it to the
Panchayat Samiti last year. Ray won his Panchayat Samiti seat by a margin of 350 votes in the
last election and since then, has thrown all his political weight around to get 30–40 STWs installed
in his ‘booths’ under government programs; having ensured a base for himself, he is now trying to
get a road extended and a college for Moynaguri. Ray, along with three others as his partners,
also got himself an NBTDP-financed  PDW for himself. The four members had to pay Rs 8,000;
the balance Rs 24,000 would be paid from the subsidy funds. The pump had already come; and so
had the rings for the dug-well; however, they had a land subsidence problem in digging the well; so
the four partners just sank an STW at a cost of Rs 650–700 and got their irrigation started!
29 Ray
was not very forthcoming in talking about his own PDW, how he managed it, and who his other
partners were, however much as we tried probing him on these. Perhaps this was so special a
case of PDW that these standard questions did not make sense. But Ray showed that there is
certainly no conflict between power seeking through CPM cadre and self-interest seeking along
with general do-gooding for one’s constituency calculated to strengthen and enlarge one’s
following.
Beneficial Impact of STWs
Even in the scheme for providing STW and PDW clusters, the organizational model used—which
was contributed by the 1985 World Bank MI Project and continues to be in force without any
modification—is unusual in some respects. The 1993 government order stipulated that the BC
would consist of a representative sent by each group as a member; and one of the members
would be appointed by the Panchayat Samiti as the Chairman of the BC. The organizational logic
underlying this design is difficult to understand; it assumes the cluster of 6 STWs or PDWs as a
single unit needing common management and governance; however, operationally, there need be
no link between two STWs; they share nothing except the privilege of being funded by the same
program. And such limited empirical evidence there is seems to suggest that STW groups that did
                                                                
29Ray thought the procedure for allocation of PDWs and STWs was crazy; he thought there was no basis to keep the
categorization of STWs and pump dug-wells at all, except in  some specific areas. He argued that there should be just
one category; and each farmer group should decide whether it can do a dug-well or an STW depending upon the site-
specific conditions.44
well found ways of neutralizing this management and governance structure and operated pretty
much as an independent unit.
A study by van Niekerk (1993) offers a useful example of a highly effective group ownership
and management of STWs given under the NBTDP in Kalamati in Coochbehar. Unlike the recent
practice of providing shared pumps between a cluster of STWs, the STWs studied by van Niekerk
included a 40-m bore-well and a 5-hp diesel pump fitted with a hand pump for priming. STW
utilization rates were high, resulting in the actual command approaching the design command;
collective mobilization of 25 percent of the capital cost from farmers helped build solidarity,
cooperation and collective stake and responsibility.
The author found in these groups strong commitment for maintenance and for good record
keeping. The establishment of STWs helped the beneficiary groups to switch to boro paddy, which
is now their main source of income. Farmers pumped their STWs 12–15 hours a day during the
boro season; an STW can practically cover a command of 30 bigha of boro rice at the maximum;
and, according to van Niekerk, these ones did. So STWs were of crucial importance to the farm
economies of the beneficiary groups. This was evident in the attention devoted by beneficiaries to
setting aside funds for future replacement, and to ensuring full cost recovery of O&M from
irrigation levies without cross subsidization. Great expense and effort were involved in night
guarding and sheltering the STW; these were shared by all beneficiaries; in a few cases, this cost
was borne by the Captain. Bamboo shelters costing Rs 200–500 are made every year; two people
took turns each night to guard the pump during 5 months of the boro season; after boro, the pump
is taken to the Captain’s home. It was rarely that guards were hired at Rs 15/day, which was
either shared by all or paid by the Captain. There was overall happiness with the collective
operation. Collective ownership and management of STWs here created a powerful economic
impact.
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The economic benefits of irrigation varied; shareholders got their irrigation cheapest; non-
shareholders paid a `dry rent’ of Rs 10–12/hour in addition to diesel; however, farmers who
bought water on pump irrigation markets paid the highest for irrigation at Rs 40–45/hour. Their
surplus from boro rice cultivation was the least. Irrigation costs for members was nearly half of
that incurred by water buyers; this alone was enough to signify the economic benefits of STWs.
Irrigation intervals as well as pumping hours needed per bigha depend upon weather conditions
and soil characteristics but ranged from 4 to 6 hours for land preparation and 1–2 hours for normal
waterings depending upon the distance from the well-head. If the utilization rate is defined as area
irrigated per design command, the rate was 87 and 96 percent for the Kalamati STWs. The annual
hours of pumping averaged well over 1,200. This was equivalent to some 32 bigha of boro rice per
STW; and at a conservative Rs 400 per bigha, the average STW caused an incremental net output
of Rs 12,800/year. Since the STWs—which include an STW and a diesel pump but not a buried
distribution system—cost barely Rs 35,000, the economic payback period for the STWs is just
                                                                
30van Niekerk’s description of  Kalamati STW groups might easily be taken to be oligarchic, especially since the
Captain of the group takes an unduly large burden of maintenance and upkeep and presumably also has a lion’s share in
its use. The Captain is typically the largest of the four; and the STW is most likely located in his field. However, as
long as all the members of the group can get their irrigation needs met and as long as they are comfortable with the group
dynamic dominated by the Captain taking a larger share of the benefit as well as cost, there seems no reason to take
exception to the way the arrangement is working..
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around 3 years. The financial payback period too is attractively low; since the beneficiaries
contribute just around Rs 8,500 towards capital cost, the interest cost at 15 percent amounts to Rs
1275/year and the depreciation at 10 percent on the entire system would be Rs 3,500, making a
total interest and depreciation cost of Rs 4,775/year. At 1,200 hours of operation/year, as long as
the group can generate a surplus of Rs 5,000/year over diesel and repair and maintenance costs,
the STW will become financially viable.
Box 14
Successful Collective Management of STWs, Kalamati, Coochbehar, circa 1992
Common patterns have evolved in organization and management. Pumps circulate freely. Farmers in each
STW command identify a Captain who is often the largest farmer and has contributed the most and
commonly organizes maintenance and repair. Shareholders (SH) are those who have paid the 25 percent
share; non-shareholders (NSH) are those who irrigate but have not invested in a share. NSH pay a dry
rent for using the SHW on an hourly or a seasonal basis which is typically Rs 8–10/hour; they also have
to buy their own diesel. However, NSHs do not have to contribute to repair and maintenance and do not
have to buy Mobil. SHs do not accept NSHs as members even if they want to buy in; restricted
membership and seniority claim are valued. Proportionality with acreage is strictly maintained. In some
groups, an initial 25 percent was collected in proportion to acreage; in some, equal contribution was
collected; subsequently, however, large farmers are expected to share a greater burden of repair and
maintenance costs. Water tax collected from NSHs goes to Mobil and maintenance costs. In most cases,
the Captain bears a larger share of  major repair costs; sometimes, these are shared equally or acreage-
wise. Repairs are quick; and shut-down periods are short, especially during rabi; the longest shut-down
period reported was 2 days. Expenses on spares were Rs 500/year on acreage but ranged from Rs 100 to
1,200/year. Similarly, the fitters’ charges were Rs 300–400/year.
Groups were very happy with collective ownership, with no problems in water distribution or
cost sharing; rules were clear and accepted by all. Counter-intuitively, there was strong preference for
group ownership of STWs over individual ownership: a) the former faces problems in drawing channels
across others fields; b) those without STWs will always make demands of the STW owner for the use of
his STWs, which may create ill-feelings. This preference was revealed by many other groups in the
course of our fieldwork. “ The machines are our gods”; so they have to be replaced when their economic
life, which is 15–20 years, is over. At the end of its life, they will sell the old machine as scrap for Rs
3,500; and they will pool the balance by member contributions to rebuild their STW.
Source: van Niekerk 1993.
The Chemistry of Degenerate Collective Action:
Electric STWs in Zarmangurmari
From the Kalamati experience, it would be difficult to imagine that STWs can fail to become
viable and useful to their beneficiaries, especially if they are even cheaper to operate compared to
Kalamati’s diesel STWs. But van Niekerk’s study of the seven Zarmangurmari STWs established
under the West Bengal MI Project suggests that this is a distinct possibility when the chemistry of46
collective action goes awry. Zarmangurmari STWs were 38–40 m deep bore-wells fitted with 3-
hp electric pumps. Moreover, here, farmers were not required to make any contribution to the
capital cost. Physical conditions were different too, compared to Kalamati. Soil was sandy; so
boro rice needed a watering every alternate day; and it took 3–6 hours for irrigating a bigha. As a
result, against over 30 bighas for the Kalamati STW, the average boro rice area in Zarmangurmari
was barely 8.5 bigha per STW.  And since conveyance losses were high, effective command per
STW had reduced even further to barely 6 bigha of land closest to the STW. The soils here were
better suited for rabi crops than boro; as a result, the STW utilization rate was 28 percent for boro
and 57 percent for rabi.
Box 15
Economics of boro rice cultivation in Kalamati, Cooch behar, circa 1992
Shareholder Non-shareholder Water buyer
Irrigation cost 425 575 875
Labor: land preparation 240 240 240
Transplanting 180 180 180







Total cost of cultivation 1,645 1,795 2,095
Value of Produce 2,240 2,240 2,240
Net Profit /bigha 595 445 145
Assumptions:
?  command area of STW: 25 bighas
?  life of pump 12 years; of well, 20 years
?  Mobil: 3.5 liters/100 hours
?  running hours/bigha of boro rice: 35 hours
?  diesel consumption: 1 l/hour
According to the original scheme, once commissioned, the STW cluster was to be handed
over to the Panchayat Samiti that, in turn, would constitute a BC including a President and a
secretary. Each STW group was to send a member to the BC. The government notification about
the transfer to Panchayat Samiti vested all powers and responsibilities—including those for
conducting repairs, paying electricity bills, collecting charges and running the STW—in the
Panchayat Samiti. Making this arrangement work was however nearly impossible from the.
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Panchayat Samitis’ viewpoint since they are already overburdened. In reality, therefore, the
arrangement that eventually got established was different. The Panchayat Samiti and Gram
Panchayat Sabhapati concerned encouraged the beneficiaries and their BC to completely take
over the STW management. So the BC member representing each group was made the
President—or Captain—of each STW groups. As a rule, the owners of land on which the STWs
were located became beneficiary representatives from each group. These were, commonly,
better-off farmers who could also influence the location decision. Thus, for all practical purposes,
many of these STWs could well have ended up getting reserved by the BC members—or, the
Captains—for their exclusive private use. However, they did not do this because doing it did not
make sense; by encouraging others to use the STW, the captains could get others to make some
contribution in electricity and repair costs.
Box 16
Chemistry of Collective Action: Kalamati and Zarmangurmari STW Groups
?  Kalamati STW Groups ?  Zarmangurmari STW groups
?  Group members contributed 25 percent to
the capital cost of the STW; this led to a
sense of collective ownership
?  Group members contributed nothing to the
capital cost; so there was no sense of
solidarity.
?  Fitted with diesel pumps; diesel cost was
the most important variable cost, which had
to be paid at the time of use; so there was
continuous financial transaction in the form
of water tax collection.
?  Fitted with electric pumps subject to flat tariff
collected once in a quarter; so there was no
concept of a `water tax;’ members often forgot
that they had to pay for using the STW; so the
`Captain’ ended up paying the bulk of the
electricity bill and felt `exploited.’
?  Each STW was a managerial unit and had a
self-contained BC of its own.
?  Formally, there was a BC for the entire cluster,
although in reality the arrangement was
different.
?  The beneficiaries had taken over completely
and were running STWs independently and
viably.
?  Strong Sarkar Mai-baap syndrome; groups
were factious and dependency on Panchayat
Samiti was high.
Counterintuitively, most `Captains’ found the BC leadership to be a burden rather than a
pleasurable position. There was no spirit of cooperation in these groups; the `Captains’ found their
responsibilities too onerous. Cost sharing amongst members here was neither  done equally nor in
proportion to use; at the time of payment of electricity bills, each member contributed whatever he
could while the Captain made good the deficit. This was clearly far from satisfactory; as a result,
the solidarity between members and the Captain, that was the hallmark of the Kalamati groups
studied by van Niekerk, was largely absent here.
Pump Cooperatives48
The comparative analysis of Kalamati and Zarmangurmari STW clusters suggests that
organizational design issues become critical even in simple devices such as STWs. A classic
example of designed failure was the National Schedule Tribe Development Corporation’s
scheme to support 500 cooperative irrigation schemes in Coochbehar, of the total of 1,500 for all
of North Bengal. These are basically STWs costing Rs 40,000 apiece in which beneficiaries
contribute 25 percent; the balance is divided equally into a grant made by the Corporation and a
loan, which will eventually be repaid by the Government of India. This sounded like a good
scheme since it required some farmer contribution. But the catch was that 8–9 SC/ST small
farmers had to register themselves as a cooperative under the Cooperative Act, which
complicated things enormously. A senior government official of Coochbehar with whom we
discussed the scheme also thought so but argued that little could be done to help it since the
scheme’s design required it. The Cooperative Department naturally expressed great apprehension
in registering 500 cooperatives each with less than 10 members! But the Department got them to
register them somehow. Under the Cooperative Act, each group would be required to maintain
formal account books; there would have to be formal election of the managing committee and
Chairman; there would need to be a Cooperative Department’s audit of its accounts. One
wondered how these poor groups would manage all this hassle; and more importantly, why should
the poor fellows have to get into such a mess in the first place, especially now when even
NABARD has begun lending to nonformal registered groups.
The assessment of the government officials was that registration as a cooperative has to be
gone through more as a procedural formality to meet the NSFDC conditionality; once the scheme
gets commissioned, business-as-usual is likely to operate, and the groups will hopefully never have
to remember that they ever were registered as cooperatives, nor entertain an audit team from the
Cooperative Department. If they do, they agreed, God help them! The point was whether the
Registrar of Cooperatives would be able to treat them as nonexistent. The administrators thought
that he would, since cooperatives anyway are nonentities here.
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We were also told about the NABARD-supported program to set up 166 mini RLIs in the
district at a unit cost of Rs 4 lakhs each under the Rural Infrastructure Development Fund.
Beneficiaries contribute 15 percent of the total cost; the rest would be a grant. A total sum of Rs
5 crores is assigned to this scheme. Considering that a lot of irrigation infrastructure—especially
RLIs—is available on a 100 percent grant basis, a major apprehension is that beneficiaries may
not be willing to contribute even 15 percent;
32 the danger is that the Panchayats or the
administration will not let go of the do-gooding opportunity; and they will reimburse the missing 15
                                                                
31The Panchayat system destroyed even those few cooperatives that functioned well.  One administrator  explained to
us  how the Left Front finished the credit cooperative movement with one stroke of the pen: as soon as they came to
power in 1978, in a display of devious ingenuity, they modified the principle of ‘open’ membership to PACS to that of
‘universal’ membership, in the process replacing a common property  arrangement by an open access rights system; the
government was lauded for this progressive act; but West Bengal’s cooperatives never knew what hit them; they have
not recovered still; in fact, the movement is as good as dead.
32Especially because these are costly mini RLIs spending a great deal on buried distribution system. A ratio of 15
percent of a Rs 4 lakh scheme amounts to Rs 60,000, which is a good deal compared to 25 percent on an STW scheme
costing Rs 30,000, which is controlled by four partners..
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percent on behalf of the beneficiaries under some pretext or other. One wonders why a mini RLI
should have to cost a whopping Rs 4 lakhs, and that too in North Bengal. If the past performance
is any guide, chances are that less than 5 of the 166 schemes will ever run for more than 500
hours in a year; and the 20–25 farmers in their command will be ever so happy if someone just
gave four diesel pumps between them costing Rs 50,000.
Pumps-on-Rent: Gram Panchayats in MI
Besides all that the state administration, Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis did in the field of
MI, even Gram Panchayats in Jalpaiguri were important `public’ players in the field of MI. They
tailored their coat according to the cloth available to them; so rather than blowing money on huge
MI schemes, where the problem is concerned they hit the nail on the head. Most Gram
Panchayats of Jalpaiguri used the resources made available to them to acquire diesel pumps for
custom-hiring them to small farmers who needed them. As we argued earlier, if pump capital
scarcity—and not the shortage of water points—is the binding constraint on irrigation expansion in
North Bengal, then what the Gram Panchayats did was the most appropriate answer to the
problem. It is a different matter that the poor people we met had only frustration and despondency
to convey about the scheme.
Gram Panchayats used different sources of funds to acquire pumps. The Krishi
Karmadhyaksha of Jalapaiguri told us that many Gram Panchayats bought pumps from Jawahar
Rozgar Yojana/Million Well Scheme funds. Many Gram Panchayats also used their own savings
and internally generated resources to expand their stock of pumps. A variety of arrangements
prevail about the custody of the pumps, their renting, and who get to use them; some Gram
Panchayats entrusted the pumps down to BCs; others managed them themselves through their
members. In the office of the Krishi Karmadhakya of Dhupguri Panchayat Samiti, the Pradhan
of Shakwajhora II village outside Dhupguri told us that his Gram Panchayat has 30 diesel pumps
to rent; Sakwajhora I had 20, all bought by the Gram Panchayat from its own resources. All the
Gram Panchayats around Dhupguri charged a `dry rental’ of Rs 8–12/hour for renting the pump;
the farmers procured their diesel but Mobil would be added by the BC. Custom hiring of pumps
was thus a big operation in some villages around Dhupguri; and these GPs made BC to be in
charge of the upkeep and renting of these machines and they were satisfied with the results.
In the area around the Avasthali village of Moynaguri, we found the entire range of the
NBTDP-supported and private MI structures; there was an STW cluster serving shareholders at
zero `dry rent;’ they buy their own diesel and Mobil; non-shareholders paid Rs 35/hour. There was
also a private pump irrigation seller who sold water at Rs 40/hour. Recently, an NBTDP-
supported mini-RLI has been constructed; although it was yet to start irrigating, its members had
decided it would charge Rs 26/hour. Finally, there was a Panchayat diesel pump that was given
over to a small farmer to operate on a he-keeps-profit-or-loss basis; however, he was to charge
Rs 25/hour inclusive of diesel and Mobil cost.
In villages with pump capital scarcity, Gram Panchayats often—and understandably—used
high rental to clear the pump irrigation market. In Avasthali, Moynaguri, the Gram Panchayat
rented out its lone machine at Rs 40/hour all-inclusive; it also rented the delivery pipe at Rs 50–
60/350 feet. This was higher than the rate charged by even some private pump owners. In the50
Zarmangurmari village of Dhupguri block, other than an STW cluster sanctioned recently, there
were few pumps in the village; the Gram Panchayat had two of which one was broken down and
the other rented at a `dry rent’ of Rs 25–30/day while diesel is bought by the renter. The rent was
collected by the Panchayat member on behalf of the BC, which also took the responsibility for its
upkeep. The conked-out machine was shortly being sent for repair. Some time ago, one of the
machines—the one now under repair—was fitted to an ultra-mini RLI using village technology;
but that meant that its use was restricted to a small group of farmers with land near the river;
there was some resistance; so the BC disengaged the machine from the RLI and decided to keep
it free-wheeling and mobile. Having discussed the Panchayat machine hire with 5–6 groups, we
found it significant that none of them complained about machine breakdowns, maintenance and
repair problems, operator high-handedness and nonavailability about Gram Panchayat machines in
the same way as they did about the DTWs and RLIs. Their complaint was of a different nature:
the BC members monopolize the machines, which are not available to others; at peak irrigation
periods, too many chase the lone Gram Panchayat machine, and seldom get it because the
Panchayat members have the first claim over it.
Box 17
Focus Group Discussion: Paschim Magurmari
In the course of a group discussion, we had asked the farmers in the command of the defunct
Paschim Magurmari RLI: ‘How would they like it if the government just increased the number
of diesel pumps at the disposal of the Gram Panchayat; after all, the Gram Panchayat already
had 15 diesel pumps for renting to marginal farmers like you all?’
They were aghast: ‘Do nothing of the sort. Our Gram Panchayat has diesel pumps for
many years… but none of us has ever seen them, leave alone renting them. They are hardly
free from the work of the Panchayat members for others to be able to use them. In our Gram
Panchayat, the machines have been entrusted to the Panchayat members to rent to needy
farmers in their booths; there is no rental to be charged; whoever needs it can buy his own
diesel and Mobil and run it. It is the Panchayat member’s responsibility to keep it in working
condition. This he does; he spends on repair and maintenance; but he hardly shares it with
others… and, naturally… So he does not mind spending on maintenance because  the
machine is used solely by him! Now there is some talk of charging Rs 10/hour for the use of
the machine. But it is all very complicated and will not work. So forget it. Give the pumps to
farmer groups of 4–5.’
In many other villages, however, the arrangement was far from satisfactory. According to a
Moynaguri Panchayat Samiti member we talked to, Saptiwadi II Gram Panchayat had 8–9
pumps; one pump was assigned to each Gram Panchayat member who selected an operator from
amongst the village youth. Whoever needed to rent a pump approached the operator or the Gram
Panchayat member. The operator would go with him to operate the pump; the farmer would
procure diesel and pay the operator a rental at Rs 5/hour. The operator would turn in the money to
the Gram Panchayat member who in turn pays him Rs 30/day and retains the balance for.
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maintenance and repair costs. Some of these were loose and bizarre arrangements, to say the
least; and calculated to fail in a resounding manner.  Mr Majumdar, Jalpaiguri’s Executive
Engineer confirmed that the initiative has begun to backfire for entirely predictable reasons:
farmers who rented the pump bought the diesel but no Mobil; so, after a few weeks, one after the
other, engines would begin to get seized; the operators seldom turned in the moneys paid to them
to the Gram Panchayat members who, in turn, had no money for repairs. So many Gram
Panchayats were turning into warehouses for new but conked-out diesel pumps.
Commonly, however, the Gram Panchayat pumps were the center of grassroots political
brinkmanship. According to Safiur Rehman of Magurmari II in Moynaguri, ex-Panchayat Samiti
member and CPM active member, his Gram Panchayat had seven diesel pumps provided by the
Panchayat Samiti, one for each hamlet. For the pump, each hamlet has a BC, which has members
from various political parties but led by a front-ranking CPM worker of the hamlet—who is
typically also a Gram Panchayat member; he is normally the convenor and operator. The BC rents
out the pump at Rs 10/hour while the farmer buys diesel. A sum of Rs 10/hour is not enough to
cover maintenance; so for major repairs they collect money. Last year, for instance, the pump in
Rehman’s hamlet conked out needing major repairs; so each member of the BC forked out Rs
200 while the CPM member—the Chairman—coughed up Rs 300 to collect the needed Rs 1,500.
Even where systems were in place for efficient and viable renting of pumps, the question of
access was paramount. We talked to over 200 small and marginal farmers’ groups in over 20
villages of the Jalpaiguri District about their experience of renting Gram Panchayat pumps; in each
village, there were Gram Panchayat (GP) pumps for sure; but nowhere did we come across small
and marginal farmers who had actually been able to rent these, even once. The problem is that
one pump per hamlet—which was the case in many villages—is hardly enough even for the BC
members’ irrigation needs; so it keeps doing rounds of their plots and is seldom available for other
farmers. None of the six marginal farmers who were present in our focus group discussion in
Magurmari II had ever got to use the Gram Panchayat’s pump; a few had tried repeatedly but
unsuccessfully; others knew better and had never tried. Rehman, himself a member of the diesel
pump BC of his village, could hardly get to use the machine for 20 hours throughout the year; so
he went ahead and purchased his own. These were bitter men, highly distrustful of GPs; they
were firmly of the view that GP-owned machines were monopolized by GP members and their
cronies; and that these served essentially as fringe benefits of being in power.
Despite these problems, giving GPs diesel pumps for onward renting at cost seemed a
basically sound idea—in point of fact, a brilliant one, in view of the pump capital scarcity being the
principal challenge in irrigation expansion in the region—and showed an uncanny understanding of
what the people needed most. Whoever thought up the idea recognized that there are numerous
water sources in every village; and any farmer can dig a chuha or a bamboo bore without having
to mobilize capital; the best thing that the government can do is not blow away public funds on
money-guzzling DTWs and RLIs but increase the pump capital/ha, no matter who owned it. That
the Gram Panchayat pumps are not available outside their BC except in prosperous villages
around towns like Dhupguri suggests that this—that is, the expansion of pump capital—needs to
be done on a far larger scale, and costly construction works need to be minimized or avoided all
together.52
V. Private Minor Irrigation Environment
Introduction
In arid and semiarid areas of South Asia, protective role of irrigation in draught-proofing is as
important and striking as its production impact. But this is not quite the case in North Bengal,
which seldom suffers a draught. Rain-fed cultivation here—supported at times by very light
supplementary manual irrigation—is far more productive and risk-free than in most regions of
India south of the Gangetic plains. Aman paddy, the mainstay of smallholders, seldom gets
irrigated and yet provides a stable, even if low, yield. Then, a good deal of moisture gets retained
in the topsoil much of the year so that crops getting completely destroyed because of draught is a
remote occurrence.  Over time, rain-fed cropping patterns here have also got adapted to make the
best use of the moisture retained in the soil after the monsoon. Thus even rain-fed farmers
achieve a cropping intensity of 160–180 percent that would be envied by farmers of Gujarat or
Maharashtra. Finally, all farmers—including small and marginal—are already used to protective
manual irrigation through traditional methods. There are numerous surface water bodies from
which limited amount of water can be drawn using taar-balti; or, it is always possible to dig a 5–6
feet deep ditch and procure more water manually. These sources are generally enough for small
farmers with tiny patches of vegetable crops. Because of all these reasons, it is easy for a lay
observer to underestimate irrigation impact on farm productivity and income.
However, this impression may prove deceptive when one visits an agriculturally dynamic area
like Dhupguri where intensive irrigation use produces huge livelihood and income impacts through
the multiplicative operation of increases in crop yield, higher cropping intensity and high-value
cropping pattern. The most common discrete change that access to mechanical irrigation tends to
produce is the switch-over to the cultivation of boro-rice varieties; since these respond well to
controlled irrigation and nitrogen application, the switch often marks the departure from
subsistence farming to surplus creation. And boro-rice cultivation with manual irrigation is
demanding, to say the least; irrigating small boro rice plots with treadle pumps has become
common in many areas of Coochbehar (Shah 1997); but doing it with taar-balti is well-nigh
impossible. The need for mechanical irrigation—or much improved manual technologies—also
becomes acute in crops like potato, wheat, boro rice and vegetable cultivation for the market. For
a vast mass of North Bengal’s small farmers, thus, having access to controlled irrigation may
mean 12–14 mon (40 kg) of aman paddy instead of 6–8, 10–12 mon of tobacco instead of 3–4,
and 9–10 mon of jute instead of 6–8 mon.  And getting these large productivity increases may not
mean more than 15–20 pumping hours (5 hp) of irrigation per acre. The most striking aspect about
the role of irrigation in North Bengal agriculture is its minimalist nature; small amounts of
controlled irrigation can produce large yield-increases, open entirely new cropping pattern
opportunities to small-farmers, and help them make a transition to a higher trajectory of
productivity and income.
From Manual to Mechanical.
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And yet, this small amount of controlled irrigation is not available to most small and marginal
farmers because the region faces acute scarcity of pump capital. As a result, their opportunity
sets are unnecessarily restricted because of their inability to properly utilize the water resource
that the region is abundantly endowed with. Taar-balti is still the most popular and widely used
irrigation technology amongst marginal farmers. In the course of an impromptu PRA on the road
from Jalpaiguri to Dhupguri, Sushindra Nath Roy, typical of the region’s small farmers told us he
does grow 1–1.5 bighas of chili during rabi but would toil throughout the season watering it with
taar-balti while his other 5 bigha remain fallow. With 50–60 hours of a 5-hp pump irrigation, Roy
would be able to grow potato on the remaining 5 bighas. Similarly, in the Avasthali village of
Moynaguri, we interviewed a young farmer whose family owned 18 bigha in Ranirhat in the
neighboring Coochbehar District. The family had no access to mechanical irrigation;
33 as a result,
they grew aman paddy on all their land but then grew only 2.5 bighas of potato because they had
no pump irrigation. Even for these 2.5 bighas, they did not hire a pump since it was not easily
available in their neighborhood; but they hired two workers at Rs 15/day plus meal each to operate
the taar-balti.
34 In Magurmari II (in the Moynaguri block), similarly, we interviewed Naik Dinesh
Chandra Ray, an angry, young ex-service man with 14 bighas of mostly unirrigated and partly
manually irrigated land.
35 Without access to a diesel pump, own or hired—Ray and his neighbors
either avoided crops that needed irrigation or used the manual taar-balti system of watering from
surface water bodies, or rarely, rented a diesel pump at Rs 30–35/hour from a village 8 km away.
                                                                
33They had a power-tiller costing Rs 90,000 but not a shallow costing Rs 15,000. They had tried getting  a diesel pump
and a shallow because they knew the Agriculture Development Officer (ADO); but despite ADO, the banks refused
and instead encouraged him strongly to buy a power tiller. He paid Rs 77,000 and got a subsidy of Rs 12,000. It looks
as though the machine costs Rs 85,000 cash down without subsidy; going through the subsidy route, the price swells to
Rs 89–90,000 the farmer gets Rs 8,000 subsidy;  rent-seeker’s pocket Rs 4,000. Even then, the power tiller subsidy
took 8 months to come. He rents his power tiller to cultivate some 150 bighas of others’ land mostly in Rabi and for 1
chaas and collects Rs 18,000. The power tiller takes 1.25 hours to do one chase and uses up 2.5 l of diesel.
34 To get the facts right, farmers with tiny holdings did not see the diesel pump more appropriate to their needs as
compared to the taar-balti. In the Avasthali PRA, we also explored with a group of young and old farmers of Avasthali
what was better to irrigate potato with: diesel pump or taar-balti. The general conclusion was that taar balti is
impractical for anything more than a bigha; hiring workers to operate taar-balti  is costlier and messier than hiring a
diesel pump. But then, many farmers present, especially the older ones, also felt that taar-balti water output is easier to
manage and use well, compared to the water gushing out of a 5-hp diesel pump drawing from a surface ditch. They
would have probably found the treadle pump more appropriate to their needs; but farmers here were unfamiliar with
the technology; the few who had heard about it were mal-educated about the strengths and weaknesses of the
technology. Lesson for IDE: these farmers would need to be disabused of their current notions about the treadle pump
before they become ready to try it out with an open mind.
35Ray was bitter about the partisan approach of the Administration. As an SC farmer, he would normally be entitled to
diesel pump subsidy; but Ray was resigned that he cannot get it and had stopped trying. No one he knew of had got it
yet; and even if it were really available, he asserted, it would first go to the party members and their associates before
the benefit trickled to the non-political ones like him. Things were sort of falling into a pattern; from what both the
Rays—Dinesh Chandra Ray in Magurmari II and Karuna Gobind Ray in Saptivadi II— gave us to understand, it is
more critical to be a political animal in rural Bengal—rather than being a Communist party member—to access any
government schemes.54
Another manual technology increasingly coming into use was the hand pump tube well promoted
by the NBTDP as a device preferred by women for homestead irrigation-cum-domestic water
needs. We could not see enough of these to form a good overview of their irrigation use; in some
areas, we saw women irrigating small backyard vegetable plots as their own separate little
enterprises. But as we figured in the course of a discussion with a group of men and women
owning HTWs in Uttar Altagram (Magurmari II),  `HTWs are no good for serious agriculture;
taar balti is much better.’ But in Coochbehar, we found treadle pumps have left behind all
traditional manual irrigation technologies and have taken off as devices useful for `serious
agriculture’ (Shah 1997a).
Box 18
PRA with marginal farmers in village Ullar Dabdi in Moynaguri:
What difference would it make to them if they had access to an STW?
?  All agreed that crop yields would be higher but marginally, and in rabi and pre-kharif seasons;
?  aman paddy would continue to be the standard fixture on their crop cycle;
?  almost all would grow either boro rice or a range of rabi crops such as potato, wheat, tobacco,
chili, and vegetables such as bitter gourd;
?  those who grow rabi crops would take jute in summer; those who choose boro paddy would
settle for two paddy crops a year.
What would change with access to mechanical irrigation? We explored this issue with the
farmers in our Avasthali PRA. Very little, in the short run at least. The cropping pattern might
change only marginally since boro rice varieties were unsuitable for this particular stretch because
of the sandy nature of the soil; irrigating boro rice with diesel pumps would be prohibitively
expensive here. But the farmers felt they would be much better-off  growing a wide variety of
vegetables. And they would also grow a lot more potato, wheat and tobacco than they are doing
now.
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36There would also be a substantial increase in the cropping intensity, especially as the holding size increased beyond 3-
4 bigha on which manual irrigation can be managed by a large family of adults. We examined the cropping plan of
Lankeshwar Burman on his 10-bigha holding. Two years ago, before he got himself an STW, he grew aman paddy on all
his land; and potato on 4 bighas; that is about all he could manage without mechanical irrigation. Now that he has an
STW, he still cannot grow boro season rice; but he takes 3 crops a year on 4 bighas, 2 crops on 2 bighas and 1 crop on 2
bighas, which are far from his residence. In the first 4-bigha plot, he grows china boro or mala rice during Aman, which
gets ready for harvesting in early November; he follows it up with potato and vegetables in rabi, which takes him
through to March; in March-April, he takes a crop of pat. In the second 4 bigha-plots, he grows traditional aman rice,
which gets harvested in December and then leaves the land fallow and takes a pat or aus paddy crop in summer. In the
last 2 bigha plots, he takes only aman paddy. This took his cropping intensity to 220 percent. Many other farmers who
participated, however, argued that Burman was not getting the biggest bang out of his STW!.
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Box 19
The taar-balti production function, based on an impromptu PRA in village Ullar Dabdi in
Moynaguri.
Crop Bighas* Hours per No. of waterings Total cost of Output
watering needed cultivation kg/bigha
Potato 1.5 26–30 3 3,000–3,500 3,200–3,600
Wheat 1.5 26–30 3 1,000–1,200 240–320
Tobacco 1.5 18–20 4 1,500–2,000 160–200
* Maximum that can be reasonably irrigated with taar-balti by an average smallholder family
including imputed irrigation cost. Operating taar-balti requires two people working in a team;
many farmers hire labor at Rs 40/day; others cooperate with each other.
Later, we probed similar issues with another group of a dozen marginal farmers who took time
off from aman-paddy harvesting to participate in our impromptu PRA in the village of Ullar Dabdi
in Moynaguri. We began with Dulal Sarkar, a young farmer, by exploring the economics of rain-
fed farming. Sarkar had 4 bighas in two plots, both thoroughly unirrigated. He still grew two crops:
aman paddy (high priced Pai Jaam) in August-Mid-November; and then jute in summer (March-
July). He did not use any irrigation either through rented pump or the taar-balti. In an average
year, he harvested 40 mon of aman paddy (1,600 kg, or 400 kg/bigha or about 2,800 kg/ha); and
20 mon of  jute (800 kg or 200 kg/bigha). His was low-input farming; in his crop of aman rice,
Sarkar spent nothing on seeds, Rs 200 on 20 kg of chemical fertilizer, Rs 500 on insecticides,
manure from four of his cows and Rs 2,000 on hired labor (at Rs 30/person/day plus meal). In
jute, he spent even less; last year, with jute prices crashing, he lost heavily since he had to sell his
crop at Rs 250/mon instead of the recent normal price of Rs 500; but even at Rs 500/mon, he
might have just about broken even .
Does he not find irrigation an attractive investment? Very much so; Sarkar revealed his plan
to set up an STW in one of his two plots. He expected to complete it within a budget of Rs 15–
16,000; the pump would cost Rs 12,000, and the boring complete with PVC pipe, strainer and
casing should be Rs 2,500–3,000 since the boring rate charged by private rig owners is Rs 10/foot.
This again brought to the fore the question about the high cost of  externally supported STW
schemes.
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Yet, irrigation did not seem an overly binding constraint for these marginal farmers. They
considered the substitutability between taar balti and diesel pump to be high; at Rs 40/day paid as
wage, they can produce in a day an amount of water equal to that a diesel pump, hired for an hour
                                                                
37We repeatedly checked if there was any difference in the boring they made and those made under government
schemes; but they asserted that `...a boring is boring... they are the same everywhere...’ and yet the costs were so vastly
different.56
at Rs 40, can. And because of their very small-sized parcels, they were under no great pressure to
raise the water output per hour. They certainly preferred taar balti over HTW, perhaps because
through constant use, they had developed a high level of dexterity and proficiency in its use. They
had heard about but not used a treadle pump
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Technology Choice in a Subsidy Environment
A constant refrain throughout our discussions with small farmer groups was that, in the present
subsidy environment, farmers view themselves as facing zero resource cost without budget
constraint, when it comes to government schemes; and a high resource cost with stringent budget
constraint in deciding in favor of their own resources. In the course of our PRAs, we tried to
force them to make choices in a situation of budget constraint. In the Ullar Dabdi PRA, for
instance, we asked the group what they would choose if the government offered them the option
of a) a diesel pump without boring; and b) a boring without a diesel pump; the unanimous choice
was a pump without a boring, which they could do at Rs 2,000–2,500; of course, they insisted that
the government must give them both. We also asked them whether they would prefer individual
STWs or pumps shared by a small group of 4–5; surprisingly, several preferred the second option.
But when we asked them to choose between a) 2 STWs between 12 farmers, and b) a diesel
pump without a bore to each, initially, there was no consensus but after two minutes, it emerged
that those who owned less than 3 bigha would prefer a) and those who owned 5–8 bighas or more
would prefer b).
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In the Avasthali PRA, likewise, we explored with a small-farmer group their relative
preference for a poly-pipe versus a soil-cement-lined channel for water conveyance. Poly-pipe
has been the farmers’ answer to the problem of transporting water from the well-head to a distant
field at acceptable water and energy loss; and soil-cement-lined channel is being promoted under
the NBTDP at 50 percent subsidy. At Rs 3–3.5/foot, poly-pipes are inexpensive; they are also
mobile and shiftable but may last for no more than 2 years; a soil-cement channel at Rs 50/foot
costs a lot more but may easily last 20 years. In the course of our discussion, the strong farmer
preference for the lined channel—or, rather the dis-preference for the poly-pipe was evident. The
main reason was the short life of the pipe, which gets torn or cut because of thorns and sharp
edges of anything in its way. According to the group, the useful life of a poly-pipe under intensive
use is just around a year. Another reason was that the land here is so flat that the pipe’s
advantage of overcoming topographical irregularities is heavily under-perceived and discounted.
But the relative costs do not enter this discussion; it is implicitly assumed that poly-pipes are at
                                                                
38Here was another sample of the disenchantment of the poor with the Gram Panchayat pumps. The Gram Panchayat
kept and rented out diesel pumps; but these were of no use to them because it was hardly available for them; in fact,
there was hardly time left after the Panchayat members were done with them. If and when it was available, the rate
charged was Rs 10-12/hour as rental and the farmer had to buy the diesel and Mobil.
39One of them began giving to the group and us a well-articulated lecture about having to live in a society with mutual
cooperation; but a wry old man cut him short and explained the basic economic logic of why it makes sense to get diesel
pumps for 3-4 partners rather than to individuals: a small farmer will not be able to utilize the asset enough and will find
it costly to maintain it; so shared STWs would be easier to maintain since the maintenance costs will also be shared; but
a large owner would be attracted by an individual STW because he can achieve a high level of utilization!.
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their cost, and soil-cement channels areat the government cost, mostly. In this cost regime,
preferences are clear: the government should construct only soil-cement channels because they
help in better water management and delivery pipes have a life of only one year. The moment we
introduce relative costs, the tenor of the discussion changes:
‘But if there was a scheme in which you got entitled to 1,000 feet of delivery pipes
every year versus soil-cement channel once and for all, what would you prefer?’’
There was general confusion. One or two still preferred soil-cement channels; but most did
not want to commit themselves. Would they ever build soil-cement channels themselves? No, no
way. But all who have diesel pumps buy delivery pipes in the normal course of events.
Finally, we found a similar attachment to open, ring wells over shallow bore-wells although we
seldom came across a farmer who constructed his own open well using his own resources. If
provided under a government scheme,  they prefer dug-welsl; they find them pretty to look at;
they seem to give a better water yield; they have a longer life. But they cost Rs 20,000 to make as
against Rs 1,500 for a bamboo bore with a PVC strainer pipe,
40 and though they are better, dug-
wells are not all that better so that they will pay 15 times more. It is a different matter if the
government was to give it; then, of course, they would like only dug-wells, why not? But one
seldom finds privately financed dug-wells, in any case, rarely of the type given under government-
subsidy programs.
Pump Irrigation Markets
Most small farmers without their own pumps in North Bengal supplement manual irrigation by
purchased diesel pump irrigation in the informal pump-rental markets. The depth and width of
these markets are determined largely by the density of pumps in the area; and outside
agriculturally dynamic areas like Dhupguri in Jalpaiguri and Dinhatta in Coochbehar, diesel-pump
density in North Bengal tends to be low. As a result, small farmers commonly rent pumps from
private owners in other villages. Rental rates vary depending on several factors; but the standard
rent is Rs 40/hour if the field is closeby and Rs 50/hour if  it is far away. The rent tends to rise to
as high as Rs 60–70/hour in periods of peak irrigation demand; also, separate charges are levied
for poly-pipes; these range from Rs 0.30 to 0.50/foot/day; Rs 50/day for 300 feet of poly-pipes is
common in areas with well-developed pump-irrigation markets.
In areas with low diesel-pump density, small farmers rent the pump only under extreme stress,
and then too, heavily economize on its use. High cost may be just one factor; the hassle of getting
it when needed may be equally important. In advanced potato villages of Dhupguri where a single
village may have 100 pumps or more, renting a diesel pump may be no big deal and has become a
standard, widely used practice; but in villages where only 2–3 private pumps may be on offer, the
                                                                
40To check on private cost of making STWs, we visited Narain Rai in Uttar Altagram (Magurmari II) who made a 60’
deep STB 6 years ago at a cost of Rs 4,900; he spent Rs 3,000 on the GI pipe itself; if he had chosen PVC pipes
instead, this cost would have come down to Rs 500.58
`hassle factor’ may be overriding in farmer decisions to get a pump on rent. To check on this, we
asked the farmer group in Magurmari II the cost of pump rental for a bigha of China boro; the
figure we got was Rs 400, which would buy 8–10 hours of irrigation, one-third of what would be
needed for a good yield of 22–25 mon/bigha.
The monopoly power of pump irrigation sellers easily translates into large surpluses on pump-
irrigation sale; and this applies not only to diesel-pump irrigation but to all machine- rental markets.
The government-run irrigation schemes, however, were largely unable to use this opportunity
because of their pricing policy and poor management. In Purva Harmoty, we interviewed Gobind
Biswas, the only owner of a diesel engine; but this he used to operate a threshing and milling plant
for wheat and paddy. On a pump capital of Rs 25,000, Biswas made a profit of Rs 25,000/year;
41
Bholanath Mondal, a pump irrigation seller in the upper part of the village also earned Rs 20,000
on his diesel pump costing Rs 20,000 (see box 20); with its total investment of Rs 7 lakhs and
annual gross business of Rs 6,000, the Purvo Harmoty RLI makes a net economic loss/year of
probably Rs 2.5 lakhs or more!
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The degree of development of pump-irrigation markets varies greatly across the region. In
remote, agriculturally stagnant areas, pump-irrigation markets tend to be thin and shallow,
fragmented and highly imperfect; they contribute little to augmenting the total irrigated area of
non-pump owners. In contrast, in agriculturally advanced areas near urban centers, where pump
density is high, pump irrigation markets are highly developed and contribute substantially to the
agrarian dynamism. Curiously, advanced pump irrigation markets result in the divorcing of the
irrigation political economy from the politics of the State; government schemes and subsidy-loan
programs progressively lose their significance in these areas as the energetic agrarian economies
dominated by pump-irrigation markets get on with the job of wealth creation and break away from
the shackles of politics-ridden government schemes.
Box 20
Underdeveloped Pump Irrigation Market of Purvo Harmoty
                                                                
41This looked like good business since he gets customers from several neighboring villages. He invested around Rs
20,000 in facility in 1989. The 10-hp plant used 1.7-1.8 liters of diesel/hour of operation; and Gobind needed 150-180
liters of diesel every month, indicating 90-100 hours of running per month. He charged Rs 80/qtl for wheat and Rs
20/qtl for paddy as processing charges; and in 1 hour, he could process 60 kg of wheat and 240 kg of paddy. Thus,
effective processing charge per hour was around Rs 45-48. Taking diesel and Mobil cost at around Rs 12/hour, he
earned a contribution of Rs 33-35/hour and made a net profit of around Rs 25-30, 000 after allowing a liberal sum of Rs
12-15, 000 towards repair, maintenance depreciation and interest cost.
42Take the average staff cost of the operators and chawkidar at Rs 3,000/month/person; the annual staff cost per RLI is
Rs 108,000. Take annual hours of operation at an ultra-conservative 1,000; at 8 liters/hour, the system uses 8,000 liters
of diesel costing Rs 88,000; take Mobil as 10 percent of diesel cost; energy cost is Rs 96,800. Take repair, maintenance,
depreciation and interest cost at 20 percent of the capital cost of Rs 3 lakhs. This makes the total annual operating cost
of the RLI to be Rs 264,000 of which the water tax does not bring even Rs 6,000!.
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In up-lying part of Purvo Harmoty village, which is not served by the Purvo Harmoty RLI,
most small farmers pursued rain-fed farming; 3–4 had diesel pumps; they used their pumps
primarily for own irrigation needs and a little for selling pump-irrigation service. These were
first-time pump owners; the pump was the most intricate machine and valuable movable
asset they had ever possessed; so they refused to part with it and believed they had to go
with the pump wherever it went; so the opportunity cost of their time had become the
binding constraint on water selling. Some years ago, nonowners used to get hired pumps
from the neighboring Bhotpatti village. In recent years, Bholanath Mondal, a poor young
farmer with 9 bighas of largely useless land, had emerged as a specialist water seller; he
bought a pump with a bank loan and had made water selling into a full-time occupation. He
had also invested in 800 feet of delivery pipe at Rs 2.5/foot (Rs 75/kg and 3 kg contain 100
feet). He sold water to 18–20 farmers in rabi at Rs 45/hour if delivered through pipe and Rs
40/hour if not. Bholanath treated his investment in pipe as an operating cost because the life
of the rubber pipe was around 1 year, especially as he made intensive use of it involving
frequent shifting and laying. Bholanath told us he sold around 500 hours of water a year;
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however, in my estimate, Bholanath probably sold more than 1,000 hours per year, mostly
during rabi and probably earned Rs 40,000–50,000 gross, and Rs 20,000–25,000 net from his
pump-irrigation service selling business.
Just outside Dhupguri, we met the fanatically apolitical Noor Hussein Fazle Rehman of
Gadong village.
44  Gadong is a village wholly devoted to potato production; but besides growing an
outstanding crop of potato, Hussain also kept an eye on its market; so last year, when every potato
farmer in the region was wiping tears of frustration arising from the depressed potato prices,
Hussein sold half of his crop before everyone else and sat pretty on the other half through the
season; he lost 10 percent in spoilage but got the long-term average price. Hussein also rented out
his diesel pump without delivery pipe and irrigated 60–70 bighas of others’ potato crop besides his
own. But the pump rentals in Gadong were astronomical. He charged Rs 50/hour for his 5-hp
diesel pump; he further charged Rs 50/day for 100 feet delivery pipe.
45 But the pump-renting
                                                                                                                                                                                                
43We interviewed Bholanath in the presence of a group; this compelled him to make his business sound far less-
profitable than it probably is. Had he sounded too upbeat, there were two diesel-pump owners who would have
considered the water market prospects with renewed interest; and that would have meant intensified competition for
Bholanath. In any case, in general, we found pump owners in North Jalpaiguri District to be reticent in talking about
their renting business.
44An honours graduate in History, Hussain struck it out as a private tutor and has a roaring tutoring practice in
Dhupguri that earns him Rs 7–8,000 a month. On the side, he had an equally booming farming enterprise with total
focus on potato cultivation.
45As if these businesses were not enough, Hussain has an equipment leasing business. He invested in a power tiller (Rs
87,000 bank loan), which now cultivates 300 bighas of net cropped land besides his own at Rs 100/bigha/ploughing. His
hired driver can finish a bigha in 1 hour flat, will burn 1.3 liters of diesel and collect Rs 100 as service fee. In my60
season in Gadong is always short and intensely busy. The whole of Gadong—that is, some 3,000
bigha of farmland—would be under potato during rabi; so every one would want to irrigate at the
same time, sending pump rentals skyrocketing at critical irrigation periods. It was strange that
even in a tradition-bound, close-knit rural society, oligopolistic sellers in the pump-rental markets
should find prices as the only way of clearing the market!
The Gram Panchayat pumps-for-rental scheme could have played a powerful disciplining role
on the informal pump-irrigation markets; if they have not done so in most villages of North Bengal,
it is because access to these is determined by political calculus and as we gathered from one
village after next, small and marginal farmers who are not active players on the local Panchayat
scene find it impossible to use the Panchayat pumps. We figured, for instance, that Hussein’s
Gram Panchayat also had 5 diesel pumps, which they rented out at Rs 25–30/hour. Did they—the
Panchayat pumps—not put pressure on private renters to lower their rentals? No; because at
peak irrigation periods, there were just not enough pumps; Gram Panchayat’s pumps went first;
but even in this, they had a pecking order shaped by the political hierarchy: the Panchayat pumps
went first to irrigate their BC members’ lands, then, those of their kith and kin, then their
supporters’ crops. By then, they had no machine time left for the remaining all and sundry. So the
all and sundry had to hire machines from the likes of Hussein at sky-high rates and still feel
grateful to them. In Hussain’s village, active CPM party members were given the charge of the
Gram Panchayat pumps; so it was also necessary to be their political supporters to get a favorable
treatment.
Pump Subsidy-Loan Schemes
In studies of North Bihar and Eastern Uttar Pradesh, which are similarly well-endowed with
groundwater, a major factor behind rapid development of groundwater irrigation—and upsurge in
agricultural productivity and income—during the past decade and more, has been caused
principally by a growing stock of privately owned diesel pumps and the consequent rise of
booming and pervasive pump-irrigation markets (Shah et al. 1996; Shah Ballabh 1996). These
studies have also shown the overwhelming influence of the MI policies followed by State
administrations in these regions; and the growth in pump capital stock has been ensured not so
much by private capital accumulation but through a government policy that combined subsidy on
pumps with easily available bank credit through a scheme that was readily accessible to small and
marginal farmers (Shah et al. 1996). Although both Bihar and Uttar Pradesh have public tube well
programs, these are not nearly as large and prominent as in North Bengal. Moreover, in North
Bengal, all public funds and subsidies have been directed through State administration and
Panchayati Raj institutions; as a result, the bulk of the pump capital growth has been controlled by
these agencies and the privately owned pump capital stock has grown very slowly; in contrast, in
North Bihar and Eastern UP the resources under JRY and MWS have been used largely to
support subsidy-loan to building up private stock of pump capital—which, in turn, has spawned
vibrant pump-irrigation markets.
                                                                                                                                                                                                
surmise, he recovers his entire capital 1.5 times over every year. So much for the mechanical undercapitalization of
North Bengal agriculture and the exceedingly high rate of return on machine capital..
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One would have thought that a similar strategy—designed to a) rapidly augment private stock
of pump capital and b) catalyze vibrant pump-irrigation markets—would have unleashed North
Bengal’s Green Revolution just as it did in Eastern UP during the late 1980s and has been doing in
North Bihar during mid-1990s. In the course of our fieldwork, however, we gathered that the MI
subsidy-loan policy in North Bengal has been systematically co-opted by the State MI
administration and the Panchayati Raj institutions as their instrumentality; as a result, it has not
even begun to play the kind of role it has played in Eastern Uttar Pradesh and North Bihar. On the
contrary, the process of accessing the scheme in North Bengal has become so lengthy, complex
and laborious that small farmers without backing in the political system have completely given up
hope of benefiting from it.
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According to a Jilla Prishad leader in North Bengal, the procedure of accessing the pump
subsidy-loan scheme involves the following steps: 1) the aspirant gets his name listed as eligible
with the Gram Panchayat along with all documentation; at the first stage, the Gram Panchayat has
to agree to forward his application to the BDO; 2) a Gram Panchayat member has to personally
recommend his application to the BDO; 3) The application is discussed in the periodic meetings of
the bank, Gram Panchayat Pradhan and Panchayat Samiti member concerned, to assess the
creditworthiness and eligibility of the aspirant; 4) if the aspirant clears this stage, his application is
completed and forwarded to the bank with the recommendation of the Panchayat Samiti; 5) after
this, the bank claims the subsidy from the DRDA; 6) the bank releases the loan but only after the
DRDA pays the subsidy; 7) the bank issues the Delivery Order to the beneficiary who can claim
his diesel pump. The procedure always took 1 year or more; now it seldom gets completed
because banks, facing massive NPAs in government subsidy schemes, are dragging their feet. We
met the Dhupguri BDO who asserted that the delay was caused mainly by the banks dragging
their feet; but the Central Bank (lead bank) officials we met passed the blame to the DRDA and
Panchayat authorities. They argued that that the banks do not proceed unless the Panchayat
Samiti forwards an application; and the Panchayat Samiti does not forward it unless the Gram
Panchayat recommends. This means that the Panchayat leadership has a tight grip over the
process. Bank officials suggested that Panchayat members—and their protégés—are naturally the
first to access the system; and ordinary folk cannot access it except through the goodwill of the
Panchayat leadership. Delays also occur because the first thing every bank checks in an
application is whether the applicant is on the BPL (below poverty line) list or not; if not, the
application goes back to the Panchayat Samiti.
Because of the large number of overdue loans, banks have, of late, been tightening the
procedures. Under the new arrangement, the bank retains the subsidy amount until the loan is
repaid; if it becomes a problem case, the bank adjusts the subsidy against the loan repayment.
Moreover, to avoid cases of malpractice, it is stipulated that the loan cannot be repaid before 5
                                                                
46The pump subsidy scheme in North Bengal is run under several schemes including the IRDP by the DRDA. Under
this scheme, SC/ST and BPL families are entitled to a subsidy of Rs 6,000 on a unit cost of the pump. The Government
Departments involved in MI subsidy are DRDA (IRDP), Agriculture Department, and the SC-ST Corporation. The
unit price of an STW has recently been raised. The subsidy is 50 percent or Rs 6,000 whichever is less. The bank
finances the whole investment for the diesel pump, but will not give cash; instead, it will issue a Delivery Order to the
dealer; the dealer will issue the pump and the engine and later gets reimbursed by the bank.62
years; even if it is, the subsidy cannot be released before 5 years.
47 With this change in
procedures, the Panchayat leaders have lost interest in the subsidy scheme; not a single proposal
has been put up so far under the new arrangement as also under the Ganga Kalyan Yojana. This
means that under the earlier system, many bank loans were paid up immediately by selling off the
asset (or, better still, by not buying the asset at all!); and the subsidy was eaten up. Poor recovery
and growing NPAs are a major concern for the banks that are therefore beginning to drag their
feet.
We explored farmers’ experience with the diesel pump subsidy- loan scheme under the
Million Well Scheme with several small farmer groups we met. There was all-round frustration
with the scheme, which was matched only by their frustration in accessing the Gram Panchayat
diesel-pumps-for-renting. A young Panchayat Samiti member from    Dakshin Saptiwadi thought
the procedure to access the subsidy-loan scheme to be `very lengthy, complex and tiresome; small
farmers in his area seldom try it. Moreover, each district, each Panchayat Samiti and each Gram
Panchayat had a quota.’ A farmer wanting to get it has to apply to the Krishi Prajukti Sahayak
(KPS) who decides and forwards it to the ADO with a recommendation from a Gram Panchayat
member and after a long wait, the subsidy-loan may or may not get approved. This was true about
other farm equipment as well. Rehman, a Panchayat Samiti member in Magurmari II in
Moynaguri had tried accessing the subsidy-loan scheme himself but found the experience
frustrating.
48 According to him, there is no point in trying to access subsidy for the diesel pump; it
may not come through; even if it does, it may not get approved before 18–24 months. For claiming
the pump loan and subsidy, the application has to be processed at several levels starting with the
KPS and then in the ADO’s office. Rai, an ex-serviceman turned small farmer said that,
ostensibly, the subsidy was being reserved for landless and marginal farmers for giving them
pumps for renting out; but added tongue-in-cheek that, in fact, the bulk of it actually went to diesel
pumps purchased by Gram Panchayats, and in many villages, effectively ended up with the Gram
Panchayat members and their protégés.
                                                                
47A common malpractice was to get a subsidy application sanctioned, get a diesel pump issued, have it sold in the
market, repay the loan component immediately and pocket the subsidy. Repaying the loan immediately reduced the
interest burden; stipulating that the loan cannot be repaid before 5 years and the subsidy cannot be released before 5
years is a deterrent to swindlers but it also undermines the purpose and the attractiveness of the subsidy scheme. In
effect, the applicant has to find from his own sources an amount equal to the subsidy before he can get the pump.
48According to him, the problem was not only with the diesel pump subsidy but all agricultural machinery. He showed
us the receipt of Rs 5,000 he had deposited in early 1996  (18 months earlier) with the Agro-Industrial Corporation
towards the margin money for a loan to buy a power tiller; he had still not received any response. And there was only a
small element of subsidy here. Despite these difficulties, one found privately owned power tillers more common than
diesel pumps; this was curious because the power tiller costs Rs 90,000 whereas a diesel pump costs all of Rs 14,000.
In Zarmarguri PRA, farmers agreed that people invest in private power tillers more easily than on STWs; one reason
probably is that banks are far easier on giving credit for power tillers than for diesel pumps. Zarmarguri had already 4
power tillers, all bought with the help of a bank loan and Rs 12,000 subsidy; these have extensive rental markets; and
bullocks are gradually being retired from the area. The power tiller wallahs come and finish a bigha inside of an hour for
Rs 100; a goru-walah comes for Rs 40 but works only from 7 a.m. to 12 noon, does a bigha light chaas and expects a
meal as a bonus..
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In the final analysis, the net impact has been that the pump subsidy scheme has got stuck in
the quagmire of complex procedures evolved by the Panchayat institutions, DRDA, ADO’s office,
and the bank bureaucracy; as a final result, North Bengal may enter the twenty-first century with
among the lowest pump densities (pumps/1,000 ha of net sown area) amongst all the regions of
the country with comparable water resources. The Zarmangurmari village, which we visited had
less than 10 diesel pumps for an agricultural area of over 600 acres. Besides its low-performing
mega RLI, Purvo Harmoty had all of 12 private pumps for over 1,500 bighas of farmlands. It is
only in areas around agriculturally dynamic towns such as Dhupguri and some parts of
Coochbehar that the pump density is approaching the figure of 8–10/1,000 ha, which is common in
some of the most far-flung areas of Eastern UP and Bihar; elsewhere in North Bengal, the pump
density may be as low as 0.5–2/1,000 ha.
Why so little private pump capital in a region so flush with water? As we posed this question
repeatedly, farmers were very clear about the reason: Banks, NABARD, and the ADO’s office
are together responsible for a good deal of under-capitalization of pump capital in the area. Banks’
lending policy, according to them, was the main culprit. Banks insist on 15 bigha for loaning for a
power tiller as well as diesel pump; no small farmer wants a power tiller, so the requirement does
not hit power tiller aspirants; but most people who want diesel pumps are small guys; and banks do
not lend to them. Farmers expressed frustration and resignation about the diesel pump subsidy;
some said it is discontinued; yet others said the hassle and time taken were too much and the
results are highly uncertain; so the effort was not worth its while.
Diesel pump dealers—who are the hub of the pump subsidy-loan schemes in Eastern UP and
Bihar—shared the farmers’ frustration in North Bengal. And the low population of pump dealers
in North Bengal towns were an eloquent indicator of the pump capital starvation of the region; in
Eastern UP and North Bihar, in tehsil towns, one can find dozens of pump dealers who do nothing
else but sell diesel pumps; here in North Bengal, you can find a handful of pump dealers only in
district towns; and for all of these, diesel pumps are just one of the several products they sell. An
oil engine dealer in Jalpaiguri lamented that a) the system of processing subsidy-loan in West
Bengal is extremely complex and takes enormous time; b) the dealer has absolutely no role in it;
he comes into the picture only after all the processing is done; and c) this affects the demand for
engines, which can be potentially large. B K Jain (Sukhlal Baid), a prominent and experienced
diesel pump dealer of Coochbehar explained why the subsidy-loan scheme here does not function
quite like it does in Eastern UP.
49 During the previous year, the demand for subsidy pumps had
                                                                
49Jain dealt in Atul Shakti and BSA brands; other brands popular in the region were Bharat, Usha, Kirloskar, Shakti,
Bharat Shakti, Kangaroo, Dipco, etc. All 5-hp pumps sold at Rs 14,500–15,000; Kirloskar sells at Rs 16,500.
NABARD recently revised the unit cost for diesel pump to Rs 15,000. Jain’s estimate of the uptake of diesel pumps in
the NBTDP districts was around 4,300–4,500 pumps a year as follows:
Coochbehar             2,500 units/year
Jalpaiguri                 1,000 units/year
Siliguri                     800–1,000 units/year
According to Jain, there has been a sudden spurt in private demand for pumps over the last 5 years; earlier, the uptake
was just around 400–500/year, and almost all demand was under government subsidy programs. Now, slowly a demand64
slackened because the Government of India had begun to discourage purchase of pumps under
the JRY in which the material cost cannot exceed 40 percent. Jain did a lot of business in
subsidized pumps; but still, over 50 percent of his pump sale was over the counter—which was
somewhat surprising. Government demand tended to come in bunches and under different
programs. A year earlier, for instance, Coochbehar Jilla Parishad bought 258 pumps under the
Prime Minister’s grant to give away two pumps to each Gram Panchayat to rent it to poor
farmers. Similarly, during the previous year, 1,400 STWs were done under the World Bank
scheme. All these were to be electrified; but there were no power connections; so there was a
move now to provide two diesel pumps for a cluster of six STWs by the Panchayat Samitis.
50
The difference between the over-the-counter and subsidy price of the pump is around Rs
500–600. This is to cover the marketing costs involved, agent’s commission, etc. The dealer here
has a very limited ‘pairavi’ (mediating) role; once a beneficiary’s application is approved, the
agent tries to sell his brand to him. The transaction cost of influencing the Panchayat decision-
making process is very high; therefore, the diesel pump dealer in North Bengal has not been very
aggressive. Jain told me however that the pump dealer is indeed a very aggressive player in
agriculturally dynamic districts such as Burdwan and Hoogly. Perhaps, the large overall volume of
business there has increased dealers’ stake in an enlarged coordination role, and at larger volumes,
they can absorb the higher transaction costs of `managing’ the Panchayat decision making in the
MI field.
Comparison with Eastern Uttar Pradesh and North Bihar:
Where Subsidy Has Sent the Market for Diesel Pumps Booming!
For over two decades now, the UP and Bihar governments have been operating a Free Boring
Scheme (FBS) which provides the farmer complete subsidy towards the cost of boring and pipes,
and a partial subsidy towards the diesel pump cost.
51 The FBS offers an interesting study because:
a) in Eastern UP, it may well be among the most powerful rural development interventions
benefiting marginal farmers and unleashing a belated Green Revolution in the region; b) it seems
to have met with resounding success in terms of its quality of subsidy-targeting, reduction in
leakages and in creating a political economy that, instead of compromising or subverting the goals
of the scheme, actually furthers them; c) the good performance of the scheme is an outcome of a
                                                                                                                                                                                                
outside the government subsidy is emerging. According to Jain, the demand under subsidy schemes is still 40 percent of
the total demand.
50This, we finally figured out, was the genesis of the 1 diesel pump: 3 STWs formula of the STW cluster scheme. One
still wonders why it was 6 STWs and 2 pumps and not 2 STWs and 6 pumps or 6 pumps and no STWs!
51This is Rs 2,800 for small farmers (with < 5 acres); Rs 3,600 for marginal farmers (<2.5 acres) and Rs 5,650 for SC/ST
marginal and small farmers..
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series of design changes made, which have aligned the incentives and motivations of those
involved in subsidy administration with the interests of the poor. It thus offers wider lessons on the
design of `smart’ subsidy programs (Shah et al. 1996).
In the course of a field investigation of groundwater irrigation in Eastern UP, over 200
marginal farmers we interviewed in several areas of the Gorakhpur Mandal expressed great
happiness and satisfaction with the FBS. This was not because no `transactions costs’ were
involved in accessing the subsidy-loan scheme; in fact, it was widely agreed that, buying an engine
and a pump off-the-shelf without a subsidy, a farmer has to pay a premium varying from Rs 700
to 1,800 if he avails of the subsidy-loan scheme.
52 Despite this, marginal farmers we met
throughout Gorakhpur mandal expressed a high degree of satisfaction with the working of the
scheme although they had only anger and frustration to convey about the bureaucracy and other
government programs in general.
At the heart of the popular admiration for the FBS is the high-quality supported provided by
the pump dealer. Farmers described to us in detail how the pump-dealer took care of almost all the
formalities of claiming the subsidy and loan on the pump and engine; all that a small farmer has to
do is provide a photograph of himself and a copy of his land record; the rest was all taken care of.
Many farmers described the FBS as `a real friend of the farmer’.  A group of farmers in
Maharajganj explained that the scheme’s design made hassle and delay difficult. For a new
aspirant the process of getting a bore and pump under FBS subsidy is the same as that described
earlier (page 7, a–f).
Applying the normal thinking about subsidies on the FBS, the Scheme should by now have
gone off badly. Diesel engine quality should have deteriorated;
53 farmers should be cursing the
dealers and the MI office; and; in general; there should be a lot of stink around the scheme. But,
at least in Eastern UP, none of these fears seemed justified. The farmers we met did not seem to
mind at all the ‘reasonable service fees’ charged by the dealers for the services rendered. And
the services offered seemed substantial; under the subsidy-loan scheme in Eastern UP, the pump
dealer does not sell just a pump set; he virtually rolls out the red carpet for the small farmer, taking
over all the bureaucratic chores, which would normally make life hell for a subsidy-seeker!
One probable reason was that the dealer and manufacturer incentives were aligned with
farmer interests. Because there are a large number of manufacturers—and even a larger number
                                                                
52A more accurate statement is: the off-the-shelf buyer gets a `discount’ of Rs 700–1,800 compared to a farmer
applying for the subsidy-loan scheme. This `discount’ on direct purchase without subsidy is an extremely important
indicator of a variety of variables that come into play in this complex game; at the least, it includes: a) the unofficial
payments or bribes that pump dealers have to pay to agencies authorized to approve the loan and subsidy; b) other
money and time costs—mostly of running around from office to office—involved in getting the application processed;
c) interest costs incurred during the processing time—between the date of the farmer’s first approach with photograph
and land records when he collects his engine and pump, and the date when the check is released. The discount varies
over a large interval because large dealers—who get applications processed in fair-sized lots—are able to carry out these
tasks at a lower average cost compared to small dealers who get applications processed in ones and twos; and because
of intense competition, rather than using their lower cost to increase monopoly profits, large dealers offer larger-charge
lower premiums to attract customers and increase their market share.
53Because dealers and manufacturers would have figured out that big money lies not in selling a good quality product but
in keeping the subsidy-controlling bureaucrats in good humour.66
of dealers—each vying with each other to tap the growing demand for pump sets stimulated by
subsidies, there is a powerful drive among dealers to offer a comprehensive package of services
to farmers, including getting bank loan formalities and subsidy procedures completed effortlessly.
And many services in this `comprehensive package’ are probably dominated by fixed costs;
keeping the bank officials in good humor, ensuring that the Block office and the MI office quickly
clear his cases also probably involves a fixed monthly or annual hafta; as a result, aggressive
dealers with a large market share are able to cut average unit costs of the `comprehensive
package of services’ they offer to farmers.
R. K. Chaudhary, a pump dealer in Basti town, explained to us: `Diesel engine makers provide
good commissions. So if a dealer can sell 250–300 sets a year, he earns a very decent income.
This is the primary driving force. And this has become possible in recent years. There are some
28 dealers in Basti; the demand for diesel pumps in the district is around 5,000/year. But then
there is a lot of competition in this business. If I do not help the farmer, he will immediately walk
away to another dealer.’
54 And even small farmers did not mind paying an
average of Rs 1,000 extra as service charge to the dealer for cutting the red tape for them; they




                                                                
54At Sandila town near Hardoi, we met five dealers of diesel pumps to discuss the FBS. Sandila town itself had 22
pump dealers working through the Land Development Bank (LDB) alone; there were others working through
nationalized bank branches. The five we met together sold around 600 sets per year. There was intense competition
amongst the dealers to increase their share in the total demand for diesel pump sets at 1,200–1,500 sets a year. During
1995, the LDB branch at Sandila alone had loaned Rs 70 lakhs for pump sets; at a unit cost of Rs 12,500, this meant
560 sets. The intense competition among pump-set dealers was the principal source of the freedom-from-hassle in the
FBS. Here also, we found the diesel-pump-subsidy-at-the-farmer’s-doorstep working as smoothly as elsewhere in
Eastern UP. Again, two problems frustrated the dealers: a) the increasing gap between the NABARD-determined `unit
cost’ and the actual cost of the pump set; and b) the service area approach of the nationalized banks, which restricted
the freedom of an aggressive bank branch to finance pump sets outside the area assigned to it, and on the other hand,
condemned many villages to a bank branch, which was apathetic to pump financing.
55Compare this with a differently designed treadle pump subsidy in an eastern state in 1995: a TP which the
manufacturer would be prepared to market at Rs 800 is being sold by the government at Rs 1,400 but with a 50 percent
subsidy; thus the farmer pays Rs 700; the manufacturer gets Rs 800, and the remaining Rs 600 disappears on the way!
Things have since changed.
56The process of subsidy-loan scheme as described by the dealer was as follows: a) the farmer gets his Khasra-khatauni
and a photograph and approaches him; b) the dealer gets a file prepared in the block office; this takes around 1 week;  c)
the file goes to the bank, which again takes around a week to process it; the file originating from a good dealer grows
extra feet and travels fast through the chain; once approved by the Department and the bank, the dealer gets a check
from the bank on himself and the amount gets debited against the farmer’s name in the latter’s new loan account; after
his first approach to the dealer, the farmer has to come just once to sign his loan papers; (d) the farmer gets 60’ pipe
and 100’ strainer issued from the MI office at the block level; the dealer organizes these; the farmer then gets a bore
done directly. Depending upon the location, depth and geology, he is entitled to a labor cost subsidy of Rs 400-700,
after the bore is inspected and certified by the Block-level MI officials.  One point of hassle and delay was at this
juncture:  it takes quite a while to get the MI staff to inspect and certify the bore. Then, there is the problem with the.
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In a subsequent spell of fieldwork in the Muzaffarpur District of North Bihar, I found that the
FBS of the Government of Bihar has generated even more farmer-friendly dealer dynamic;
dealer’s agents roam around in villages looking for potential buyers of pumps under the subsidy-
loan scheme; and once they find them, they provide them the same package of cutting the red
tape to give services at their doorstep. Here, subsidy for borings—ranging from 70 to 90 percent
of the cost of boring and pipe—is available only to those who have land to do borings; but diesel
pump subsidy is available even to the landless. Thus the idea underlying the scheme is that a pump
set has an earning capacity independent of the land belonging to its owner; and both irrigation
surplus on land and pumping surplus from pumps can be separately appropriated through pump-
irrigation markets. In the Gaighat block in Muzaffarpur, for instance, we found there were around
15 pump dealers—or, ‘agents’ as farmers call them—whose full-time job is to roam around in the
villages looking for customers for engines under the subsidy program. These agents fiercely
compete with each other for clients by outperforming competing agents with the offer of a
superior package of services. The ‘services’ basically include speedy clearance of subsidy-loan
papers; we were told that subsidy-loan applications for diesel pumps in Gaighat got processed in a
record time of a week or less. As in the Gorakhpur Mandal, all that the applicant has to do is to
provide a photograph of himself and a copy of the khasara; the rest is all taken care of, and the
pump set often delivered at the doorstep of the farmer.
The superior performance of the pump subsidy scheme here is explained not so much by the
superior quality of development administration, which is much better in North Bengal, but by
design of the scheme that has created a positive dealer dynamic. This becomes evident by
comparing it with the difficulty of accessing the new subsidy program on sprinkler systems
announced by the Government of Bihar. The product, which includes 100 feet of pipes with five
nozzles, costs Rs 27,500; there is a subsidy of 90 percent on it so that it can be had for just Rs
2,750. But the access-process is agonizing and involves repeated greasing of palms at various
levels, which require special skills and abilities that are not widely distributed. The product is
stocked by the government and is released on a case-by-case basis. Manufacturers, dealers, and
agents do not come into the picture. Chances are that the manufacturer would be quite willing to
market the product at a fraction of Rs 27,500; but the product price is inflated by subsidy
administrators to create room for rent extraction.
Our overall assessment of the FBS as it operates in Eastern UP and North Bihar is that: a)
the entire subsidy amount does not reach the farmer; this is evident in the difference of Rs 700–
1,800 between the price of the same pump in direct sale versus price of sale under the subsidy
scheme; b) however, the small farmer is happy with this particular subsidy scheme, something
                                                                                                                                                                                                
method of payment of subsidy. There has been a change in this procedure now. The subsidy for the borehole labor cost
gets directly credited to the loan account of the farmer in the bank, which gives him loan for the pump set. This subsidy
is then adjusted against the repayment due from the farmer for the pump set loan. Elsewhere, some farmers complained
that since this change came into operation, one has to take a pump loan in order to get the borehole subsidy. However,
there is still a long delay in the preparation of checks. Mr. Chaudhury agreed that the dealers take over the entire hassle
of setting the government procedures in motion once the farmer approaches them. On an average, a dealer is able to get
the procedure completed within 15–30 days. In the earlier version of the scheme, the farmer had to come to him just
once and all his problems were taken care of; now, he has to make 4–5 chakkars.68
that cannot be said for most other subsidies; c) the services offered by the dealer in helping the
farmer through the entire bureaucratic process seem highly valued; d) if the ultimate purpose of
the scheme is to encourage small and marginal farmers to acquire and use bores plus pump sets
for irrigation, the dealers’ drive to compete for a larger share of the subsidy-induced demand for
pumps helps the scheme along in achieving this purpose; e) the FBS has dramatically expanded
the pump capital stock available in these regions and has catalyzed their Green Revolution.
The present design of the scheme has been achieved by gradual changes calculated to make it
farmer-friendly. Initially, around the mid-1980s, the FBS scheme in Eastern UP was very different
and far less easily accessible and attractive than it is today
57: a) farmers were required to choose
between a small number of ‘designated’ brands; b) the Department stocked pumps for giving
away to farmers at a subsidized rate, and c) the boring had to be done by the MI Department staff
using their own rigs. Together, these features severely restricted the role of the dealer and the
competition among them and made the government and bank bureaucracy the central coordinating
mechanism of the FBS. As it operates today, the scheme has a more farmer-friendly design
because a) the pump dealer (and not the MI Department) has been made the point of access to
the subsidy; as a result, over the years, all trading towns have specialist pump dealers who deal
solely or mostly in diesel engines; even small district towns can have 15–40 such specialist
dealers; b) this pump-dealer community offers to farmers a choice from a wide variety of brands;
c) each dealer would naturally look for the easiest way to corner as much of the subsidy as
possible; d) however, he would be constrained from overdoing because of the fierce competition
amongst dealers to increase their share in a growing market; e) competition amongst alternative
brands and dealers prompts the dealers to take the hard way and offers to farmers quality product
and services that go far beyond their ‘call of duty’; f) and in return if they extract an unofficial
`service charge’ by jacking up pump-set prices more than they would have in the absence of the
subsidy, the farmers we met did not seem to mind it very much; g) unlike earlier, in the  present
system, the farmer is spared the agony and hassle of dealing with the various bureaucracies
involved in approving the subsidy-loan; his interface with them is mediated by the dealer; and the
dealer who can offer a stable `business’ is able to strike a better bargain with those in charge of
processing subsidy-loan applications and change to the `hafta’ system rather than settling the
`price’ for each application; h) pump dealers with larger turnover have obvious advantage in
dealing with the administrative system; they can and do form long-term contractual
                                                                
57In Eastern Uttar Pradesh, for example, a study in 1984 discovered that the process of approval of an application for
subsidy and loan for a diesel pump took over 11 months to complete. The MI Department played an active role in
implementing the subsidy policy; for example, the MI Department maintained a stock of diesel pumps of one or two
preferred brands. Similarly, the block office maintained an inventory of PVC and GI pipes, rigs, foot valves and other
material needed for making bore-wells and employed an army of staff who will go and make borings. When a small
farmer applied for a shallow tube well under the subsidy-loan scheme, he had to accept the diesel pump stocked by the
MI Department and wait for months until the government mistry came to make a boring. After all these, the final cost
of the STW to him often turned out to be higher under the subsidy-loan scheme than if he had done it on his own. The
diesel pumps stocked by the government sold in the open market at 20–30 percent discount compared to what the
government charged; similarly, farmers who made borings on their own, employing private contractors, got them done
for less than Rs 2,500; but under the government scheme, the small farmer ended up paying over Rs 10,000 for the
boring..
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arrangements—informal of course—with bank staff and MI staff to secure speedy clearance of
loan and subsidy applications, and can afford to pay larger `hafta’ and charge lower premiums to
the farmer on the subsidy pump—which is probably why the discount on direct sale varies from
Rs 700 to Rs 1800; i) this dynamic propels the dealers to constantly try to increase their market
share by offering better and hassle-free services to farmers.
According to the pump dealers we interviewed, the FBS scheme would become even more
hassle-free if additional changes are made in the scheme design: a) The nationalized banks’
service area approach reduces the effectiveness of the scheme; each branch is allotted 20–25
villages for pump-set loans; if the bank and the branch are not inclined towards pump-set loaning,
the farmers in those villages have no option; and this is a real problem because many nationalized
bank branches minimize agricultural lending. Fortunately, the LDBs operating in the region provide
an option and as it happens, in many districts, the bulk of the pump loans are made by the LDBs.
But such artificial monopoly-making not only hits the scheme and the farmers but also increases
the scope for corrupt collusions; b) the NABARD unit cost fixed in 1992 continues to be Rs
12,500 while pump-set prices have gone up to Rs 15,000 and more; this needs to be raised so that
the farmer does not have to fork out cash for the balance; c) in Eastern UP, bankers expect the
dealer to help them keep a tab on the FBS beneficiaries and in ensuring loan recovery from the
farmers who came through them; many bankers we talked to agreed that dealers were helpful in
ensuring loan recovery. However, dealers did find the additional duty burdensome. A suggestion
they had to improve recovery was: give the subsidy on pump set as well as on the boring as a
fixed deposit (just as the DIC does) with attractive rates of interest; this would reduce the scope
for malpractice and increase farmer incentives to repay.
Overall, then, the evolution of the present FBS design greatly enlarged the market for diesel
pumps. It enabled the pump dealer to emerge as a powerful change agent for the farmer. As a
specialist red-tape cutter, the dealer was able to accomplish subsidy-loan approval at much lower
`transaction costs’ than the farmer could; as a result, the farmers are gladly willing to pay him the
`service charge’ in the form of a premium. For the efficient red-tape cutting dealer, this premium,
added on the margins provided by the manufacturer, strengthened his incentive in expanding his
share in the local pump market. This design of FBS fundamentally changed the ballgame of diesel
pump marketing. In fact, over 70–80 percent of the new private shallow tube wells in Eastern UP
established after 1988 have been supported by the government subsidy-loan program; and this
growing stock of diesel STWs owned by small farmers has been at the center of the belated onset
of the Green Revolution in Eastern Uttar Pradesh. One can also argue that but for the rapid
expansion of diesel pump sales, the growing de-electrification of agriculture in these regions after
1988 (reflected in steep decline in the number of functioning electric tube wells) would certainly
have slowed down—if not all together stopped—this belated onset of the Green Revolution.
Lessons for North Bengal
While the rest of India has a great deal to learn from Bengal’s experience in building  a vibrant
system of Panchayat institutions, at least in this one respect—of catalyzing a Green Revolution by
stimulating MI investment—we tend to think that Eastern UP and North Bihar can teach a lesson
or two to the planners and administrators in North Bengal. Considering that all the three areas are70
similar in their water resources potentials and in their flood-proneness, it is pointless to belabor the
argument that a bright agrarian future can be built in all three by expediting MI development. And
by no criterion can one say that North Bengal has done as well in this respect compared to
Eastern UP and North Bihar—both of which have, in the past decade, achieved pump densities in
the neighborhood of 80–120/1,000 ha while North Bengal as a whole is still hovering around 2.5–
5/1,000 ha barring a few pockets with dynamic agriculture. Our comparative analysis shows that
Eastern UP and North Bihar have followed a completely different path in MI development.
?  First, they have given up all pretence that government and community management of  large-
sized MI systems can offer a big, long-term institutional model for irrigation development.
Under the World Bank DTW program, Uttar Pradesh continued to build large public tube
wells based on the World Bank design; but by the late 1980s, studies had already shown their
continued worthlessness; as a result, since 1990, the UP government has been trying hard to
turn over public tube wells to any group of farmers in the command who would care to take
them over;
?  Second, while these efforts have proved unworkable even with lucrative terms of turnover,
during recent years, the focus of the MI policy has been squarely on the FBS. All resources
available under all manner of schemes—state and central government—have been assigned
to the FBS thereby creating a sense of sufficiency and obviating the need for stringent
rationing.
?  Third, as we described earlier, through a series of design changes, the policy has created room
for the pump dealer to pitchfork into the central coordinating role in the FBS; this has not
eliminated the dangers of leakage or mis-targeting or even of rent-seeking but it has made the
scheme extremely friendly and accessible to the small farmer at a service charge the farmer
finds reasonable for the package of services that the dealer supplies.
?  Finally, and belatedly, the MI policy has accepted that the key problem it needs to tackle is of
shortage of pump capital and its challenge, of increasing the pump density; and the FBS is best
suited to meet this challenge.
In North Bengal, in contrast, the MI policy is still obsessed with state and community
management of large MI schemes despite abundant evidence to suggest high failure rates. The
bulk of the public resources devoted to MI development—in our rough estimate, around 70–80
percent—continues to get devoted to construction and very little to putting pumps in the hands of
the farmer even though it is common knowledge that any farmer in the region can make a bore
ever so much more easily than lay his hands on a pump. This suggests that the MI policy of North
Bengal is pretty much like that of Gujarat or Rajasthan; it fails to recognize the criticality of pump
capital scarcity as its principal challenge; and instead keeps building capital-intensive MI
miscellany such as deep bores and buried distribution systems that farmers would never build with
their own money. Finally, through a series of design reversals, North Bengal’s pump-subsidy
scheme has become all but unworkable. Resources available to the scheme are probably woefully.
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limited; of this, the bulk got captured by the Gram Panchayats (at least in Jalpaiguri District) for
their pump-rental programs; the process of getting approval for subsidy-loan applications, which
involved 8–10 decision makers, is made so lengthy, laborious and full-of-hassle that the scared
small farmer wrote off the scheme as out-of-bounds; and the pump dealer, who made the scheme
a success in Eastern UP and North Bihar, remained completely marginalized in North Bengal.
Result? Pump density of 1–2/100 acres whereas it should be 15–20.
VI.  Panchayat Institutions and MI Policy
Panchayat Politics and MI Policy
With the Panchayati Raj institutions playing such a dominating role in the administration of  all
government programs, it is neither possible nor desirable to conclude an assessment of how North
Bengal’s MI policy works—and with what impact—without exploring the dynamics of  the
Panchayat institutions. Several aspects of the functioning of the Panchayat system set apart the
socioeconomic dynamic in rural North Bengal from what we had found in Eastern UP and North
Bihar (Shah et al. 1996; Shah and Ballabh 1996): a) The Panchayat system in North Bengal is far
more mass-based and participatory than in most other States because the Panchayat leadership is
under constant pressure to respond to people’s aspirations; b) The level of corruption and
malpractice of Panchayat leaders is far less than elsewhere because the political environment is
mature and animated, and because local leaders are constantly watched by people as well as by
the ‘party;’ c) Opposition to a reform in the present design and administration of MI subsidy on
the lines of Eastern UP may well come from the Panchayat leadership itself because in the sort
run at least, many leaders may conclude that such reform might undermine their power base.
According to some observers of the North Bengal Panchayat scene, perpetuating a
development regime based on subsidies has been a political necessity for the government. From
the beginning of its days in power, the present government has arduously cultivated an image of a
`caretaker’ or `steward’ for the masses. Starting with the resounding success of Operation
Bargha—through which landless and marginal farmers throughout the State were given secure
title over land—each major policy initiative was designed to give poor people resources they did
not  have to earn or fight for. In the process, the government and the Communist Party were
able to rapidly expand and consolidate their mass allegiance.
The Motivations of the Grassroots Political Leader
The transactional nature of the interplay between political support-seeking and subsidy allocation
was nowhere in fuller play than at the level of the Panchayat Samitis and Gram Panchayats.
Emerging grassroots leaders seem to pursue a dual objective function: first, recognition, approval
and support by the ‘Party,’ and second, the capacity to attract and sustain the allegiance of the
masses. Young party workers understand both these sides of the coin very well; all leaders—at
least among those harboring political ambitions—try to attract mass support in their respective
domains to the best of their ability, waiting for a time when their talents would be noticed by the
Party’s senior leaders. According to many analysts, it is at the hands of such Party upstarts that72
some of the most constructive mobilization and organizational work get done by the Communist
Party cadre. Because they have to start from scratch, these leadership-aspirants have to find
genuine people’s causes to espouse; and since they have no resources to work with, they have to
push their effort and imagination to the limit in doing something worthwhile for the people that will
earn them popular accolade and allegiance.
A young worker identified to be have probable possession of such capacity is given the first
break in some position such as membership of the school board.
58  In this new position of
moderate authority, the objective function of the leader remains the same: of expanding and
consolidating mass allegiance to himself and the Party; and of winning recognition and support
within the Party. However, s/he has somewhat diversified means to pursue these objectives
because of some power of patronage, such as in recruitment of teachers and peons. In this role,
the party functionary ends up dividing his time between ‘party work’ and the constructive
mobilization and organizational work he was doing earlier.
From now on, the time and energy left with a middling local Party leader for constructive
work tend to be inversely proportional to the success he has in winning recognition and support in
the Party. If he is successful, he rapidly gets drafted into the Party political machine and in local
governance structures. The most likely trajectory for a high-flyer is Adhyaksha-ship of the Gram
Panchayat, to start with, or the membership of the Panchayat Samiti. Once in these tracks, the
leader has considerably more diversified resources for consolidating his mass base. Moreover,
once in this slot, recognition within the Party tends to get linked directly with general Party
perception about his mass base. As a result, the leader devotes more and more of his time and
energies to enlarging and strengthening popular allegiance to himself and the Party. However, in
this slot, he has hardly any time to pursue a truly constructive development agenda. Instead, he
builds and sustains his political base, essentially through the preferential allocation of development
resources.
Subsidies are thus closely associated by local people with Panchayat politics and an indulgent
government. Over several rounds of subsidized development programs, the post- Operation
Bargha, the Sarkar mai-baap (government as provider) syndrome has got deeply entrenched in
the popular psyche. At the lowest levels, political rivals are expected to win support and allegiance
through maximization of free resources made available to the domain’s collectivity; and the
aspiring leaders of the ruling party are happy with this arrangement because their being in power
at the level of the State, district, block and village levels places them in a strongly advantageous
position to play the patronage card. The leadership at the State level is happy too because its mass
base depends upon an agile grassroots cadre that feels actively involved in mediating development
programs.
If this is a broadly accurate description of the driving force of Panchayat leaders, several
hypotheses can be formulated about the way the political calculus works in North Bengal:
                                                                
58Well, this is not all that innocuous a position; in point of fact, school board membership in rural West Bengal is a
rather powerful position since the entire class of primary schools is controlled and run by the school board. This board
membership also provides some opportunity for patronage since recruitment and posting of primary teachers are the
responsibility of this board..
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?  Since the quantity that a Panchayat leader has to maxime is the number of people who can be
benefited through him, from a given entitlement of subsidy resources, he would prefer
schemes/technologies such as treadle pumps (Rs 150/family) that help him reach out to large
number rather than a hand pump (Rs 3,000/family) or STW/PDW (Rs 5–7,000/family) or
RLI/ DTWs (Rs 25,000/family) that are quite expensive ways of winning mass allegiance; if
this were true, treadle pumps will always remain under danger of a subsidy imposed by the
Panchayat leaders.
?  People give allegiance to a leader in proportion to the improvement in their well-being that
political patronage causes; thus an RLI that remains defunct yields the Panchayat leader less
political allegiance than one that functions well, even if both were fully subsidized;
 
If this were true, the leader should be concerned not only with `winning’ a scheme for his
village/block but also in its beneficial operation and its ‘intrinsic value’ to the recipients; on the
other hand, if  allegiance were given just for getting schemes, local leaders would not worry too
much about the quality of functioning of the schemes.
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We tried to test this logic with a variety of people with whom we came in contact in the
course of our field work; and as usual, there was some evidence that supported this logic; and a
lot more that suggested things to be more complex and nonlinear. Many well-informed small
farmers agreed that an average rural voter is indeed strongly driven to a local leader’s capacity to
bring government schemes and resources—and the general inclination for public works—in
choosing a candidate to support in a Panchayat Samiti election.
60 Discussions with farmers also
highlighted the singularly heightened  manifestation here of the ‘winner-take-all’ nature of the
political spoils system. Regardless of where in India, the ruling party tends to enjoy critical
advantages in reinforcing and enlarging their support base through their control over resources;
however, how well a party is able to press this advantage depends critically upon the quality of its
organization and its  grassroots presence. The CPM’s strong grassroots cadre has emerged as its
great strength in this respect. At all levels, the main concern of the party cadre has been to obtain
developmental resources and direct them with the singular purpose of strengthening and enlarging
mass allegiance of the people to themselves and the Party. In the process, a good deal of the mass
support that has been built is probably based less on ideology or programs than on the politics of
patronage.
Local Panchayat leaders we talked to also readily affirmed our key hypothesis that a local
political aspirant has a `two-axes’ objective function: he has to cultivate a good image with the
                                                                
59Stretching this logic further, if allegiance were the function of the intrinsic value of patronage, then, there should be
evidence about Panchayat leaders taking actions to ensure smooth and efficient operation of, for instance, group
irrigation schemes; and if they are ‘smart,’ we should find them arguing for some form of operational contract that uses
or mimics market processes rather than to favor slow, wasteful collective action or bureaucratic management;
60In the present conditions with CPM control over administration, people would prefer that their chosen candidate
belongs to the ruling coalition; but the voters in his constituency threw out a CPM sitting candidate—who proved
good-for-nothing—in favor of a Revolutionary Socialist Party candidate who has transparent sincerity but is still unable
to do much because the CPM-dominated ruling coalition is ruthless in selectively directing all schemes and resources to
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party superiors
61 and also win the support of the masses; and that his supporters expected him to
mobilize resources under development programs, get them for his constituency, and selectively
allocate them to his present and potential supporters.
62 However, some also raised a question
about our other hypothesis—that Panchayat leaders would prefer low-cost assets like treadle
pumps to reach large numbers; from these discussions, it seemed that the motivations—or, rather,
the methods—of the political leader are more complex; not all supporters are of equal importance;
some `fixers’ who command mini vote banks are more important and need to be propitiated with
more valuable largesses—such as PDWs or mini-RLIs—than ordinary supporters who will be
happy with a treadle pump or a shared STW. Thus the `mass’ whose allegiance is sought is not
homogenous but is organized in a stratified hierarchy.
While the politically active and articulate amongst the rural folk strike opportunistic alliances
with local big-wigs for a share of the spoils, we met numerous small and marginal farmers who
were politically naïve and uninvolved, found the Panchayat institutions blatantly partisan and
experienced deep anguish and frustration. A good spokesman for this class was Dinesh Rai, an
angry, young ex-serviceman with 14 bighas of mostly unirrigated and partly manually irrigated
land, and highly embittered about the partisan approach of the Panchayat authorities. As an SC
farmer, he would normally be entitled to diesel pump subsidy; but Ray was certain he could not get
it and never tried it. No one he knew of who had got it yet; and even if it were really available, he
asserted, it would first go to the party members and their associates before the benefit trickled
down to the nonpolitical ones like himself. According to him, to get access to government
programs in rural Bengal it is not enough to be just eligible; it is critical to be a political animal.
Internal Contradictions?
Thus, while we did find a good deal of evidence in favor of West Bengal’s highly acclaimed
Panchayati Raj system, a curious internal paradox seemed built into the system as it has evolved
under the present government policies over two decades. The argument—that the Communist
Party’s strong grassroots presence through its cadres has given distinctive vigor and substance to
institutions of local governance—seemed validated through all our interaction with common
people, Panchayat leaders and social analysts. The claim that West Bengal’s Panchayat system
has a far larger presence and salience in the rural socioeconomic scene than in most other States
does not need to be belabored. However, hidden somewhere in the success of the institution might
                                                                
61When we asked when does he expect to become the Sabha Pati, he sheepishly said: ‘That is for the party to decide...
what can I say in the matter… we party workers just do our bit...  and ultimately the party decides whom to nominate
for the Panchayat Samiti…’ Another local party leader later explained to me that at the level of the Sabhapati, the party
leadership has to take many considerations into account besides the grassroots work, mass base and organizational skills
of the candidate; the person must have some education; he should be capable of leading the Panchayat Samiti, etc. So
even if there may be local leaders with strong mass support, the party may select relatively lightweight leaders for such
positions.
62See the context on pp. 47-48, which states that Ray won by a margin of 350 votes in the last election and since then,
has been able to get 30-40 STWs installed in his ‘booths’ and is trying to get a road extended and a college for
Moynaguri..
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lie important threats to its future success; and the most likely of these threats might be the inherent
propensity of the grassroots political leaders to use development programs and resources to
expand and sustain their mass base through the patronage mill. This is likely to create a `winner-
take-all’ situation in which a party in power can keep progressively expanding its mass base at the
expense of other parties ending up in a single-party dominance of governance institutions, and
weaken the   political competition that would pressurize the cadres to perform. Thus, in an
informal discussion, a young political scientist argued that the existing Panchayat system
accompanied by the Communist Party’s strong grassroots base has very nearly annihilated all
other parties and virtually emasculated the plurality and `political competition.’  According to him,
the seeds of the decay of the present system may well be contained in the present situation of
virtually uncontested control of the ruling party over grassroots institutions; as a result of this
situation and the massive scale of resources and development schemes, the Panchayati Raj
institutions and development programs are used by the ruling party cadres to further entrench and
congeal their power base at the local level.
63
Another observer disagreed with the assertion that the ruling elite had a built-in propensity to
use development programs and resources in a partisan manner to consolidate and expand their
power base,
64 and questioned the empirical and conceptual bases of such an assertion. He did not
agree that Panchayat leadership in North Bengal acts in a partisan manner; second, he agreed
even less that other decision makers—such as administrators—are less partisan or judgmental or
inspired. He also argued that people have their own ways of culling out the riffraff from the
political arena and therefore only those who are known to have a basic sense of fairness tend to
rise to the fore and dominate the political platform.
One problem was in reconciling this belief with the vehemence with which the poor, whom we
had  interviewed in village after village, criticized the Panchayats and their leaders not for being
inept or corrupt but for being partisan and selective in favoring people for winning or retaining
political support.
65 To this, one plausible response was that as long as the Panchayat leaders are
not supporting the unworthy, it is difficult to fault them for being selective towards their political
                                                                
63Having been a congressman earlier, Debu’s antipathy towards the Left Front was understandable; but his analysis
seemed plausible.  However, even so, it is useful to bear in mind that congress or any other party would have fallen
prey to the same propensity under similar circumstances. After all, such are the rules of politics; when you are in
power, no one can fault you for wanting to secure, strengthen and perpetuate your power. And CPM is doing it well
because it has a strong grassroots presence; congress in many states was not able to do it because it has allowed its local
organization to virtually disintegrate during the past three decades.
64Sinha sounded sympathetic to many aspects of left front policies, especially, with the way powerful Panchayat
institutions have emerged under its reign, the constant pressure on the administration to be more people-friendly, and
the subordination of the local bureaucracy to elected leadership. So, I told Mr Sinha I was not being evaluatory or
critical about the Left Front but merely setting out a hypothesis about political behaviour which would apply to any
formation in similar circumstances.
65I described to him the repeated PRA inputs from the resource poor who said that Gram Panchayat diesel pumps were
seldom available to anyone outside the group of Panchayat members and their cronies. We also told them about our
interview with Karuna Gobinda Ray in Dakshin Saptiwadi; and our repeated encounters with local political activists
whose loyalties were shaped less by ideological leanings than by expected gains from opportunistic alliances.76
supporters; that was because people are habitually inclined  to accuse those in power of corruption
and partisan decisions. If, instead of political leaders, the administrators took the same allocative
decisions, they too would be criticized similarly.
Our sense however was that people—at least those we talked to in the villages—did  expect
the Panchayat politicians to behave in a partisan manner but hoped that they would not; on the
other hand, people expect bureaucrats to be arbitrary or corrupt but not partisan in a political
sense. So if an administrator decided to favor a poor farmer who is also a ‘party member,’  other
poor people who are left out are not likely to perceive partisan behavior as they would when they
know that the decisions are being taken by ‘party leaders.’
Our problem was also the ruling elite’s apparent lack of sensitivity to popular perceptions of
partisan behavior and the angst expressed so vehemently by the excluded poor. Being so close to
the grassroots, one would expect the Panchayat leaders’ antennae to capture such sentiments and
reshape their behavior accordingly; but this did not seem to be happening. And what is politics if
not the art of managing the perceptions of the people? One explanation was in terms of
opportunistic political behavior; politicians believe that people will offer them their allegiance if
they selectively direct ‘goodies’ to them; those who are established supporters will feel vindicated
in having reposed their faith in the right man and the party; new supporters will find enough
empirical evidence to rationally decide to support them; and fear of God will be suitably instilled in
those who are nonsupporters or opponents by their deliberate exclusion from the distribution of the
goodies. If an average (or typical) political leader believed people to behave thus, he would then
be impelled towards partisan behavior. However, if he believed that people were looking for Ram
Rajya, for rule-of-law, for a fair system of governance, then he would strive to offer them what
he thinks people demand from him. So one way of explaining partisan politician behavior is by
suggesting that people expect politicians to be partisan.
One analyst offered an interesting inference of the dynamic of the Left Front politics:
according to him, the CPM has always given much more importance to enlarging its grassroots
presence rather than strengthening its power base at the higher levels. Until recently, it never took
national politics seriously; and at the State level, West Bengal has an alliance of left parties but in
the Panchayat system, each party is on her own. To the CPM, it has always been very critical to
entrench and expand its power and mass base at the district level and below. So today, all the Jilla
Parishads of the State are run by CPM Sabhadhipatis. In its long term political strategy, thus, the
CPM is very different from the Congress. The BJP is the only other party that gives grassroots
politics the same level of importance.
However, according to him, major changes have been occurring with the Panchayat politics
and the internal dynamic of the Communist Party. Some 20 years ago, in the CPM, some of the
most sagacious and powerful district-level leaders would not be nominated for posts of MP or
MLA or even Sabhadhipati in the Jilla Parishad; they would be appointed the Secretary to the
district-level party committee. The strategy was to concentrate real power in the party
functionaries; and distribute the trappings of office to the loyal but less sagacious. With the
growing power and resourcefulness of the Panchayat system, however, the Sabhadhipati’s,
Sabhapati’s and Pradhans have begun to attract all types of rewards: they have power to give
away doles; the Sabhadhipati has the rank of a Minister of State; `even Sabhapati of the
Panchayat Samiti (at the block level) moves around in a chauffeur- driven car with beacon lights;’.
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they have far greater visibility; everyone who wants anything done has to seek their indulgence. In
contrast, the Party Secretary’s post has been singularly devoid of glamor, status, reward or
recognition. He cannot even be introduced as the Party Secretary in a public forum. True, he still
has the ultimate power; but some of the most competent and ambitious leaders are getting
attracted to Panchayat positions; and the party management is gradually on the decline. The
erosion of this intricate balance between the party and the government is a major potential source
of atrophy in the CPM. The ambitious leader has found great scope for activism in the
empowered Panchayat system of West Bengal; and in pursuing this activism, he has gone
overboard, so much so that the Panchayat has become the administration; the Panchayat leader
has usurped the role of the administrator. As a consequence, rather than providing a system of
responsive local government, what the CPM has ended up offering is a representative
development administration, which is responsive to popular aspirations but at the same time is also
subject to the demands of partisan politics. This, then, is the source of propensity towards partisan
dispensation of development programs and resources.
In sum then, the larger dimension of North Bengal’s MI policy cannot be understood—far less
assessed—without exploring the internal dynamic of  the region’s Panchayati Raj institutions and
the political canvas in which they are embedded. In the course of our earlier discussions, we noted
that it is difficult to find any other Indian State where government administration and the
Panchayat system are as active and dominant in the MI scene as in North Bengal. Nowhere else
is the direct participation of these agencies in establishing irrigation schemes, financing them,
running them, governing them as striking as in North Bengal. Nowhere do we find such a great
plurality of small-scale irrigation technologies and institutions as in North Bengal. And nowhere is
MI policy as closely mixed up with grassroots politics as here. And all these can be attributed to
the present dynamic of the region’s Panchayati Raj institutions.
Equally, no other region as well-endowed with water resources has been as slow and
ineffectual in transforming them into an agrarian economic revolution. In large part, this is
explained by an MI policy that a) has been mindlessly obsessed with governmental or community-
control and management; b) has placed far greater weightage on constructing water points than
on expanding the overall size of the pump capital—which is the binding constraint on MI
expansion in the region; c) has continued to support and expand the large, bureaucratically
managed stock of big DTWs and RLIs long after other States gave these up as wasteful, unviable
and inequitable; d) has completely overlooked and wasted the potential for `efficient’ irrigation
expansion offered by privately owned pumps and pump irrigation markets; d) has focused much
more on `backward linkages’ and done little to strengthen `forward linkages;’ and e) has
encouraged a Sarkar Mai-Baap (Government as the Provider) culture that has paralyzed farmer
initiative and participation to ensure proper management and upkeep of government-supported MI
establishment.
VII. Policy Questions and Concluding Observations
The original objective of the NBTDP in commissioning this study was to analyze the subsidies
provided under the Project to MI schemes, to explore their rationale and impacts and to78
recommend a more rational subsidy regime and elucidate the logic supporting it.  This objective
could have been served through a tighter study with a narrower focus. Instead, we have
undertaken a bigger exercise: besides analyzing subsidies per se, we have also attempted a
broader socioeconomic analysis of MI investments in North Bengal to evolve a broad-based policy
assessment of MI policy environment in North Bengal. The reasons for this overkill are several:
first, a broader assessment of overall MI policy in North Bengal appeared interesting and useful in
its own right; second, there are important parallels to be drawn with the experience of other
regions in developing a fuller understanding of what can and needs to be done in the region; finally,
and most importantly, analyzing MI subsidy policies in the region on purely micro-economic
grounds would have proven trite and meaningless because of the larger questions of political
economy involved. So, in these concluding remarks, we consider some of the specific questions
posed to us against this larger backdrop of North Bengal’s MI political economy.
We are confronted with three distinct sets of questions regarding the subsidy aspects of  the
NBTDP: first, about whether there is justification and rationale for MI subsidies in North Bengal;
second, about whether the NBTDP’s current subsidy policy achieves the Project’s MI objectives
in an efficient, sustainable and livelihood intensive manner; and third,  if there is scope for
modifying the current policies for better impact. In the remainder of this, we deal with these
important but difficult questions as best as we can.
(A) Justification and Rationale for Subsidies
An important basic set of questions that needs to be tackled at the outset is: Are MI subsidies
necessary in North Bengal? What could be an appropriate rationale for designing subsidies? On
what grounds can they be justified?
Environmental Grounds
In pure micro-economic theory, subsidies are called for in situations where the presence of public
goods or common property externalities creates a divergence between private and social costs.
Subsidies are used in such a situation to encourage private economic agents to do more of
something that is desirable from the social viewpoint. In this sense, subsidies to groundwater
irrigation would be justified only in areas, which suffer from flooding and waterlogging conditions.
Here, pumping of groundwater by private economic agents creates a positive externality by
reducing the intensity and length of post-monsoonal flooding. And the reduction of social loss of
production and income due to flooding would be reduced by private economic action. Since private
pumpers have no interest in pumping to mitigate flooding, on their own they would tend to pump
less than is socially desirable to reduce flooding; so it makes sense for public agencies to stimulate
private pumping of groundwater through subsidies to pumpers. Else, public authority would have to
undertake direct action to pump groundwater as under the SCARP program in Pakistan and Satluj
Yamuna canal in Northern India where government-operated pumps were installed specifically to
mitigate waterlogging in the canal commands.
Many parts of North Bengal—and of Eastern Uttar Pradesh and North Bihar—especially
those with low-lying areas in these regions, face the problem of flooding and waterlogging for
months during and after the monsoon. These conditions result in multiple economic losses and.
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other problems. Flooding of low-lying lands implies that their owners cannot grow crops for nearly
half the year; owners of low-lying lands can grow crops only towards the end of rabi and during
summer when their fields are dry and the groundwater table has receded beyond the root zone of
crops. Then, flooding of villages with stagnant water creates major health hazards. Many villages
get cut off from market towns, making communication and transport difficult and costly. Villages
near rivers often need huge and costly embankments as flood protection structures. In all these
regions, the social dis-benefit caused by waterlogging and flooding would substantially decrease if
the post-monsoonal groundwater tables were pulled down by a few feet compared to their present
levels. And  this could happen through escalation of  private pumping. In the absence of private
pumping, the task of maintaining the groundwater tables at an environmentally ‘safe’ level  would
need to be performed by public agencies using public resources. On this ground, then, there is
strong justification for selective subsidization of  private MI.
Selective because overdoing it—or doing it indiscriminately—might create new, negative
externalities. In the water table aquifers as in North Bengal, lowering the water tables would
create positive externalities for low-lying areas but negative externalities in up-lying areas where
farmers will face increased pumping depths and costs. Lowering the water table down too much
might make it costly or impossible for a large number of farmers using traditional and modern
manual or animal-driven irrigation devices that become useless or impractical beyond a certain
depth. For instance, treadle pumps are not practical beyond the water table depth of 20–25 feet;
traditional taar-balti technology—widely used by resource- poor farmers would become
infeasible when the uppermost aquifers become emptied. The seriousness of the productivity and
equity impacts of these negative externalities will, over time, decline as farmers take to
mechanical devices in increasing numbers; but until then, a balance has to be struck between
positive and negative externalities of groundwater development.80
Figure 1. Pumps per 100 ha m of groundwater resource..
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Figure 2. Pumps per 1,000 ha of net sown area.
In sum, then, MI subsidies are justified in North Bengal even on purely micro-economic
grounds. However, the grounds on which the present subsidy policy is based have little to do with
the divergence between private and social costs; they are based more on the understanding of the
powerful role that MI development can play in facilitating rapid agricultural development and
expanding livelihood and employment opportunities for the rural poor. This understanding has been
repeatedly—and amply—validated by the experience of many regions in India and other South
Asian countries, especially Bangladesh, which has an aquatic and socioeconomic environment
very similar to North Bengal’s. Within India, the most recent cases of agrarian revolution based on
groundwater-irrigation have been Eastern Uttar Pradesh and North Bihar; earlier, however, the
rapid rise in agricultural productivity in Western UP and Haryana too has been attributed to the
tube-well revolution that preceded the Green Revolution in these areas (Dhawan 1982). Even in
semiarid Gujarat in Western India and Tamil Nadu in the south, MI explains a large part of the
agrarian dynamism and rural livelihood growth.82
North Bengal has been amongst the last and the slowest in capturing the livelihood-
development potential offered by MI. It is therefore not surprising that development planners in
the region are keen to expedite the development of the sector; all the more so because they do not
have to worry unduly about the deleterious environmental impact of groundwater development that
soon followed the tube-well revolution in States like Gujarat, Tamilnadu and Haryana. North
Bengal is far more generously endowed with groundwater; it has so numerous and plentiful
recharge sources that the region can easily sustain a several-fold increase in its present
groundwater use without any environmental threat; what is more, even though it uses less than 10
percent of its utilizable groundwater potential, North Bengal already supports large areas under
irrigation-intensive paddy cultivation. So MI development is not likely to multiply groundwater
extraction by a factor as large as has been the case in areas that moved from purely rain-fed to
irrigated farming; here, MI is likely to create agrarian wealth more through crop-diversification,
through increased yields of already irrigated crops, more intensive use of inputs such as fertilizer,
farmyard manure and labor—all encouraged by greater control enjoyed by farmers over the timing
and quantum of water application.
Rural Poverty and Capital Scarcity
In many areas of India—such as, for instance, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Western Uttar Pradesh,
Punjab and Tamilnadu—where groundwater irrigation through modern pump- and tube- well
technology caught the fancy of farmers during the 1960s and 70s, most of the development took
place at private initiative using private capital. For a long time, governments at the State as well as
central levels had no policy on groundwater; there was little government support to or regulation of
private MI development. However, in retrospect, it is evident that MI development at private
initiative has powerful and well-defined spatial and social biases: in all the States mentioned above,
mounting evidence suggests that capital formation in MI occurred in agriculturally dynamic areas
and fuelled their dynamism even further; tribal areas in Gujarat, for instance, lagged behind central
and north Gujarat by over 20–25 years in making their MI investment; even within a village, the
scale-bias of MI technology is repeatedly established. In general, regions with a history of
enterprise and multiple sources of capital accumulation have tended to build up machine capital
fast; in contrast, regions with inward-looking cultures, absence of entrepreneurial tradition, and low
capital accumulation occurring in a primitive format through agrarian production systems tend to
be low on their machine capital base and have tended to be slow to take to the MI revolution.
North Bengal appears a classic example of the latter type of    regions.  Its large Rajbangsi
population is a community of first-generation settled farmers with little or not tradition of enterprise
and capital accumulation and with a primitive outlook towards modern technology. Its postage-
stamp sized landholdings, dependence on traditional technology, and weak input and output
marketing institutions have provided the sure-fire formula for machine capital scarcity. It is
understandable, then, that little MI development has taken place at private initiative with private
capital; and left to private initiative and capital, chances are that it will take several decades before
North Bengal achieves the same level of MI development as, for example, Medinapur or Nadia
Districts. This then is another ground for infusion of external capital through subsidies.
Productivity and Livelihood Impacts.
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One of the key conclusions of our field research has been that scarcity of mechanical pump
capital is the primary bottleneck on North Bengal’s Green Revolution. This was evident in the
extremely low pump density we found in most areas we visited; this was also evident the from the
1987 MI census. The vast transformation of the region’s agriculture through expansion of pump
capital becomes clear when one compares areas such as Kalchini, Raiganj, Falakata with
Dhupguri, Moynaguri and Dinhata in Cooch-behar. In the former areas, we still find the
predominance of  traditional varieties, dependence on aman paddy, low fertilizer use, wide use of
taar-balti irrigation, and ill-developed pump- irrigation markets; in the latter, we find the full
battery of Green Revolution symptoms—such as high fertilizer use, mechanical irrigation, adoption
of high-yielding varieties, production for the market, intensive land use and vibrant pump- irrigation
markets. Our judgement is that the transformation of agriculture is an 8–10 year process during
which a lot of changes can occur besides irrigation methods; there is an all-round increase in
mechanical capital including power tillers, powered threshers, tractors and diesel pumps; there is a
faster growth of input and output marketing institutions; there are changes in the cropping patterns
and land use intensities. However, the shift to modern groundwater irrigation is, in our view the
catalytic agent that unleashes this transformation.
The high productivity of pump irrigation is revealed by the transactions in the pump- irrigation
markets. Where private diesel pumps abound, small farmers commonly rent these at Rs 40–
45/hour; irrigating an acre of potato takes 25–30 hours and of boro rice 45–50 hours (in low-lying
areas); this implies that buyers of pump irrigation are willing to spend up to Rs 1,000–1,200/acre to
pump-irrigate potato and up to Rs 2,000/acre to pump-irrigate boro rice. They would not be willing
to spend so much unless pump-irrigation productivity is high. Regrettably, in many parts of the
region, the density of diesel pumps is so low that it cannot even support pump-irrigation markets.
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To give a big  kick-start to groundwater-based agricultural transformation in North Bengal,
thus, what is needed is to sprinkle the region with some100,000 diesel pumps. These may cost all
of Rs 150 crores; however, this needs to be stimulated through a part-subsidy loan program since,
left to themselves, the resource-poor farmers of the region may not be able to mobilize investible
capital of this size for a long time. The point is that, 5 years down the line, the Rs 150 crores spent
to day in augmenting the region’s pump capital will produce production and livelihood impacts that
may well pay for the investment several times over, and every year.
                                                                
66Many demand side factors however reduce immediate profitablity of MI investments in hinterland areas. Weak
irrigation-demand conditions, excessive public-policy emphasis on backward linkages in contrast to forward linkages,
underdeveloped output marketing institutions, and low levels of farmer enterprise—all these exogenous factors
influence the actual economic returns generated by MI investments; given these, the financial and economic performance
of MI investments tend, in general, to decline as we move from small to large, from individual or small groups to large
groups of beneficiaries, and as the MI technology chosen for project support becomes progressively unlike the
technologies that farmers in the region choose when using their own resources. Financial and economic performance of
MI investments are also critically influenced by the design and performance of the organizational arrangements for the
management of irrigation assets; in overall terms, there is great scope for overall improvement in this department
through better organizational design and process work.84
Box 21
Irrigation Impact on Crop Production and Farm Income:














before after before after
Wheat 510 678 456 754 233 100–150 580–870 730
Jute 532 498 398 780 191* 150–600 710–2850 1,90
Brinjal 3,00 4,00 2,80 5,10 1,65 50–100 2,50–4900 3,80
Aman
paddy
675 766 452 823 186 100–150 460–690 580
Early aus - 1,00 382 618 236 100–150 590–885 737
Tobacco 400 446 410 412 24 300–400 180–240 210
Potato 6,00 8,40 2,40 6,24 2,62 50–80 3,50–7525 4,85
Chili 9,00 1,20 3,20 1,00 50–70 2,50–3150 2,00
Gourd 1,20 1,20 160–230
Mustard 320 320 320 250–450
Lentil 376 376 300–400
Sesam 380 380  350–500
Benevolent Development Politics
Finally, as we noted, West Bengal’s grassroots politics is far more strongly development- oriented
than in many other States where the Panchayati Raj institutions are not as strong and well-
entrenched as here. The principal weapon that political leaders have to strengthen their mass base
is the resources available under various development programs. Unlike elsewhere, local political
careers are made or marred by the effectiveness with which grassroots politicians are able to
claim and channel resources with maximal beneficial impact on their supporters. In many other
States, such resources tend to get channeled to programs that have little or no livelihood impacts.
However, since West Bengal politics invests considerable power and influence in its local
politicians who are close to the scene of action, the bulk of the resources has been channeled into
MI projects, which have great potential for livelihood impacts. It is therefore plausible to argue
that the resources used to subsidize MI investment have low opportunity costs because, if not MI,
they will be used to subsidize some other developmental activity, which may have lower potential
to generate livelihoods and incomes; and that a) substantial resources are available to a region
from various sources depending upon its level of underdevelopment and poverty; b) in the absence
of a `demand pull,’  a good deal of these resources may end up being allocated to
activities/projects with doubtful livelihood impact; and c) if the grassroots political leaders perceive.
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MI to be a livelihood-intensive sector in a region like North Bengal, based on demands made upon
them by their vote banks, and if they successfully channel these to this sector, they are doing a
great service to the poor people because in the absence of their demand pull, these resources
would have been spent as subsidies in non-livelihood-intensive activities/programs.
In sum, then, subsidization of MI investment in North Bengal seems justified on four grounds:
a) enhanced withdrawal of groundwater and moderate lowering of the groundwater tables might
create positive externality in low-lying and flood-prone areas; b) North Bengal has a huge
unutilized groundwater potential; the region has been amongst the slowest in the country to
translate this resource into livelihoods for the resource poor; and if it succeeds in doing this, there
is unlikely to be any adverse environmental impact; c) the region is so poor and devoid of an
entrepreneurial tradition that left to individual initiative and private capital, its Green Revolution will
for long be held back by scarcity of pump capital; d) the production and livelihood impact that
infusion of pump capital can generate is likely to be large compared to the investment needed to
expand pump capital to requisite scale although the resource-poor farmers on their own may not
be able to mobilize so much capital except over a long period of time; and, finally, e) if
development resources available are not used to subsidize MI capital, it is likely to get used to
subsidize other activities, which may have far lower livelihood potential.
(B) Assessment of the NBTDP’s MI Subsidy Policy
The second class of questions we need to address is about the appropriateness and impacts of the
current subsidy policy: Is the existing design of the NBTDP subsidy policy appropriate, especially
from the viewpoint of the resource-poor farmers’ investment and repayment capacity? Do the
current subsidy arrangement influence the choice of farmers? Is the targeting of the subsidized
schemes right? Does the subsidy policy also affect the choice of irrigation technology by farmers
and government decision makers? Then, does the subsidy policy result in efficient delivery of
irrigation systems? Finally, is the subsidy policy realistic in its assessment of the organizational
preconditions necessary for their efficient and viable operation?
This are involved and complex questions that have driven the core of this study; and in
tackling these, the methodology we have used has been eclectic, using all the resources
available—including, of course, the substantial and excellent literature the NBTDP itself has
helped create on the subject over the past decade—besides using the learning and insights derived
from the author’s own fieldwork and PRAs we have used to test central conclusions of this study.
Tentative responses to some of these questions are scattered all over the earlier sections; here,
we will attempt to pool together some of these to evolve as coherent a response as possible to the
questions raised in this class.
We have already reviewed the NBTDP MI subsidy structure: until the Project discontinued
support to them, DTWs and RLIs—the big MI structures—got away with 100 percent subsidy on
capital cost and around 80–90 percent subsidy on full cost of O&M; in Mini RLIs and MDTWs—
the scaled-down versions of RLIs and DTWs—get 100 percent subsidy on capital cost but no
subsidy on O&M; STW and PDW clusters get 75 percent subsidy on capital cost and none on
O&M cost; HTWs get 90 percent subsidy on capital cost and none on O&M; and treadle pumps
get no direct subsidy, on capital cost or on O&M cost. In addition, the soil-cement distribution86
structures on 4-ha plots were eligible for 50 percent subsidy; but this project has been dropped.
There is also no project subsidy on the fuel- saving device developed and promoted by the Project.
Some aspects that we found striking in the course of our fieldwork—and which we have already
discussed in the main report—can be summarized as follows:
Major RLIs and DTWs
The NBTDP decision to discontinue support to mega DTW and RLIs is very well justified; all the
information we could find—our direct field experience as well as the data furnished by the
administration suggests that these schemes do not—and, in all likelihood, cannot, in North Bengal’s
present conditions—become viable, efficient and sustainable method of  expanding poor people’s
access to groundwater irrigation; experience throughout South Asia has repeatedly shown that: a)
they are technologically too complex and awesome for small farmers to handle; b) the
assumptions made at the time of their planning and design are unrealistic and rarely hold once the
scheme is commissioned; c) their management by public agencies through bureaucratic structures
is invariably bewitched by operator-absenteeism, long shut-down periods, delayed repair and poor
maintenance, fuel or power supply problems, all of these resulting in the actual area commanded
being a small fraction of design command; d) they can become viable and equitable only under an
extremely tight management regime that necessitates a high-calibre user organization rarely found
outside areas (such as North Gujarat) where there is no alternative to deep tube well technology;
e) even after providing 100 percent capital cost subsidy and over 70–80 percent O&M subsidy, if
these schemes help transform their command areas into vibrant and booming agrarian economies,
the subsidies provided can be justified; however, all available evidence indicates that the economic
impacts of these schemes in their commands are far from commensurate with the public
investments made in them; as a result, they are neither financially viable nor economically
justifiable; f) as a consequence, the only logical course open to MI authorities with respect to
major RLIs and DTWs is: stop constructing any more of such schemes, treat past investments in
these as a sunk cost; and try to establish a program to turn over these schemes to farmers in their
command areas
67 or auction them to whoever would buy them.
Mini-RLIs and MDTWs
                                                                
67The most eloquent testimony to the unsustainablity of these systems is the reluctance of farmers in many command
areas to take over their management even if they are given away free to them. This is the case in other States too;
Gujarat has tried for 10 years to turn over its 3,500 public tube wells to farmer groups almost at giveaway—more
recently, at zero—price; and there have been notakers for them. So now, the Gujarat government is hell-bent on getting
them off its back even by selling them through auction to whoever would buy them at any price above zero. A major
reason why farmer groups are unwilling to take them over is that they can never sell water at the government-subsidized
rate and run the systems viably; and farmers used to the opiate of subsidized irrigation for years are unwilling to buy
irrigation at market price even if the quality of subsidized irrigation they get under public management is so poor that it
confines their farm enterprise at a permanently low-level equilibrium..
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The NBTDP subsidy support to mini-RLIs and MDTWs is likely to produce better outcomes than
its support to major DTWs and RLIs in that: a) these schemes are smaller and somewhat simpler
technologically
68, b) the scheme provides for their turnover to a BC as soon as they are
commissioned,c) because of the fewer farmers in their command,it would be easier to build a user
organization that can operate the scheme on a sustainable basis. The threats for the mini-RLI and
MDTW program arise from: a) the ambiguity about the government order stipulating the turnover
of the schemes to BCs, b) the process-intensive organization of users in the command of the mini-
RLIs and MDTWs, c) the high capital cost per family as well as hectare covered by these
schemes, and d) the unfamiliarity of the small farmer and local technicians with the buried pipeline
distribution system, and the consequent difficulty they are likely to encounter in its maintenance
and repair.
STW and PDW Clusters
From the techno-economic and organizational standpoint, we believe that the NBTDP subsidies
are put to best use in STW and PDW cluster schemes; many aspects of this scheme fit farmer
needs and constraints well; a group of four small farmers seems ideally suited to achieve a viable
level of utilization of these systems; the requirement that they contribute 25 percent of the capital
cost helps build solidarity among them and also oblige them to transparently decide the `rules-of-
the-game’ for O&M cost sharing at the outset; small farmer beneficiaries are fully familiar with
the technology involved; they are comfortable about maintenance and repair using largely local
resources and skills; all in all, then, STW and PDW cluster schemes are financially viable and
economically rewarding. A few worrisome aspects of these schemes are: a) the allocation of
budgets between PDWs and STWs, and the allocation of schemes to different areas tend to be
somewhat arbitrary; b) the cost of the system tends to be significantly higher than what farmers
themselves would incur if they were making their own capital investment; c) schemes fitted with
electric pumps seem to run into a variety of problems because of the unreliability of power supply
and the flat system of electricity tariffs; d) because these fit small farmers’ needs well, naturally,
there are pressures from farmers who would normally be ineligible to claim and get benefit of the
scheme; e) there is a propensity amongst the better-off amongst the small farmers to form
`dummy groups’ to claim the subsidy but effectively privatize the scheme; f) however, the
negative equity impacts of such oligarchic propensities are probably far less serious than one
would think and we suggest a broad, holistic outlook towards these
69; g) the problem of choice of
beneficiaries is more serious vis-à-vis the partisan propensity of  Panchayat institution decision
                                                                
68 They use 5 or 8-hp diesel pumps that farmers are familiar with; they also have a smaller and buried PVC pipeline
network with fewer PVC spouts that are cheaper to fix or replace.
69Because of the following reasons: a) of critical importance is the need to increase pump density in a village regardless,
largely, of who owns the pump; (b) a small farmer finds it very difficult to utilize a pump fully on his own land; so he
is anyway under pressure to custom-hire it with others; (c) as a result, even if one of the four members pays the 25
percent contribution on behalf of all the four and claims individual ownership, chances are very high that he will have to
encourage others to use it and share the maintenance and repair costs.88
makers; it is very likely that most of the subsidies are directed towards politically active farmers to
the exclusion of the politically passive; however, there is no easy resolution of this problem except




The problem of choice of beneficiaries is simplest in case of treadle pumps because they enjoy no
subsidy; as a result, there is no concern for misallocation in their case; however, even when they
enjoyed a 50 percent subsidy during 1996, the problem of mis-targetting of treadle pump subsidies
was probably never serious because of the self-selecting nature of the technology; it is of appeal
only to the resource poor who have small parcels of land and are acutely short of capital; thus it is
unlikely that treadle pump subsidies would have suffered mis-targetting; however, a recent small
sample survey carried out by the International Development Enterprises expressly for this study
showed that while farmers who purchased the treadle pump with subsidy and without subsidy
were all small and resource poor, the former were worse-off compared to the latter on several
counts. This is the only piece of concrete evidence to suggest that even such low-cost irrigation
assets can have a price-elastic demand function. The treadle pump technology has already proven
its techno-economic viability in Bangladesh where a million such pumps are in use; however, even
in North Bengal, several sample surveys and field studies have shown the financial viability and
economic benefits of the device for marginal farmers.
HTWs
Hand Pump Tube Wells (HTWs) are a case apart; they are promoted as a  multipurpose device
used for obtaining drinking water as well as for irrigating backyard vegetable gardens in
homesteads; their target is primarily the resource poor women; as a result, rather large subsidies
on HTWs (90% on a unit cost of Rs 3,500) are to be assessed not so much against their
productivity and income impacts but against their contribution to health and sanitation and to
gender equity. There are nevertheless cost-effectiveness issues here; in terms of water output.
The performance of HTWs is as good as that of treadle pumps; however, they cost 5 times as
much. The high cost of HTW is explained by the deeper bore (up to 100 feet or more) and the use
of GI pipes, cast iron head and metal strainer.
71 it is justified on the grounds that HTWs, widely
                                                                
70Political leaders have to be partisan in allocation of subsidies because available subsidy resources are not sufficient to
cover all eligible poor; if subsidy resources for a given scheme were unlimited, there would be no need for them to be
partisan. If subsidy resources are allocated through market-like processes, then the subsidy administrators would
allocate subsidies to those beneficiaries who offer them highest rent (bribe); and if competition amongst administrators
is strong and if subsidies to be doled out are large, then competition would drive the rents down to low levels so that the
resource poor, regardless of their political affiliation, would be able to access the subsidies by paying small rents as has
happened in Eastern Uttar Pradesh in recent years.
71As a result, the bore-well itself costs over Rs 2,500; in contrast, treadle pumps commonly use 15’ bamboo for pipes
as well as for strainer and MS sheet for the head and cost hardly anything..
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used for fetching drinking water need to tap deeper aquifers;
72 women are more comfortable with
hand-operated pumps than foot-operated ones because with the former, they can hold a container
in one hand while pumping with the other; finally, there is an implicit cultural bias against using
foot-operated devices for fetching drinking water. Over the past decade of the NBTDP operation,
thus stylized gender conventions have emerged around the two manual devices: HTWs are the
women’s pump for drinking water located near homesteads and used secondarily for irrigating
vegetable gardens; in contrast, treadle pumps have emerged as a serious irrigation device used
mostly on farms and driven mostly by men. Be that as it may, the HTW program needs some
reexamination on cost-effectiveness grounds. If water quality in upper aquifers is good—or if
there are other technical compulsions to use deeper bores with GI pipes and metal strainer—there
seems no reason why HTWs should cost as much as they do now.
Box 23
Does Subsidy Reach the Poorest?
Results of a Special Survey for those who leased in.
With subsity Without subsity
Sample size 23 20
Amount Paid for the pump 190 375
Installation cost (mean) 136 187
Total cost 326 562
Average land owned (bigha) 3.93 4.46
# Who leased in land (& average bigha*) 6 (2.83) 0.0 (0.0)
# Who leased out land( & average bigha) 1 (3.0) 0.0 (0.0)
Number owning bicycle (%) 11 .48) 14 .70)
No. owning bullocks (av. no./owner) 21 (3) 20 (3)
No. who owned diesel pump 0.0 2
No who owned transistors 2 3
No. who owned spray pumps 2 1
No. ( %) who are Rajbansis 20 (87 %) 15 (75)
Source: A quick survey done by IDE, North Bengal expressly for this study.
Overall, then, there is no gainsaying the need for intelligent subsidies in North Bengal’s MI
development. Even so, there are important issues in the design of subsidies; while some capital
investment subsidy can be justified, it is difficult to justify large subsidies on operating costs as
provided in major DTWs and RLIs; similarly, the rationale underlying different levels of
subsidization for different MI schemes is far from clear, and the arrangement such as obtained at
present might, in fact, be counterproductive; above all, the current scheme of subsidization might
                                                                
72A number of tests have shown water in upper aquifers to face a higher risk of contamination and, in many areas, it is
already unsuitable for human consumption.90
support and encourage a culture of dependency and patronage on the part of the rural poor and
stimulate a profligate, construction-oriented program of MI investment on the part of the
administration, which is likely to be poor value for money from the viewpoint of the tax payer and
donors as well as of the beneficiaries. Three broad apprehensions need to be noted.
Apprehension 1: Sarkar Mai-Baap Syndrome
A major apprehension with the use of subsidies is that they create dependency and stifle
enterprise. A related concern is also about sustainability and endurance of the micro-level change
that subsidies create. Ideally, a capital subsidy serving as a tonic or an elixir should help
beneficiaries rise to a higher trajectory of operation where they will not only mobilize techno-
managerial and financial resources to self-finance O&M but also make replacement investment
when it becomes necessary. When a capital subsidy fails to induce such transition, it results in
dependency. In the NBTDP, this apprehension is most evident in major DTWs and RLIs in which
we found the Sarkar Mai-Baap syndrome deeply entrenched. The beneficiaries of a few of
these whom we visited were blatantly unwilling to contribute to O&M—either through
responsibility for management or through cost-sharing; even in defunct schemes, the beneficiaries
were happy waiting for years before the government recommissioned the schemes rather than
invest in new, superior irrigation alternatives.
The profligacy and myopia produced by the Sarkar Mai-Baap syndrome in MI promotion is
quickly catching up with the Sarkar. As if taking a leaf from the NBTDP book, the newly
announced Ganga Kalyan Yojana of the Government of India stipulates that 25 percent
contribution must come from beneficiaries in all Kalyan schemes and there has to be a loan
component. This has put the Zilla Parishads, Panchayat Samitis and Gram Panchayats in an
awkward position; RLIs and DTWs, which so far went on a 100 percent subsidy basis, will now
have to be redesigned, or better still, given up; in HTW too, beneficiary contribution will probably
have to be increased. Panchayat Samiti, Dhupguri had the issues thrown up by the Ganga Kalyan
Yojana to the people; the Krishi Karmadhyaksha discussed the new conditionality in an open
meeting, appealing to them to adapt to the changing circumstances; but the Praja was in no mood
to let go of the opiate of subsidies they have been addicted to over the past decades.
The experience with mini-RLIs in the current phase is too limited for us to make a judgement
whether these will perform better on these counts.
73 Our judgement is that STW/PDW cluster
schemes do not breed the dependency syndrome because they represent a widely used
technology, they are organizationally simple and robust, and they generate large and early
economic benefits; besides, the design of these schemes as one-shot subsidy support has helped
moderate popular expectations. Treadle pumps, of course do not face this problem at all since it
offers no subsidy; however, even with 50 percent subsidy last year, it had little to worry on this
count because of its low cost and its large productivity benefit relative to its cost. The high HTW
subsidy, however, may create dependency because few resource poor women might buy it in the
                                                                
73The redeeming aspect of these, however, is that they will be handed over to beneficiaries as soon as commissioned;
and there would be no subsidy on O&M costs. The scope these will offer for `dependency building’ will therefore be
limited..
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absence of the subsidy. This might mean that the poorest beneficiaries might give up conked-out
HTWs or expect the government to get them repaired rather than get them repaired with their
own resources. However, evidence so far suggests these apprehensions to be unfounded; and that
a high proportion of HTWs installed remains functional.
Apprehension 2: Subsidy-Induced ‘Money Illusion’
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Another apprehension is about the bias that subsidies tend to introduce in the choices people make
through the creation of a `money illusion’ of sorts. In specific terms, the presence of subsidies
makes government contractors feel that earning margins is easier in a subsidy regime than in the
normal course of business; in MI, thus business would always put pressure on greater allocation of
subsidies to construction components; they would prefer the schemes chosen to be capital-
intensive and large since their margins lie in large schemes with high construction-intensity.
Similarly, beneficiaries too would suffer from a `money-illusion’ created by subsidies; if an asset is
to be available free or at a vastly reduced price, the chances are that they will opt for a costlier
option even if cheaper alternatives could serve the same need equally well. Thus, one reason why
major RLIs and DTWs survived for long was probably that they were far more beneficial to
contractors than treadle pumps, and because farmers are fascinated by complex buried pipeline
networks as long as they do not have to spend on them. Similarly, many beneficiaries we met
preferred the NBTDP to its costly GI pipe STWs although they would themselves build bamboo
bores or use PVC strainers, which are nearly as productive but cost less than a fifth of the
government STWs. Then, in many PRAs, farmers invariably showed a preference for buried
pipeline networks or `pucca’ soil-cement channels although none of the 250 poor and well-off
farmers we interviewed had ever used anything other than kuchcha channels or over-land poly-
pipes to convey water.
75 One might also suspect that both beneficiaries and contractors might
resist cost-efficient improvements in HTWs without any loss of quality; beneficiaries will do so
                                                                
74 `Money Illusion’ is illusion about one’s wealth that is absent; people subject to money illusion tend to spend more
money than they have. In the present context, it may mean that even if a consumer is indifferent between two products
x and y, she may prefer x with a subsidy which makes x cheaper; if x is costlier than y, and if the consumer is indifferent
between the two, she will buy; but if a subsidy makes x cost the same amount as y, she will tend to choose x; even if x
remains costlier than y, she might choose x because of the `money illusion’. The reasons why people prefer hand tube
wells so much compared to TP: (a) it fits their needs better than treadle pump; (b) it comes with a proper tube well
with a metal suction pipe, and a metal pump; (c) it produces high level of money illusion; by chipping in Rs 300, a
beneficiary family gets an article perceived to be worth Rs 3500; where as in the treadle pump, by forking out Rs 500,
they get an article perceived to be worth Rs 500, never mind if the TP is equally or more useful in an intrinsic sense.
75 In one PRA,  we asked farmers whether  they would accept a 100 percent subsidy on poly-pipes or 50 percent
subsidy on soil-cement channel; the smart ones calculated and opted for latter option; but when we asked them to
choose between a one-time 50 percent subsidy on soil cement channels versus 100 percent subsidy on 500 feet of poly-
pipes every alternate year, they  chose the latter. This suggested that farmers behaved `with opportunism bordering on
guile’ when it comes to choosing amongst alternatives in a subsidy regime; they do not necessarily choose the option
that is suited best to their needs; but they try to maximize the subsidy receivable even if it involves forgoing an equally
good but less expensive option.92
because of the `subsidy-induced money illusion;’ contractors will resist because it will mean
reduced margins.
Apprehension 3: Partisan Selection Bias
Yet another apprehension is about the tendency of those in positions of power to allocate subsidies
and select beneficiaries to favor their chosen groups. Equally, there is also pressure from the
powerful and articulate to corner subsidy resources. From the larger social viewpoint, this
tendency is probably harmless as long as those favored satisfy the eligibility criteria; however, if
they result in selection of ineligible beneficiaries, the goal of the subsidy policy gets compromised.
In our assessment, the NBTDP subsidies suffer least in terms of this bias; it is likely that the
Panchayat leaders have influenced the beneficiary selection in favor of eligible families from their
support base; however, there seems little mis-targetting of subsidies to farmers who are otherwise
ineligible for subsidy support. In group schemes such as DTWs and RLI, it may be very difficult to
find a command area exclusively of small and marginal farmers groups; as a result, inevitably,
some medium and large farmers may end up benefiting from subsidy; however, in HTW and
STW/PDW schemes, our assessment is that the subsidy has been targeted to small and marginal
farmers. It is also our view that this has been achieved by close and continuing monitoring of the
beneficiary selection process by the Project Support Unit of the NBTDP.
We would not undermine this achievement, especially since the track record of the
administration and Panchayat institutions in targeting subsidies has not been all that good. In the
main body of the report, we have documented substantial—if qualitative—evidence to show the
frustration of the politically naïve among the resource poorest people with the partisan approach of
the Panchayat leaders in the allocation of subsidies to the politically agile among the poor. The
most widely referred was the case of Gram Panchayat-owned diesel pumps meant for renting to
the poor; every farmer—among the 200-odd we talked to—knew that his Panchayat had pumps
for renting; and none had ever been able to rent any because the pumps were monopolized by the
Panchayat members and their cronies.
(C) Policy Conclusions and Recommendations
From a purely micro-economic analysis, subsidies can seldom be justified except perhaps in the
presence of externalities; yet, development interventions everywhere use subsidies directly or
indirectly suggesting that development planners are governed by a more pluralistic and complex
set of considerations than by the logic of purely micro-economics. In development programing,
subsidies seem justified, for instance, if: a) they help pioneer a new idea (such as the fuel-saving
contraption of the NBTDP); b) they are `minimalist in nature’—that is, they unleash a large
change by removing a minor constraint that keeps it bottled (such as the treadle pump); c) they
have potential for large strategic impact in a society (such as by expanding pump capital in North
Bengal); d) they are appropriately targeted to achieve an important social end (such as of gender
equity through HTW subsidy); e) they are more `additive’—that is, topping up what the target
group is already prepared to incur—and less `substitutive’ that replaces what the target group
would have spent anyway. Most of the NBTDP subsidies can be justified on one or more of these.
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grounds. However, a relevant second-order question is about whether the project gets `the best
bang out of its buck.’
This can be assessed by judging a subsidy program against a set of normative criteria. To
produce the desired impact, in our assessment, a subsidy should: a) be `efficient’—in the sense
that it should be designed to minimize the cost of assisting a beneficiary in the manner defined; b)
be designed to produce sustainable change; that is it should support techno-institutional
interventions that beneficiaries can—and will want to—sustain on their own; c) aim to significantly
address outstanding anomalies and inequities of a society.
Without explicitly stating them, the analysis of the NBTDP MI policy throughout this report
has used these normative criteria to assess it. And, we believe that the NBTDP itself has
implicitly used strikingly similar normative criteria to introduce the changes that it has in recent
years in its MI subsidy policy. Discontinuation of support to major RLIs and DTWs,  abandoning
of the 4-ha scheme, support to mini-RLI with 100 percent capital subsidy but 0 percent O&M
subsidy, etc.—all these changes are based on implicit and explicit analyses that are synced with
our own assessment. We are also in full agreement with several stated and unstated
assumptions/hypotheses on which the NBTDP Phase III has rested—such as, a) the success and
viability of mini-RLI and MDTW will depend crucially on the quality and robustness of the
beneficiary organizations to which they are turned over; b) the STW-PDW cluster scheme should
not be burdened with the buried piped transmission systems; and c) treadle pumps are best left out
of the direct subsidy, etc.
We believe that a reflective incremental approach of this type—in which the Project reviews
periodically the performance of each component and modifies the component mid-project—is a
valid and functional approach of planning and implementing a self-correcting development project.
However, besides using its own feedback loops to improve project performance, the Project also
can—and needs to—constantly assess and learn from what farmers themselves do when their
own resources are at stake, and what other agencies making similar interventions do and with
what effect. We found it striking, for example that Panchayat Samitis provide subsidy support to
even smaller RLIs, which cost at best a quarter of the NBTDP’s mini-RLI; and, when they use
their own money, farmers themselves build even simpler RLIs that have just a pump on the river
bank and a distribution system consisting of shiftable flexible poly-pipe.
76 True, the basic mini-
                                                                
76In some senses, subsidy provided in the NBTDP MI program  on buried pipeline transmission system is the most
problematic; for one, it is the largest cost component in RLIs, DTWs, mini RLI and  MDTW; second, farmers and their
BCs are the least comfortable with is maintenance and repair; third, the most frequent cause of underutilization of these
schemes is the transmission system, which needs expert outside input for fixing; finally, their techno-economic
justification is questionable in a region like North Bengal. Buried pipeline transmission systems are indicated in regions
like Gujarat and Maharashtra where water if often pumped from depths of 800-1,000 feet and is to be conveyed across
undulating terrain. Here, water extraction costs in private as well as social terms are very high; cost of making deep tube
wells is so high that it makes more sense to spend Rs 6–7 lakhs on one tube well and use it for 3,500–4,000 hours/year
than to sink many such tube wells and use them for 1,000 hours a year; buried pipe transmission systems here play
multiple roles: a) channels are often useless here to convey water due to topographic constraints; b) buried pipe
transmission systems help reduce the number of tube wells needed to irrigate a village’s farmland; c) since water is
scarce, the saving of evaporation losses in conveyance through open channels is a major gain in these area; d) because of
high water-extraction costs, energy costs saved are also high. Because of all these reasons, buried pipe transmission
systems are so attractive from financial as well as economic viewpoints that it is common for private farmers to invest94
RLIs have a smaller design command and poly-pipes used by farmers for transmission last all of
12 months; but, ceteris paribus, chances are that Rs 1 million spent on 2 mini-RLIs will produce
less actual area irrigated than if spent on 10 basic mini-RLIs of the type Panchayat Samitis have
supported or to subsidize 75 percent of the capital cost of around 50 super-mini RLIs of the type
that private farmers use.
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Similarly, the Program needs to analyze the full potential offered by the pump-for-rental
scheme adopted by almost all the Gram Panchayats of Jalpaiguri. That so many Gram
Panchayat’s have adopted it suggests their assessment that the critical bottleneck on expanding
MI is not shortage of boreholes but of pumps. If this were true, there is need to assess the merit
of 75 percent subsidy on the cost of STWs and PDWs in the STW cluster scheme. Moreover,
even if the Project wants to continue support for boreholes, it needs to assess whether from the
same budget head for STW/PDW subsidy; it should not reach out a larger number of farmers by
encouraging beneficiaries to build bamboo bores at Rs 1,500 instead of GI pipe STWs costing Rs
18,000.
There is then the question of overall strategy: if pump capital scarcity is the prime bottleneck
on MI expansion in North Bengal, would the project not produce greater strategic impact through
a pure pump-subsidy scheme rather than through spending its limited budget on construction-
intensive MI schemes that devote the bulk of the subsidy funds on structures (such as buried pipe
transmission systems, GI pipe STWs, etc.) that farmers seldom use their own resources to build?
Imagine the STW/PDW scheme modified as follows: any group of four small and marginal
farmers who deposit Rs 5,000 in their Gram Panchayat is issued a delivery order for a diesel pump
set of their choice, a fuel-saving contraption
78 and 500 feet of poly-pipe; the procedure for
approval can be simple and completed at the level of the Gram Panchayat itself or at worst, at the
                                                                                                                                                                                                
in them. None of these reasons is however valid in North Bengal; the topography here is flat so that conveying water
across fields using channels is common; conveying water over long distances is neither economic nor necessary; it is
cheaper to have more boreholes and inexpensive transmission system than an expensive transmission system and a few
bores; the opportunity cost of water lost through evaporation during conveyance is low in North Bengal; and finally,
the cost of water extraction here is amongst the lowest in the country; a 5-hp diesel pump commonly gives a discharge
of  15–17,000 liters/hour; getting the same water output in North Gujarat would need a 15–17.5-hp diesel pump.
Because of all these reasons, the financial as well as economic rationale for investing in buried transmission systems
needs hard rethinking.
77The NBTDP mini-RLI costs around Rs 5 lakhs, have a design command of 20 ha, 3 5–8-hp diesel pumps and a buried
pipe transmission system with 8–14 spouts; Panchayat Samiti-supported basic mini-RLIs cost around Rs 1 lakh, have
a design command of 4–6 ha, one 8-hp diesel pump and  a buried PVC pipe transmission system; farmers’ super-mini-
RLI costs less than Rs 25,000, has a 5-hp diesel pump and 600 feet of poly-pipe; its design command is 3–4 ha. Real
life experience seems to suggest that a mini-RLI with a problematic organization and management system falls far short
of its design command, and a super-mini-RLI of a private water seller will commonly exceed its design command.
78We should think that more than anything else, the fuel-saving contraption developed by the NBTDP is the most
worthy of a subsidy. It is a pioneering innovation that needs wide-scale propagation; farmers are not familiar with its
potential benefits; the fuel saving that its wide-scale use can effect is far more valuable to the society than to the farmers
because the cost of diesel to the country is probably higher than the price farmers pay for it; and the marketing of the
contraption fits very well into a program of subsidizing pumps and poly-pipes..
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Panchayat Samiti level; the farmers can produce the DO before the respective dealer and procure
their pump and poly-pipes. A program such as this can, in our assessment, reach a large number
of small farmers and produce more MI;
79 it will also be more sustainable because, given the
choice of spending a sum of Rs 20,000 on any manner they wish but on MI, chances are that most
small and marginal farmer groups would spend the sum on a pump and poly-pipe.
Better still, we recommend to irrigation administrators and policy makers to give a serious look
to the way the FBS has operated in Eastern Uttar Pradesh, and the variety of MI benefits it has
produced. We firmly believe that a scheme with the following features can produce similar
impacts in North Bengal as well. For this to happen, the key design features of the scheme should
be as follows: a) sufficient resources for subsidy as well as loan should be earmarked to it so that
there is no need for stringent rationing; b) the scheme should give complete freedom to the farmer
to choose any make of engine and pump, and to get a bore made himself rather than insisting that
the government-appointed contractor should do it; c) the application for subsidy-loan should be
submitted at the Panchayat Samiti and processed there itself; d) every branch of the public sector
and cooperative banks should be encouraged to advance loans for diesel pumps; e) there should
be a separate but similar scheme under which Gram Panchayats can acquire pumps for renting
out so that they do not preempt subsidy-loan resources meant for small farmers.
                                                                
79For instance, instead of one major RLI costing Rs 10 lakhs, one can support 66 small-farmer groups of 4 each with  Rs
15,000 pumps plus a poly-pipe subsidy; from one mini-RLI costing Rs 4.5 lakh,s 30 such groups can be supported;
instead of one STW/PDW scheme, 2 groups can get pumps plus a poly-pipe subsidy. From the NBTDP Phase II
budget for  STW/PDW and mini-RLI/MDTW schemes, nearly 1,600 groups each of 4 marginal farmers can be
supported with pumps plus a poly-pipe subsidy.96
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